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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Handicapped children, their families and society are 
frequently in conflict. Families and societies attempt to 
provide for the physical maintenance, emotional welfare, 
medical treatment, and education of their children whose 
physical. mental, or emotional disabilities demand that 
their special needs be met. Although both the family and 
society have a vested interest in preparing these children 
for productive participation in home and community life, 
the problems precipitating conflict are not easily re-
solved: What are the rights, duties and obligations of the 
family, of the child, and of society? The overlap of re-
sponsibilities and the need for cooperation and support for 
each other's effort is obvious. A better understanding of 
these rights and duties is essential in the establishment 
of a framework for the resolution of disputes between 
families and society relative to the handicapped child. 
This understanding can also contribute to the building of 
family strengths and mechanisms for providing more fully 
for the advancement of the child. Community institutions 
l 
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will likewise benefit through the adoption of attitude& and 
Specific programs based upon these understandings. One way 
to achieve an understanding of parental and societal rights 
and duties is to view them from a sound philosophical 
framework, from a perspective. What do we mean by parenting 
and what is special about that function when the chi Id 
being parented is handicapped? 
Parenting handicapped children is a labor beyond love 
or duty and as such must draw upon innate human strengths 
which maintain the will to provide and care for a child 
even when the parent may at times feel at a loss both to 
express love or to feel bound by either that love or by any 
sense of duty as learned in the context of cultural and 
societal expectations. Parenting is as diverse in its 
poss i bi 1 it i es as are the fami 1 i es who experience it. 
Parenting handicapped children entails all of the vicis 
situdes and joys, trials and endearments of otherwise 
"normal" parenting, but everything is magnified, intensi-
fied, and multiplied by the physical, emotional. and 
intellectual abnormalities of the handicapped child. The 
word E~L~~il~~ is a relatively modern coinage and is 
designed to describe what passes from parents to children 
in the way of love, guidance, education, and physical 
maintenance. Its meaning encompasses duties and obliga-
tions as well as rights and privileges; responsibilities 
and worries as well as JOYS and exhilarations. Parenting is 
a never-ending adventure that begins with conception and 
inevitably passes through many trials, but it can just as 
surely be a process filled with satisfying accomplishment. 
Parenting 1s a relational process. To understand 
parenting one must understand the nature of being parented, 
or the process of growth and development of children and 
the effects that parental influences have on children. 
Childhood, implying the position of a child in the parent-
child relationship, also has its rights and privileges as 
well as its obligations and duties and will. as surely as 
parenting, be an experience with both trials and joys. 
Ch i 1 d imp 1 i es offspring of adults, but one must keep in 
mind that children are also born of children. Child is also 
an ageless state 1 ike that of "parent". Although society 
looks upon maturation as the growth from childhood into 
adulthood, parents tend to see their children through all 
the years of growth as still their children. Some children, 
because of their defects, may remain as children mentally, 
emotionally and socially, all of their lives. Some parents 
may seem to become as children emotionally or mentally 
because of mental illness. When otherwise normal parents 
become very old they may require physical care and/or 
emotional support not unlike what parents provide for small 
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a n d s o t h e " pa r e n t " a n d " c h i 1 d " r o 1 e s may children, 
reverse. 
This work will deal specifically with the parenting of 
the handicapped child and will address the conflicts which 
may arise between parents and those outside the home with 
regard to the parenting of the child. A theoretical 
framework based upon a Kantian perspective wi 11 be 
developed in order that the issues of rights and obl iga-
tions of parents, society, and children may be addressed. 
Although cases will be cited and examples which I lust rate 
various situations of conflict will be recounted, it 1s not 
the technical solution of specific problems, but rather a 
theoretical basis for decision-making that is sought. 
Two categories of rights and obligations wi 11 be 
considered, those "natural" and those "legal" on the part 
of each of the subjects, i.e., parents, children, and 
society. The resultant social philosophy is not designed as 
legal theory and does not address many legal questions 
which arise in the various legal systems of states and 
nations. It 1s presented rather as an approach to fa-
milial and societal living with respect to the particular 
issues that handicapped children bring to the attention of 
those who are responsible for their care, education and 
welfare. 
The conflicts between the family and society relative 
to t~e rearing of children with special needs concern 
everyone, whether as a potential parent, a potential tax-
payer. or a potential caregiver. A 1 1 human beings partake 
of the parenting process because the outcome affects 
everyone. The process itself demands the involvement of a 
c 0 mm w n i t y o f p e o p l e . T h e r e i s a r e l a t i on sh i p be t we e n t h e 
parent and the taxpayer because the taxpayer may have to 
pay for the failures of parenting. Each child is a poten-
tial taxpayer or a potential consumer of revenue. The ratio 
of children to adults in a society affects its economy. 
Everyone has an interest in the family process and everyone 
is related in that process because it is the means by which 
human life regenerates itself. 
This work will address the issues of concern to each 
inte~est. When a child is born with an abnormality, or when 
lateT in a chi Id's development an abnormality is evident, 
questions arise in the minds of parents and society. Could 
the =ondition have been prevented? When it does occur, can 
it be alleviated by early intervention? Is the condition 
contagious? Will the child grow and reproduce and possibly 
pas; on the problem to future offspring? What is the risk 
to t~e parents of having a second child with the same 
cond.tion? Can a recurrence be prevented? Was there 
something in the environment which contributed to the 
6 
etiology of the defect? Can this teratogen be eliminated? 
Jf genetically defective children reproduce, will this 
"pollute the gene pool?" What wil 1 be the cost to the 
family and to society for the rearing, education, training 
or 1 0 ng-term care of the child? Who will pay the cost? 
Each party to the parenting process, parents, children 
and ~ociety, has an interst in these questions. Each has a 
perspective based upon how these concerns affect them. How 
each party deals with the concerns will also reflect the 
relo.t ionship it has to the other two parties. Each 1 s 
concerned with its capacity to cope with the problem, the 
cost lo each, the prevention of the problem, or the over-
com 1 n g o f t he prob 1 e m . I n a d e e p e r p s y c h o 1 o g i c a 1 c o n t e x t 
which affects how each of the foregoing questions is 
addressed, each party is subconsciously groping with the 
identity crisis precipitated by the presence of the 
abnormality. The child with the defect is naturally 
concerned about his own identity and where he will fit into 
society, given his abnormalities. The_~l~llQ~ reflect on 
the presence in their family of something different from 
what they see in other families and on how others perceive 
t h e rr i n 1 i g h t o f t h i s a b n o rm a 1 i t y . ~~~~~Qi.LL~~ ma y b e 
comi:;c.ssionate when a defect occurs among them, or they may 
be offended and try to expel the family out of fear or 
igno"ance, thinking that they might themselves in some way 
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become tainted. This societal behavior in turn has an 
effect in turn upon every member of the family, not only 
physically, but emotionally as well. 
Because of the importance of every member of society 
as a contributor and as a receiver of the benefits of human 
a 5 s 0 c i at ion i t i s imper at iv e to est ab 1 sh the r i g ht s , 
duties, and obligations that each has relative to the 
others. In the specific case of the handicapped child and 
his family it is imperative to establish what the rights, 
duties and obligations of society, the child and the family 
are. There is clearly no consensus in the world today with 
regard to these i s sues . I t i s therefore prop o s e d t hat what 
has been written regarding these issues should be examined 
and the conflicts which appear to exist should be analyzed 
from the viewpoint of seeking a resolution to them. 
Through an examination of selected 1 iterature 
addressing conflicts between parents and society with 
regard to the rearing of handicapped children fundamental 
questions which delineate the concerns of each party will 
become evident. It will be necessary to examine writings in 
philosophy, psychology, sociology, medicine, bioethics, 
education and law (comprising examples from case law and 
public policy) as wel as expressions from the lay public 
relative to the conflicts between parents and soc ety 
concerning the parenting of handicapped children. 
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After the presentation of these conflicts, selected 
principles from Immanuel Kant's Fundamental Principles of 
. 1 the Metaphysic of Morals which have specific relevance to 
basic rights and obligations will be discussed. A 
philosophical perspective of the family will be offered in 
order to provide an interpretation of the roles of parents, 
children, and society and their necessary relationship to 
one another. With the aid of the principles offered by 
Kant, some fundamental considerations will be expressed as 
possible guidelines in the formulation of policies for 
society and for the home. 
Given the multidisciplinary nature of this work, it is 
advisable to define terms which are central to the 
discussion. 
Child: all human beings are children and as such have 
a relationship to parents. They may not know who their 
natural parents are. They may have grown up n an 
institution Nonetheless, they have a concept of what 
constitutes a parent, and they will have known some 
influence or guidance of a parental nature We more 
specifically define children as those people who are still 
under the jurisdiction, control or tutelage of parents or 
of those functioning as parents. The parent-child rela-
tionship does not terminate at ~ specific age, nor upon the 
child's leaving the home. Some of the rights, duties and 
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obligations o~ children, parents and society may change at 
particular milestones in human development and upon 
separation. 
E~r.~!:!i: Biological parents, adoptive parents. 
institutional surrogate parents, in some cases relatives 
who function as parents--all may be considered parents. 
There are legal definitions of the responsible parental 
guardian, and accountabilities before the law wi 11 depend 
upon the legal definition. All adults who come in contact 
w i th chi 1 d re n w i I l bear some parent a I asp e ct i n the i r ex 
ample, for better or for worse. In general, the term parent 
in this work will apply to the legal guardian of the child. 
Any exceptions to this definition of 
and clarified. 
will be noted 
Conflict: Any situation presenting a struggle between 
two or more parties. The conflict may not necessarily be 
perceived by all parties. For example, a poor woman may 
repeatedly have illegitimate children in spite of a high 
risk environment or the handicaps of her other children or 
a high risk for recurrence of a defect, and she may be 
perfectly content to continue in her course because of 
increased welfare benefits from the state. She does not 
P e r c e i v e t h e c o n f I i c t , bu t s o c i e t y may s t r on g I y ob j e c t t o 
supporting her practice. The woman may be oblivious to any 
need lo defend her practice. There 1s nonetheless a 
] 0 
conflict between society and what it perceives as an 
undesirable situation. 
The process of conceiving, bearing, 
\ 
nurturing, guiding, educating, disciplining and relating to 
children. In general the parenting process includes 
responsibilities prior to conception, prenatally, and 
throughout the life of the child, but most especially 
during the time the child is in the home or under the 
direct guardianship of the parent who is meeting physical, 
emotional, intellectual, social, and spiritual needs. The 
basic element of parenting is the provision of shelter, 
nutrition, love, social guidance, and education. 
Any condition, be it physical or 
psychological. genetic or acquired, which renders the 
individual in need of special consideration for purposes of 
education, community access, vocation, or social relations 
constitutes a handicap. 
All individuals. groups, or governmental 
bodies outside of the home. The home is nonetheless a part 
of society within which there may be a functional inner 
society known as the family. This society includes siblings 
and other relatives or individuals living in the home. The 
fami! ial society may extend beyond the walls of the home to 
the homes of other relatives who are a part of the extended 
family relationship and have, by virtue of their kinship 
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through blood or marriage, a special interest in the family 
beyond what the rest of society would have. 
The Law: This must be defined in several categories. 
l. Those laws and regulations which are statutory and 
which directly govern the affairs of society. 
2. Those guidelines that fami 1 ies may decide they wish 
to accept as necessary for the governance of the 
home. 
3. Societal mores which influence the way in which 
people relate to one another and which may also 
influence the judicial interpretation of statutory 
law. 
4. Those guide! ines which are considered acceptable 
professional practice by a particular professional 
body, i.e. medical educational psychological. 
legal, social work, etc. 
5. Those natural and universal laws of human existence 
the violation of which 1s disadvantageous to 
individuals and society. 
6. Those religious laws which individuals, families or 
communities may accept as valid and which may 
influence their actions. interpretation of events 
or circumstances. and self image. These laws wi 11 
vary from individual to individual, family to 
family, and community to community, and varying 
l 2 
degrees of faith in them will be evident. They 
may, however, have a high degree of influence upon 
the reactions of individuals or groups to such 
things as handicaps <"Who sinned, the man or his 
2 parents?") and upon parental accountabilities. 
A word of caution to the readers of this work: It 
deals with many controversial subjects Some of the 
concerns reflected are deeply rooted in the nature of human 
existence and derive from cultural and societal mores as 
well as individual and group beliefs which are dear to 
those who hold them. Case presentations are textual and 
discussions expound a variety of views. Some appear as 
highly authoritative and are supported by sound research. 
Some are highly opinionated and reflect traditional and 
non-traditional belief systems. No one reading this work 
should conclude that the author subscribes to any of the 
positions taken unless they are specifically detailed as 
the author's position. There should also be no conclusion 
by, nor any offence to any individual or group because of 
any association of circumstances. For example. a detailed 
description of a family with a handicapped chi Id which is 
also in poverty or of a particular race should not suggest 
that there is any necessary correlation between the con-
dition of the child, the race, or the socio economic 
status. If valid statistics should be cited to indicate a 
l 3 
correlation, then some conclusion might be in order. 
Because the literature reviewed in this work is selected 
for the purpose of elucidating specific areas of conflict 
it does not necessarily represent the total picture of any 
of the situations dealt with. Some of the literature, in 
spite of highly recognized and authoritative sources, well-
documented research and valid statistics, nonetheless 
betray the authors' bias concerning cultures, handicaps, 
races and gender. These works are especially valuable 
because they help in the endeavor to understand the roots 
of much of the conflict being discussed if only they are 
viewed with a critical eye. Some works may appear to 
reflect bias where no bias exists, but rather the facts may 
be offensive to those who feel addressed. The reader should 
proceed with an open mind and be prepared to see through 
unsound arguments and the reader's own biases. 
CHAPTER Z 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature which addresses the concerns of 
handicapped children and their families often takes into 
account the conflicts and the potential for conflicts 
between society and families rearing children with 
handicaps. The literature which addresses issues of 
familial and societal rights and duties in relation to 
children in general may also have significant implications 
in matters of concern to the special populations examined 
in this work in several ways. First, handicapped children 
are, like all children, persons under the law and have an 
equal right to the benefits of the law. Second, all 
children have the potential to become handicapped and all 
people capable of bearing or adopting children are 
potential parents of handicapped children. Children who are 
impaired or disabled constitute at least ten percent of all 
American children and whatever is done in schools, 
hospitals and social service agencies has an effect upon 
them. Disabled children also constitute a "minority group" 
and as such are affected by laws and social attitudes that 
14 
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are directed toward minorities. Many of the problems faced 
by handicapped children and their families are not directly 
related to the handicapping conditions of the children, but 
are rather the result of the fears, prejudices and 
attitudes of other members of society. This negative 
outlook is potentially a source of conflict, and it is the 
subject of a collection of literature of significance to 
this work. 
In order to limit the extent of this review and still 
adequately represent the main components of the subject, 
literature will be examined from five areas: psychosocial, 
educational, sociolegal, philosophical and parental. There 
will be an overlap of the concerns addressed in these areas 
because each field has components of the other four. This 
approach will provide a selective review of works from the 
recent past which will give the reader sufficient 
information to understand the basic issues and concerns at 
the root of conflicts between society and families with 
handicapped children. 
Psycho-Social Literature 
Parents of handicapped infants evince an emotional 
sequence of disappointment, denial, anger, and guilt. This 
16 
sequence sets the stage for conflicts between fami 1 ies and 
society according to Holt, Legeay and Keogh, Klaus and 
Kenne 1 1 • d M 
. },4,5,6 
an ar1on. 
In 1975, Drotar, al. described a series of stages 
that parents pass through in adapting to the birth of a 
handicapped infant: shock, den i a 1, anger, sadness or 
anxiety, and finally, adaptation. According to Canning and 
Pueschel. handicapped infants violate parental expectations 
of rear i n g a nor ma 1 , we 1 1 - fun c t i on i n g c h i 1 d . Be ca us e 
interaction patterns between parents and infants are more 
problematic as a result of the limited abilities of the 
handicapped infants, there is a pattern of reduced 
responsiveness during social interchanges This is 
confirmed in studies by Vietze et al., Rutter, Tallman, 
d P k 7,8,9,JO an ar e Chronically handicapped children impose 
long-term and continuing care-giving demands which may 
u 1 t i mate 1 y n e c es s i tat e i n st i tut i o n a 1 i z a t i o n . The r e i s 
almost always an escalating anxiety about the cost of 
providing for the child. According to Gumz and Gubrim, 
fathers in particular are more concerned about future 
problems such as economic and social dependence and legal 
and educational issues than are the fathers of non-
handicapped children. 11 This is also confirmed by the work 
l 2 
of Meyer et. al. Gumz and Gubrim find that the nature of 
concern evinced varies according to the sex of the parent. 
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Fathers voice instrumental concerns, especially cost issues 
and the abi ity of the child to be self-supporting. 
Mothers. on the other hand, experience an explicit crisis 
and indicate concern about the emotional stress of caring 
for a handicapped child. 11 
How parents adapt to the stressful event of the birth 
of a handicapped child may depend upon how they perceive 
the event and to what they might attribute the cause of the 
defect. The course of adaptation is explored by Afflect, 
Allen. McGrade, and McQueeney. 1 } They find that what the 
mothers of infants with severe perinatal complications 
believe to be the cause of the infants' medical problems 
affects their mood and their expectation of what care-
giving-related difficulties they might anticipate. How a 
mother views the cause of her child's defect strongly 
influences her approach to the care of the child. Some 
mothers speculate that their children's defects might have 
been caused by something they themselves did (e.g., sex 
during pregnancy, excessive exertion, smoking>. Others 
speculate that someone else did or did not do something 
<e.g .. obstetric error, insufficient stimulation in the 
intensive care unit> or chance <"just one of those things 
that happen">. Those who blame themselves for their 
infants' problems report a stronger conviction that their 
infants' recovery and future condition are dependent on 
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their own actions and that similar problems might be 
prevented in future deliveries. Others who attribute a 
greater role to chance report less personal control over 
their infants' recovery and over prevention of similar 
problems in the future. Blaming others seems to be 
unrelated to controlled cognitions. According to Tannen, 
AfflecK, 14 and Mershmen, a greater perceived severity 
produces greater self-blame, which in turn plays an 
indirect role in emotional adaptation through its 
association with the belief that a recurrence of the 
negative event might be prevented. Tannen, ~i !.1_. suggest 
that self blame may have a "potential healing role for some 
victims of adversive life events." 
Parents may derive their perceptions of a handicapping 
condition from their own rearing, and this will then affect 
how they will approach their own children. 
The stress of having an infant with a handicap sets 
the stage for conflict with those outside the family who 
play a role in caring for that child. 12 The birth ~f a 
handicapped child may also set the stage for conflict 
between mothers and fathers. According to research by Holt 
and Meyer, in spite of the increased need created by the 
birth of a handicapped infant, fathers of retarded infants 
and children do not show an increased participation in 
child care. 3 • 15 In fact, the extent to which fathers of 
19 
retarded children participate in care-giving activities is 
less than might be expected. Stoneman, Brodey, and Abbott 16 
find that mothers assume the role of teacher more 
frequently in a structured interaction situation than do 
fathers when there is a handicapped infant in the family.IO 
But mothers and fathers do not differ in the extent of 
their teaching in families of non-handicapped children. A 
more recent study by Bristol and Gallagher 17 shows that 
both mothers and fathers report that fathers assume less 
responsibility for total tasks in families of 
developmentally disabled children than do fathers in 
families of non-handicapped children. Nonetheless, father 
assistance with non-handicapped siblings does not differ 
with cross-family types. 
Michael Lamb 19 suggests that diminished father 
participation reflects the fact that fathers derive less 
satisfaction from retarded than from normal children and 
that paternal response--unlike maternal response--is 
discretionary. The maternal role is defined in such a way 
that fathers may increase or decrease their participation, 
depending upon their preferences and satisfactions, whereas 
mothers are traditionally expected to be equally committed 
to all of their children--regardless of personal pre-
ferences or the individual characteristics of their 
children. A number of studies demonstrate that ~pousal 
zo 
support is an important correlative of both parental 
competence and infant development. Trause and Kramer, 19 in 
an interview study of parents of pre-term and full-term 
infants, find that maternal adjustment difficulty is 
related inversely to father sensitivity to their spouses' 
needs and feelings. As does the birth of a pre-term infant, 
the birth of a handicapped infant often has a negative 
impact on a marital relationship. A number of investigators 
find extensive marital and familial conflict is a result of 
the birth of a retarded or handicapped child. Holt, 
Lonsdale, Tew, ~i ~l· }, 2 0, 2 l find that mothers of 
developmentally disabled children report less satisfactory 
marital adjustment than mothers of non handicapped 
children. However, Tew~~· find that the fathers of the 
two groups do not differ and speculate that dissatisfaction 
may in part be mediated by the lower level of expressive 
support--emotional, intellectual, and recreational--that 
the mothers of developmentally disabled children perceive 
that they receive from their husbands. Among United States 
parents of children five years old or less, divorce or 
separation rates for parents of handicapped children are 
nearly twice as high as are divorce or separation rates for 
parents of normal children. Rates are highest among 
families with low income and low education levels; however, 
as Bristol comments: 
Zl 
... separation and divorce are seldom due entirely to 
the stress of the handicapped chi Id. lt appears that 
marital breakdown is most likely to occur in families 
which are experiencing personal or financial 
difficulty before the birth of the child, and those in 
which the child was conceived premaritally, and those 
in which the care of the defective child is not a 
shared value, or in those where the demands of the 
handicapped child outstrip the available resources 1 ~f the family and the services found in the community. 
Tew, ~i al. find that in England parents of spina 
bifida infants were divorced nine times more often than 
were their age counterparts, assessed ten to twelve years 
after delivery, while couples whose spina bifida infants 
were stillborn had divorce rates three times as high as 
1 8 their age counterpart. Tew also reports that divorced 
fathers are I ikely to remarry, while their ex-wives, who 
usually retain custody of the handicapped child, do not. lt 
is clear that women in particular assume a disproportionate 
share of the burden. They feel ultimately responsible for 
the child, whereas the fathers believe that they have a 
choice. 
Families do not exist as units independent of other 
social organizations within society. Thus, families need to 
be viewed within their social context and a recognition of 
the role of the community as a modifier of family modes of 
interaction is necessary for an adequate understanding of 
the process of parenting a handicapped child. According to 
Holt, society plays a significant role in modulating 
zz 
interaction patterns in families of handicapped children. 
An appreciation of the problems associated with the care of 
these types of children is necessary in order for society 
to relate appropriately to the family.' 
There are generally two kinds of support systems which 
operate to alleviate the difficulties of rearing a 
handicapped child: those which are formal, such as health-
care facilities, social service agencies, and recreational 
facilities; and those which are informal, such as extended 
families, neighbors 22 and co-workers. But where these 
extra-familial systems are inadequate or are reflective of 
prejudice and ignorance which do not allow appropriate 
support, conflicts may arise between families and these 
institutions. In some cases, no matter how adequate the 
support systems are, the families will have difficulty 
accepting their help, and conflicts may arise. 21 
A longitudinal project by Parke and Tinsley revealed a 
number of differences in the patterns of social-support 
utilization among families of handicapped and normal 
children. 2 ' At regular intervals parents completed a social 
support questionnaire which recorded the extent to which 
families used either informal or formal support agents. The 
researchers recorded the parents' stated reasons for 
utilizing each of the support services, that is, whether it 
was for social, emotional, informational, or physical 
assistance. They found marked differences between maternal 
and paternal utilization of support services. As other 
studies have also revealed, these questionnaires showed 
that mothers visit and phone relatives and friends more 
often than fathers do. The mothers made more contacts with 
informal networks than fathers did. for information 
purposes or for assistance with home baby care, for 
alleviating worry or consternation about their babies, and 
for relaxation and enjoyment. In general, mothers utilized 
informal networks more than fathers did. It was reported 
that parents of handicapped children seek information more 
often from professional or social service agencies than do 
parents of normal children. This finding was qualified by 
the fact that the fathers of handicapped children sought 
information from formal support agencies more often than 
did fathers of normal children during hospitalizations. 
Mothers, however, did not differ. Mothers of handicapped 
children did not differ from mothers of normal children in 
their contact with support services. Social networks are 
particularly important sources of assistance to families 
trying to cope with and adapt to handicapped infants and 
children. 24 However, a number of studies have documented 
that these families are socially isolated. One study by 
McDowell and Gabel found significantly inadequate social 
net~orks for parents of mentally retarded infants as com-
24 
pared to the social networks available to a contrasting 
group of parents of normally developing infants. 25 The 
inadequacy was attributable to smaller extended kinship 
networks. There were many reasons given for this isolation. 
First. the families were found to be too emotionally and 
physically exhausted to maintain ties with friends and 
relatives because of the heavy care-giving demands placed 
on parents by a handicapped infant. This burden restricted 
the amount of time available to spend with friends and 
relatives. Second, the assumed stigma of a retarded child 
in the family led parents to avoid outside social contacts. 
Third, outsiders may have ostracized the family of the 
retarded person they could neither accept nor understand. 
Relatives, and even grandparents, may be less capable 
of providing emotional support when a retarded or 
handicapped infant is born, partly because of their own 
consternation and grief on learning that their own 
grandchild is handicapped. Grandparents may themselves need 
support and may become an additional burden for the 
parents. Also, many potential social support agencies in 
the informal network, such as friends or relatives, may be 
less capable of providing assistance and care for the 
handicapped child because specialized arrangements for 
these kinds of children are required. 26 
The hospital is first among formal support systems for 
families of handicapped children although there are many 
other facilities offering intervention programs for 
retarded and handicapped infants and children. According to 
Pascoe, few of these programs are family-oriented but focus 
instead on the mother. Many programs designed for parents 
are functionally mother programs, because they are often 
held at times inconvenient for fathers, and they tend to 
address mothers' Z7 concerns. Thus, i t is not surprising 
that father participation 
ited. According to Meyer, 
in these programs is very lim-
l 2 Vadasy, Fewell, and Schell, 
fathers have difficulty in adjusting to and accepting the 
birth of a retarded, handicapped child, and it is, 
therefore, important to include fathers in intervention 
efforts. Few programs designed to offer supportive services 
to parents and specifically to fathers, have been 
developed, and the capability of formal institutions to 
deal with the stresses that families with handicapped 
children suffer is limited. The stage for conflicts with 
families is thus set. 28 
Advances in medical technology over the past two 
decades have significantly enhanced our ability to detect 
fetal abnormalities at an early stage of development. 
According to Phillip, psychological evaluation of the 
impact of these diagnostic screening programs on families 
Z6 
ha& not kept pace with medical advances in the detection of 
them.z9 Much more needs to be learned about the impact of 
earlY screening on maternal and family adaptation during 
pregnancy and about ways to decrease the negative emotional 
side effect of early detection as well as to increase ways 
of assisting families to cope more effectively with the 
prospect of giving birth to an infant at risk for 
retardation, impairment, or physical defect. 
According to Affleck, Allen, McGrade and McQueeney, we 
need to learn more about what determines parental attitudes 
toward those they deem medically responsible for the 
development of the fetus and what expectations of the 
infallibility of physicians parents have. 1 ' Parents who 
blame medical experts for the less than normal condition of 
their newborns are hampered from the beginning in their 
effort to adapt to their child's affliction. Modification 
of parental attributions of blame by means of education in 
both the pre-natal and post-natal periods might help 
parents to adapt to their child's handicap more adequately. 
Families are changing in that they are able to deal with 
abnormality. According to Polkowitz, in the last two 
decades, mothers and fathers have redefined their family 
roles.z 5 Shifts in sex role, etiology, work patterns for 
men and women, and age and timing of parenthood have 
combined to alter the social atmosphere in which men and 
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women undergo the transition to parenthood. How fathers and 
mothers react to the birth of a handicapped child has also 
t 1 . fl d b . t 1 . . }O changed, and is s rong Y in uence y soc1e a op1n1on. 
According to Bloom-Feshbach, the use of social network 
agents outside the nuclear family is negatively correlated 
with the fathers' participation in child care. The pattern 
of isolated family units separated by great distances from 
blood relations that is characteristic of contemporary life 
in America may be responsible for greater participation by 
fathers. Several social trends, then, have converged to 
create conditions which have influenced fathers to 
participate to a greater extent in care-giving 
t . . t. }I ac 1v1 1es. 
Studies contrasting the relative influence of home and 
school on childrens' intellectual and educational 
achievements strongly suggest that the influence of the 
home is comparatively greater in the early years. 32 • 33 • 34 
Children who come from homes where the parents take an 
active interest in the child's education tend to have 
higher school achievement. These studies have been for the 
most part carried out with normal children, but there is 
evidence that the relationship between parental interest in 
education and the chi Id's achievement in school is 1 ikely 
to· be even more marked when the children are handicapped. 
Parents need to be made aware of the precise teaching 
28 
method& and strategies used by teachers and other 
professionals to achieve particular teaching goals. For 
example, it is important that the parents and the teachers 
adopt consistent approaches to helping a child learn to 
feed and dress himself, and in encouraging him to use 
longer sentences or in dealing with behavioral 
difficulties.}Z Such new methods need to be discussed and 
agreed upon by teachers and parents so that at the very 
least each is aware of the approach being taken by the 
other.} 5 
In spite of the fact that a growing number of studies 
and editorial comments from professional educators 
emphasize parental participation in their children's 
educational process, the literature discussing parental 
attitudes continues to record parental anxiety and 
frustration in dealing with professionals engaged in the 
education of handicapped children. According to 
Braunfrenbrenner and Cantrell, it is now recognized that 
the education of handicapped children has to be seen in a 
broader context than that of the schools alone.} 6 ,} 7 This 
conclusion contrasts with the traditional approach in 
which the individual child is the main focus of attention. 
More recent recommendations emphasize that education in 
the broad sense must encompass the whole range of 
29 
environmental contexts that influence the child's 
J7 
development. 
Psychologists see the psychosocial costs of disability 
as the root cause of many conflicts between families and 
society. A child with continuing problems places stresses 
on a family which may result in pathological responses from 
other family members and 1 imitations on family 
}8 lifestyles. Some of these stresses are a result of 
economic costs, others are not. The need to earn more money 
to cover the cost of a child's disability or the need to 
limit a family's size because of these costs can have a 
detrimental effect on family relationships. Other 
psychosocial costs, however, stem from non-economic 
societal reactions to disability, which are stigmatizing 
and victim-blaming. J 9 Much of the early literature on 
disability emphasized these negative effects without not-
ing any of the more positive aspects of life for the 
disabled child. Indeed, more recent studies have shown that 
a disabled child may also have a positive effect on family 
integration and the mental health of other family 
members. 40 One of the most pervasive psychosocial 
difficulties secondary to having a child with a disability 
is the sadness and desolation of parents because their 
child is not "normal." This acute grief reaction by parents 
to the birth of a disabled chi Id may be short-lived. 
}0 
Olshansky has argued that parents continue to experience 
"chronic sorrow" for the rest of their lives. 41 Although 
this may not have a major impact on the family's lifestyle 
or their love for the disabled child, its cumulative 
emotional cost to parents may be great. 
Because of the extra attention required by a disabled 
child, siblings may receive less attention from their 
parents than they require. The disabled child's medical 
expenses may also leave less in the family budget for 
siblings' needs. 41 Some of the other common costs to 
siblings of having a disabled brother or sister include 
unrealistically high parental expectations, extra respon-
sibilities at home, and fears related to their sibling's 
d . b·1•t• 42 isa 1 1 ies. There i s some disagreement among 
professionals over these effects. Powell and Ogle contend 
43 that siblings can be significantly adversely affected. On 
the other hand, McMichael and Shipper have indicated that 
siblings are not necessarily adversely affected by the 
presence of a brother or a sister with a disability, and 
many, in fact, may benefit from the experience. 44 · 45 
Neugarten noted in his classic study of American 
attitudes toward disability that stigmatization 
predominates. 46 Those who act differently or appear to be 
different are likely to be shunned or to encounter only 
pseudo-acceptance by "normals." Parents and other family 
members of the disabled are also likely to bear "courtesy 
stigma" that limits their possibilities for full social 
. . 46. 47 partic1pat1on. 
Professional reactions to parents of children with 
disabilities often take the form of victim-blaming. When 
parents seek help for their children's problems, they are 
often treated as though they, and not their children. were 
the patients or clients. Parents who seek a second medical 
opinion, for example, are commonly labeled as poorly-
adjusted or unable to accept their child's condition. 48 In 
the victim-blaming perspective, parental help-seeking is 
believed to derive from the parents' guilt for having given 
birth to a defective child rather than from a real need 
based on a lack of societal resources. 49 A second attitude 
that is sometimes encountered by parents seeking help is 
professional dominance, which prevents the parents from 
being in control of their own child's care. 50 This pattern 
is extensively outlined by Darling. The first psycho social 
"cost" of victim-blaming and professional dominance that 
parents face, Darling calls ~rr~~i~. or a sense of 
meaninglessness and powerlessness created by professionals 
reluctant to provide diagnostic and prognostic 
information. 51 Not knowing what is wrong with their child 
or how their child's disability will affect his future 
functioning is usually very stressful to parents. Lack of 
}2 
information can lead to lengthy parental quests through a 
multitude of lay and professional sources. Negative 
encounters with professionals often continue throughout the 
childhood period. After they have obtained satisfactory 
medical care for the child, parents may have to fight for 
an appropriate educational placement or, later, for 
vocational services. This continuing quest for services is 
likely to be time-consuming, difficult, and stressful for 
parents. 
Another source of conflict between families and 
professionals stems from advances in medical technology. 
Health care has developed to the point where we no longer 
ask, "Can we provide treatment?" but rather, "Should we 
provide treatment?" Before scientific developments brought 
treatment capabilities to the present level, we were not 
faced with the issue of deciding who should receive 
treatment. According to Polier, professionals exercise "all 
but unchecked discretion in determining to whom services 
shall be given, and from whom they shall be withheld." 52 
According to Mearig, the individual professional ultimately 
controls the quality of services rendered. 53 
Legal Literature: Children's Rights 
There is no consensus in the legal literature as to 
what precisely the rights of children are. Foster and Freed 
see children as persons and declare that the status of 
minority should be done away with. 54 They feel that 
children should be legally liberated in the same sense that 
slaves and married women have been emancipated. According 
to Farer, paternalism is detrimental to the welfare of 
children because it impairs the ability of those having 
authority over children to recognize and express children's 
needs. 55 Because of the need to ensure children's welfare 
in spite of their parents' failures, Foster and Freed as 
well as James are advocating a stronger establishment of 
children's rights and their right to egal 
. 54,56 T t representation. he mos famous landmark case 
establishing a child's right to representation is that of 
57 l~-L~-~~~li· Subsequent to this case, courts have 
generally agreed that children have the right to due 
process and that their rights cannot be abridged simply 
because they are in a juvenile system. Thus, there should 
be checks upon the arbitrary exercise of either parental or 
public authority, and children's welfare should no longer 
33 
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be regulated by gratuitous assumptions. According to Allen, 
the earens patriae power is not a blank check. 58 The most 
extensive intrusion of government into family life has 
been. according to Professor Sanford N. Katz, with 
reference to the parent-child relationship, and this 
intrusion is most often seen in poor families. 59 According 
to Rubin, government is now more frequently challenged to 
examine the consequences of state intervention and consider 
instead the maintenance of the family's status quo. 60 Some 
of the basic rights of children described in legal 
literature include the right to receive parental love and 
affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow to maturity 
in a home environment which enables the child to develop 
into a mature and responsible adult, to be supported, 
maintained, and educated to the best of parental ability. 
In return the child has a moral duty to honor his father 
and mother. He should be regarded as a person within the 
family, at school and before the law. He should receive 
fair treatment from all in authority, be heard and listened 
to. earn and keep his earnings, seek and obtain medical 
care and treatment and counseling. 61 The legal literature 
also discusses the importance of emancipation from the 
parent-child relationship when the relationship has broken 
down and the child has left home to escape abuse, neglect. 
serious family conflict, or for other sufficient cause, and 
when his best interests would be served by the termination 
of parental authority. 62 Other rights expressed include 
freedom from legally imposed disabling or incapacitating 
restrictions except where it can be convincingly shown that 
such restrictions are necessary for the protection and best 
interests of the child. He is entitled to the right to 
receive special care, consideration, and protection in the 
administration of law or justice in order that his best 
interests may remain paramount. Watson has provided an 
extensive documentation of the need of a child for parental 
love. 65 The difficulties attending presumption of parental 
love are delineated by Foster and Freed. 6 } According to 
Lewis and Mass and Engler, in order to abridge parental 
rights, there must be reasonable alternatives to parental 
authority. The lack of assurance that placement outside the 
home would be any better for an unhappy child may preclude 
termination of parental custody solely on the basis of 
emotional abuse. 62 • 64 With reference to the parents' right 
to give and the child's right to receive discipline and 
guidance, there is a great deal of subjectivity and 
latitude which leaves difficult decisions up to the courts 
or caseworkers. Methods of discipline differ, and parents 
tend to repeat those that they were subjected to in their 
own youth. More recent decisions have limited the parental 
privilege of corporal punishment and have commented on its 
}6 
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necessity as well as its excess. The concept of parental 
love is generally defined as the affectionate relationship 
between those who stand in the positions of parent and 
child. This does not necessarily mean biological parents 
and chi Id. It may mean those who have such a psychological 
relationship. This ongoing, nurturing care and attention 
.not of biological kinship defines real mother love as 
distinguished from fantasy. Courts have supported the 
priority of foster parents when they are preferred and if 
they should choose to petition for adoption. According to 
Foster. the mother should not be permitted to belatedly 
revoke her formal surrender for adoption once the child is 
in a 63 loving home and bonds of attachment have developed. 
The child's right to support, maintenance and 
education are usually defined in terms of parental duty. 
English legal literature enumerates three duties owed by 
parents to a child: to provide maintenance, protection. and 
education. Nonetheless, these duties are not enforced by 
effective legal sanctions. Today, most states can enforce 
the obligation of child support through criminal and civil 
actions. According to Krause, illegitimate children now 
have most of the same rights accorded to legitimate 
children. The child's right to be regarded as a person is 
basic to the other rights which follow. 61 A great deal of 
the difficulty parents have with minors is caused by the 
)7 
refusal to accept them as individuals with their own needs, 
interests, and desires. Children may become scapegoats for 
frustrated adults who relieve their own sense of 
inferiority by treating children as things. To fail to 
treat a minor as a person in home, at school, or before the 
law is to deny his humanity. Thoughtful adults will 
presumably accept fairness as a general principle. 
According to Forer, fair treatment is a legal essential for 
children. 55 This was established clearly in the Gault case. 
According to Midonick, the essentials of fairness must 
necessarily be observed throughout the process of juvenile 
justice, and juveniles must be treated as people. It would 
be unfair to deny a youth his right against self-incrimi-
nation, the right to notice. the right to counsel, the 
right to confrontation, and other rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution simply on the theory that he is receiving help 
in a juvenile system rather than punishment. 66 Such were 
the issues in the Gault case. 
hiterature of the Philosophical Perspective 
The most basic issue discussed in philosophical 
literature which touches upon conflicts between families 
and society relative to the rearing of handicapped children 
is the basic principle of "childhood", that is. what kind 
II h'ld • 67 
'Of "person a c 1 is. In general, philosophers have 
debated what kind of beings can be accorded what kinds of 
rights. Adults may behave in a certain way towards children 
with the intention of benefiting them through a 
paternalistic approach based upon the assumption that the 
differences between children and adults require that 
approach. Some would question whether or not the 
paternalistic approach is justified simply because children 
are less capable than adults. 68 • 69 • 70 Bernard Gert and 
Charles Culver discuss paternalism and define it as: "A is 
acting paternalistically toward S if and only if A's 
behavior <correctly> indicates that A believes that: l> his 
action is for S's good, 2) he is qualified to act on S's 
behalf. and}) his action involves violating a moral rule 
or doing that which will require him to do so with regard 
to S. 4) he is justified in acting on S's behalf indepen-
dently of S's past, present or irrvnediate forthcoming (free, 
}8 
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informed consent>. 5> S believes (perhaps) falsely that he 
<S> generally knows what is for his own good." 71 Gert and 
Culver remarked. "We can be paternalistic only toward 
those whom we regard as believing themselves to be capable 
of acting on their own behalf." 72 These authors conclude 
that those who appear to be acting paternalistically 
generally do not believe they are acting paternalistically 
at a l 1 , s imp l y because they do not be l i e v e that tho s e 
towards whom they act paternalistically are capable of 
thinking, at least initially, about what is in their best 
interest. This attitude is in concert with the expressions 
of John Locke: 
The power, then, that parents have over their 
children arises from that duty which has been 
encumbered upon them--to take care of their 
offspring during their imperfect state of 
childhood. To inform the mind and govern the 
actions of their yet ignorant non-age until reason 
shall take its place and ease them of that trouble 
is ~~at the children want and the parents are bound 
to. 
The determination that children are in need of paternal 
guidance may be based upon two assumptions. First, that 
they lack moral responsibility (a person may be described 
as morally responsible if and only if he or she is rational 
or capable of being rational; and second, the factual claim 
that children are not rational. 
40 
To associate being rational with being moral has roots 
in the Kantian tradition of ethics. John Rawle, for 
example, has followed that perspective and combined it with 
Piaget's three specific successive stages of moral 
development, the first being morality of authority, the 
second being morality of association. and the third being 
the morality of principles. The stage of morality of 
principles is the only stage in which, according to Rawls, 
a person has a true "sense of justice," the only stage in 
which he or she is acting on rational principles, and thus 
children cannot be held morally responsible until they 
reach an age at which they can reason and act rationally, 
or rationally determine on what principles they ought to 
act. 74 In this perspective is included the concept that the 
child is developing into a normal human adult and a state 
that, according to Hamlyn, "ought to be reached." 7 ' Toulmin 
finds this attitude vague and intuitive and further states: 
Our choice of 'stages' in psychology will be at 
least as value loaded as the same choice in 
developmental physiology; it commits us to some 
general view about the capacities which it is 
desirable for adolescents to develop--and so t96an 
ethical opinion about the 'true' nature of man. 
According to Rawls, "while individuals presumably have 
varying capacities for a sense of justice, this fact is not 
reason for depriving those with a lesser capacity for a for 
41 
8 sense of justice of the full protection of justice."
74 
Thus, the handicapped become equal partakers of the just 
rights in society. 
Philosophy Professor Joel Feinberg categorizes rights 
into three groups--those which are common to adults, those 
which are common to children, and those which are common to 
77 
children and adults. For example, the right to vote, to 
imbibe, to stay out all night, and so on, would be the 
exclusive rights of adults. These are protected 1 iberties 
of choice that could hardly apply to small children. 
Children's exclusive rights are characteristic of 
children's needs and are such things as dependency rights. 
This would also apply to adults if they were handicapped or 
incapable of supporting themselves and, therefore in need 
of being treated as children all of their lives. Professor 
Feinberg then describes "rights in trust." These are rights 
which children have, as do adults. Adults, however, must 
exercise them on behalf of a child. It is then the child's 
right to have these future options kept open to him so that 
he might exercise them fully when he is more advanced and 
capable of making decisions about them. These are 
'anticipatory autonomy rights'. 
In the context of future rights of the child, a moral 
Perplexity or a moral dilemma could arise, when those 
rights which are exclusively children's rights in trust are 
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in conflict with the rights of parents, which are adult 
right&. and the courts must decide. For example, there may 
be a conflict between the child's personal interests in 
growth and development rather than his immediate health or 
welfare, and the parents' right to control their child's 
upbringing, free from outside interference. 
Society as a whole, represented by the state, may have 
an interest in the conflict between the future rights of 
the child and the present right of the parent to control 
the child. If, for example, the child were a source of 
infection to others. the state would become an active 
participant in the conflict. Proceedings against parents 
charged with neglect, criminal trials for violation of 
compulsory school attendance laws, custody hearings, or 
court proceedings because of a violation of child labor 
statutes may all become contests between the rights of 
parents, children, and the state, or the collective 
. t t f . t 78 1n eres s o soc1e y. 
Because children cannot be expected to defend their 
own future interests against infringements by parents, this 
task must be performed for them, usually by the state in 
its role as Earens E~i~i~~· In American government, the 
'sovereign power of guardianship' over minors and other 
legally incompetent persons has been traditionally held by 
the state. Mentally retarded adults, for example. are 
4; 
e~pected to receive psychiatric care under this doctrine. 
Here it is the society's function to "decide for a man as 
we assume he would decide for himself if he were of sound 
.,.79 
mind. 
To presume to know what children would choose when 
theY are adults creates difficult problems for courts. 
Generally. courts do not speak in the name of a future 
adult. but there are sometimes ways of inferring, or 
interfering with parents, so as to postpone the making of 
serious and final commitments until such time as the child 
in question is capable of making those decisions himself. 
In the decision of the case E~lrrce y~ Massachusetts, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the parens patriae doctrine: 
... parents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves. But it does not follow that they are 
free in identical circumstances to make martyrs of 
their children before they have reached the age of 
full and legal discreti§B· when they can make that 
decision for themselves. 
The imits of the E~~~rr~ E~i~l~~ doctrine are 
illustrated in the case of Wisconsin y~ Y~Q~· In this 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court defended the rights of the 
Amish in Wisconsin to send their children to their own 
schools rather than the public schools. 81 In the Y~Q~ 
case, the parents' rights to educate their children as they 
saw fit were defended by the Supreme Court. In contrast to 
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this. the case of Mark Painter of Ames, Iowa, was decided 
in favor of the grandparents• custody of a child in 
opposition to the child's natural father. 92 This case 
represented an overextension of the E~L~Q~ e~iLi~~ 
principle. According to O'Neil and Ruddig, the state must 
typically shoulder a greater burden of justification for 
its interference with parents for the sake of their 
children than that which is generally borne by parents 
themselves in justification of their interference with 
children for the childrens' own sake. 9 } This is because the 
action that courts or society may take, by its very nature, 
tends to be cumbersome and heavy-handed, and to constitute 
a threat to parental rights, particularly as to the right 
to supervise the upbringing of their own children, and the 
right to the free exercise of their own religion. an 
unavoidable influence on the developing attitudes of 
children. Although the burden of the state is character-
istically more cumbersome than that shouldered by parents 
in conducting their own interventions, it should be the 
same general kind, and require the same rationale. In 
either case, the justification for intervention appeals to 
the eventual autonomy and to the good will of the child. 
The individual's right to self-determination and ultimately 
self-fulfillment has been frequently defended in philo-
sophy. John Stuart Mill argued in his book On Lib~.!:..,iy that 
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anY attempt, however benevolent, on the part of the state 
to imPose upon an individual some external conception of 
his own good is almost certain to be self-defeating, and 
that an adult's own good is "best provided for by allowing 
h . f . "t "94 him to take is own means o pursuing 1 • 
Jonathan Glover, in his work, Causing Death and Saving 
Lives. 95 discusses some of the possible difficulties in 
--
such dilemmas as having to represent children when their 
interests appear to be in conflict with the interests of 
parents. According to Sharon Bishop, "even if children are 
not fully autonomous persons, when we recognize that they 
have, or will have, such self-determination, this puts 
86 
significant constraints on how we may treat them." Robert 
Young argues that one should reject the paternalistic 
approach to children; instead children and adolescents 
should be held competent to evaluate their own interests. 
He asserts that our primary emphasis should be upon 
protecting children's rights rather than talking of moral 
rights for children. 87 This point of view is in severe 
contrast to that of John Stuart Mill in his statement from 
QrLb.i~!t!'..!..Y· "society has that absolute power over them 
during all the early portion of their existence: it has had 
the whole period of childhood and non-age in which to try, 
whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in 
l "f ,.88 1 e. 
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Neill, Dennison, and Holt assert that children are 
perfectly capable of assessing and managing their own 
interests and therefore capable of playing a determinitive 
role in shaping their education. 89 · 90 • 91 A. I. Malden 
asserts that the traditional view of legal rights as being 
primarily held only by adults, based upon their capacity to 
be rational and self-controlled, fails to recognize that 
~H~ 
others also have rights. This is an incomplete approach 
because of the exclusion of children, who are considered 
not to have such rights as adults, even though adults, or 
moral agents, may have duties toward them. Melden argues 
that children can have rights, and that infants can be 
properly said to have rights even though they are not 
mature enough to participate in specific moral activities. 
What principles should guide decision-making in cases 
concerning children is not clearly defined in the Supreme 
Court decisions which, according to Laurence Houlgate, 
waver between granting children full legal status as 
"persons" and regarding them paternalistically. 92 In the 
community of education systems, teachers' duties and 
authority over children come into play. Victor Worsfold 
asserts that there are legitimate rights which students 
have vis-a-vis their teachers as a result of the specified 
duties to and authority over students which teachers 
hold. 93 He places this relationship in the context of a 
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Rawlsian contract grounded in the rights that proceed from 
"just institutions". This contract approach, according to 
R.S. Downie, is legitimatized through the consent of the 
94 governed. C.A. Wring suggests that granting rights to 
children in school may jeopardize the relationship of trust 
between children and teachers. 9 ~ He nonetheless asserts 
that granting the irreducible value of persons and their 
interests, ends, and purposes should be taken seriously. 
The rights of children, the rights of parents, and the 
rights of society, with regard to interests in the welfare 
of children and families, are linked to many philosophical 
questions about which there are no clear answers. A variety 
of approaches can be found, and these reflect concerns of 
freedom, the limited capacity of children to represent 
their own interests, the nature of the parent-child 
relationship, and the degree to which children can be 
legitimately viewed as a part of the personhood of the 
parent or as individuals in their own right. Finding a 
balance between the theoretical approaches and the 
Practical exigencies which for each party seem so pressing 
is difficult. Guiding principles representing the interests 
of each and full opportunity for each to pursue his maximum 
potential need to be delineated. 
~rent-Based Literature 
Literature generated by the parents of handicapped 
children gives a rich picture of their problems as well as 
the joys of parenting the exceptional child. The insights 
of these parents into the process of conflict-resolution in 
disputes with the institutions of society can be gratify-
ingly enlightening. They present authentic perspectives 
since the parents have actually lived through the exper-
iences they write about and have even waged hard-fought 
battles with prejudice and bureaucratic systems. 
Harris presents the concerns of single parents with 
handicapped children when he wrote the story of his deaf 
daughter. 96 Similarly, Browne recounted her struggles as a 
single parent contending with society to secure the 
educational rights of her child. 97 Park presents the 
interests of the exceptional child raised in a large 
f ·1 98 am1 y, as did the OeBolts, albeit a large family <21 
children> of adopted children. 99 Some of the parents who 
have written about their experiences have professional 
backgrounds. The Gunthers, the Masseies, and Browne are 
examples of this group. 97 .lOO,lOl Paterson and the Colemans 
describe rearing a handicapped child from the perspective 
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k f . 1 l 02' l 0} A t 1 . . . t t. of the Blac am1 y. s rong re 1g1ous or1en a ion 
104 i& represented by Rabbi Agre&s and by Woodson, who 
t h h . 1 d . th t. f. b . l 0 } s. d. k writes abou er c 1 ren w1 cys 1c 1 ros1s. 1e 1c 
and Poole address the concerns of children who suffer the 
consequences of organ transplants. 106 • 107 Clarke deals with 
d . b'l't' 108 learning isa 1 1 1es. 
Some parents write about their experiences in 
effecting significant changes in provisions for children 
with the problems their own children have faced. Killia, 
who wrote in 1982 about her child with cerebral palsy, 
started a movement which has dramatically benefitted other 
children with the same condition. 
There are recurrent themes in the books written by the 
parents of handicapped children. Although each author 
approaches the problem differently, each contributes to the 
general picture of parenting exceptional children. Some 
have a realistic approach to disability and generally 
provide a frank and honest portrayal of what it's like to 
live with a disability. These parents show us how they deal 
with medical impairments and recount the responses of 
family members to disability. They talk as well about their 
relationships with physicians, nurses, and teachers. These 
books are especially valuable to other parents who, when 
they have a handicapped child, can relate to these 
accounts. In the case of those books by parents who are 
themselves professionals in the helping professions <social 
services, nursing, medicine) a greater amount of 
information is provided which is of special use to 
educators and rehabilitation personnel. Jablow•s book about 
her daughter with Down's Syndrome emphasizes chi Id 
development and includes information about sibling 
reactions from her own family. 109 Lund, who teaches at the 
college level, offers an account which is filled with 
descriptions of useful techniques for dealing with an 
autistic child. 110 Stimulating questions for discussion are 
l 1 l provided by the Turnbull's book, Parents Speak Out. 
Optimism, in dealing with the demands of society and 
gaining services for children, is found in many of the 
books and articles written by parents. Siedick, for 
example, recounts the arduous and difficult process of a 
106 kidney dialysis regimen for her son. Nonetheless, the 
end result is an optimistic approach to parenting in a 
difficult situation. Parents offer creative and inventive 
ways of coping with the problems of their disabled 
children. Most. indeed, will say that they are better 
people because of their struggle. They have received more 
than they have given from the experience. For those on the 
outside, the picture is undeniably one of extreme physical 
and financial demands upon the resources of the family. 
Some parents describe how they have endured a difficult 
~l 
going from physician to physician trying to find an road in 
accurate diagnosis for the condition of their child, 
finding too often that they have been provided with 
mistaken, inaccurate, and ambiguous descriptions. Andersen, 
for example, describes the unbelievable insensitivity of a 
physician examining her seven month-old child to confirm 
d · · l l 2 Wh t d h d the feared 1agnos1s. en paren s o ave a goo ex-
perience with professionals, they express their gratitude 
liberally. They are even comforted when the news is bad, as 
·1ong as it is accurate. Pringle, for example, describes the 
doctor who cared for his son in a long battle against 
leukemia as practically being a member of the family, and 
he and his wife expressed gratitude and affection for his 
11} 
ca.re. 
In Plummer's book. §lY~-~Y~£l._Q~y-~_£h~rrce, the 
particular insensitivity to hospitalized children is 
noted. 114 Her child, with osteogenesis imperfecta, endured 
so many lonely and painful hours in hospital rooms. It is 
hoped that the writings of Mrs. Plurrrner will give impetus 
to changes in the approaches of hospital personnel to 
children with such difficulties. 
The quests of parents to get their children admitted 
to schools and to secure the appropriate education for them 
are illustrated in Jablow's book. 109 Through a particularly 
ironic situation, a child with Down's Syndrome tested too 
5Z 
high for special education programming. The Masseies, whose 
son had hemophilia, found school personnel reluctant to 
cooperate in meeting the special needs of their chi ld.lOl 
Marital stress, as a result of the extraordinary demands 
that a handicapped chi Id places upon the family, 
illustrated by Featherstone, reminds us that "few couples 
agree at each fork in the road, even when the children are 
normal and th~ choi~~-1s ordinary. Disability raises the 
stakes in the conflict."
115 
There are emotional ambivalences which are probably 
not too different in kind from those any other parents 
experience, but certainly are far more intense when there 
is a handicapped child in the family. Parents at times feel 
singled out for a such a different fate. "Why me?" is the 
104 title of Agress's book. Parents find themselves tortured 
with recriminations. Segal reproached himself, upon 
contemplating his cerebral palsied daughter, "Why didn't I 
perceive the problem? Maybe could have saved those few 
crucial minutes that caused this lifetime of injury." 116 
The disabled children have their anxieties too. Many 
authors recount the substance of their handicapped 
children's expressions of frustration. DeFord's daughter, 
who suffered from life-threatening cystic fibrosis, after a 
frolicking game with her father, exclaimed, "Oh, Daddy, 
wouldn't 117 it have been great?" 
The guilt that parents experience, how they relate 
that guilt, and how that guilt is perceived by 
professionals is a subject dealt with in several books. 
Featherstone. for example, writes, "I believe that Jody's 
toxoplasmosis was my fault. The disease seemed a judgment 
'f d h t "
11
' on my 11 e an c arac er. 
In general, one cannot hope to conduct a valid 
examination of the conflicts arising between families and 
society in the course of rearing handicapped children 
without paying close attention to the expressions of the 
parents themselves, both in writing and in personal 
interviews. In most cases, parents are the ones who spend 
the most time with their handicapped children, and there-
fore have a special insight into their needs and concerns. 
Wherever good working solutions to the conflicts between 
parents and society are found, it is never without the 
parents' participation in and implementation of the 
solution that the child can be fully benefited. 
.!!18 Perspective of Educators 
How the presence of a handicapped child affects family 
life, and how family life affects the handicapped child in 
the school are special concerns to educators today. 
Children are seen as parts of a whole family process. This 
approach reflects the family-therapy psychoanalytic 
approach of Carl Whittaker who always insisted that 
treating an individual without involving the entire family 
was a futile exercise. This attitude is relatively new on 
the horizon and has gradually become more evident in the 
literature of the last twenty years. 
When we look back at early texts on special education 
from the sixties and early seventies, we find that the 
family is rarely mentioned and then only peripherally. The 
most popular texts used in teacher training colleges still 
give little attention to the parental role. The two most 
popular texts used in the early seventies, Cruickshank and 
Johnson's Education of Exceptional Children and Youth118 
and Dunn's Exceptional Children in the Schools 119 had no 
chapters on parents. 
Articles which addressed concerns of educators with 
regard to parent cooperation in the sixties and early 
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seventies tended to represent an anticipation of 
psychological malfunction and the expectation of little 
positive input from parents in the learning processes of 
children with handicaps. Clark and Hall's work on the 
utilization of parents in the behavior modification process 
is exceptional for its time, and marked the beginning of a 
.gradually developing trend toward greater recognition of 
120 the importance of the parent• s role. In 1970, She i 1 a 
Hewett and John and Elizabeth Newson produced The Family 
and the Handicae.e.~E-£hl!E~lZl which studied cerebral 
palsied children in their homes. This work describes 
British families as examined from a school, social work, 
and educational perspective. Concerns of familial stress, 
community resources, and parental contribution to 
educational programming are discussed. On the whole, 
however, parents are presented as weak and ineffectual 
participants without the necessary training to make a 
significant contribution. Parents are portrayed as a part 
of the problem rather than a part of the solution. 
Koch and Dobson wrote The Mentally Retarded Child and 
t!l!_E.~!:!!l.!.Y in l 9 71. 1 Z 2 It is a book of readings from 
several authors on a range of related subjects in the areas 
of etiology, education, psycho-social aspects, and 
community services. There is one chapter related 
specifically to the family, by Sylvia Schild. Dr. Schild 
}6 
investigates the backgrounds of families who have mentally 
retarded children and finds that parental reaction to a 
child's mental retardation may be guilt or ambivalence. 
Because of the child's effect on the family as a whole the 
family itself is seen as one aspect of the problem which 
retardation presents rather than as a positive resource for 
the child. Dr. Shield quotes, however, from Begab, who said 
in 196}: 
An important concept in child development is that 
the rate of intellectual growth can be changed--up 
or down--by altering the child's life experience. 
Among these life circumstances, none are more 
crucial than those encountered within the family 
circle .... Indeed, the impact of intra-family 
relationships on the mental growth and behavior of 
the retarded child is particularly vital, for it may 
not only raise or lower performance but may 
determine in some instances whether the child is 
not to be classed as ·retarded. 
John N. and Nellie Enders-Carver produced an 
interesting study of families of retarded children that was 
prompted by their interest in their own retarded child, 
David. 123 They describe the process of parents' discovery 
that their child is mentally retarded and how parents react 
to this. They talk about the different categories of mental 
retardation, the terms and clinical types, and the care 
Problems that retardation presents. They also offer graphic 
accounts by other parents in their own words as to how 
their child's condition or behavior affects the functioning 
of their families. They devote a chapter to life in the 
nuclear family and discuss how it is modified by the 
presence of a severely retarded child. They describe how 
parents behave toward the child and toward each other in 
their attempt to deal with the problems presented by the 
child•s handicap. They also discuss the siblings of 
mentally retarded children, how they behave toward one 
another. and how they behave towards their retarded 
sibling. In another chapter they discuss the interactions 
between the family and those beyond the home and how the 
presence of a retarded child affects those relationships. 
They talk about how family finances are affected and how 
their communications with neighbors are affected. They 
discuss the conflicts between families and other outside 
organizations, schools, social agencies, churches, and the 
participation of the family in activities with these 
groups. They discuss the feelings of parents who confront 
the need to place their children in an institution. their 
ambivalent feelings, the aggravation of problems that arise 
during their long waiting periods to find a place for their 
child, and the changes at home that are made in preparation 
for the child's departure. They discuss the feelings that 
are aroused in conjunction with the event of the child's 
going to the institution. They also discuss readjustment in 
the family after the child has been placed in an 
tnstitution, and the readjustment of the chi Id to his 
institution and his new life in the institution. Their 
approach to institutionalization is a positive one. The 
material they used for this book is gleaned from their 
surveys of families with mentally retarded children. The 
book is based on the results of surveys of thirty families 
who answered seventy-six questions. These authors provide a 
useful text which should assist those attempting to 
understand the parents' point of view and what they must go 
through in their search for services for their handicapped 
children. 
Ved P. Varma edited Stresses In Children in 197}. 124 
It is a compilation of the works of twelve authors who 
discuss handicapped children in ordinary schools, psychotic 
children, slow-learning children, delinquent and 
maladjusted children, bereaved children, adopted children, 
immigrant children, injury-prone children, blind children, 
partially-sighted children, deaf and partially-hearing 
children, and children with physical handicaps. In each of 
these chapters. the stresses experienced by the families of 
children with handicaps are discussed from the point of 
view of a professional observing from the outside. 
The third edition of Max Hutt and Robin Gibbey's lh~ 
M~ni~ll~-~~i~~Q~Q-~hllQ~--~~~~l.QE.ment, Education, and 
I 2 5 l~~at~~ni contains a chapter devoted entirely to 
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parental reactions and family problems. The cases reviewed 
attest to the professionals' recognition of the importance 
of the parent's role. Nonetheless, the parent is seen as an 
additional patient, an additional student, and an 
additional problem in the life of the handicapped child. 
This chapter includes such subtitles as Parental Reactions 
~f Rejection and Hostility, Marital Discord, Narcissistic 
Involvements, Dependency Reactions, Reactions to the 
Community, Guilt Feeling of Parents, General Family 
Problems, Treatment of Parental Family Problems, Parental 
Treatment Through Education and Guidance, Emotional Needs 
of Parents, Parental Treatment Through Psychotherapy, 
Parental Problems Difficult of Resolution. 
In 1979, Milton Seligman produced ~i£~i~~i~~-E2£ 
tl~!Eirr~-E~£~rri~_2f_~~£~2ii2rr~l Children, A Guide For 
126 Teachers. He discusses candidly the teacher's role as a 
facilitator, how parents and teachers view one another, and 
how one should understand the dynamics of fami 1 ies with an 
exceptional child. He offers specific strategies useful in 
working with parents of exceptional children and techniques 
for working with parents who are "problem parents." He 
includes an appendix of resources to help teachers help 
Parents. Parents are seen as important contributors in the 
educational life of their handicapped children. This 
evaluation of parents is more open than that found in 
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earlier texts and pays more respect to the capacity of 
parents to contribute. Milton Seligman's book is a 
practical guide containing many useful hints for teachers 
who want to work closely with parents in order to maximize 
the potential of their handicapped children. In 1985, 
Hobbs, Perrin, and Ireys produced Chronically Ill Children 
and Their Families. 127 This text focusses primarily on the 
chronically ill child. Families are represented only 
peripherally. The authors' emphasis is on the development 
of improved policy for providing the benefits that families 
of children with chronic illness need and on the nature of 
ethical dilemmas in the medical management of chronic 
illness in children. 
Recently off the press is Lee Combrinck-Graham's book, 
Children in Family Contexts, Perspectives on Treatment. 126 
This is a compilation from twenty-five authors who 
contribute works regarding children in family contexts. 
Most of the children they are speaking of are those who are 
handicapped through mental illness, although there is one 
chapter by Janet Fievers that deals specifically with 
physical and cognitive handicaps. The book is designed as 
an approach to family therapy from a systems point of view, 
based upon the premise that the family is a child's primary 
resource system. But the audience for this approach is that 
of family therapists who are encouraged to help families 
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with physical and cognitive handicaps by identifying their 
unique experiences and coping patterns, and by directing 
efforts at freeing families from the constraints and 
misconceptions about the nature and cause of handicaps, to 
utilize motivations, problem-solving skills, and values of 
all family members, including the handicapped children. 
Families are seen as positive, strength-bearing systems 
capable, for the most part of coping with the 
extraordinary experience of having a handicapped child. It 
is emphasized that the strengths that lie within the family 
can carry them beyond the moments of difficulty inevitably 
experienced in these situations. The authors caution that 
if therapists approach the system of the family without 
proper respect for the unique ways that families find to 
handle their special situations, then the therapist may 
stand a good chance of becoming part of the problem rather 
than assisting with solutions. This text is representative 
of the most current trends in the approach to fami 1 ies and 
handicapped children. 
Over the years professionals have "studied" families 
of children with handicaps. They have examined 
relationships between parents and children, drawn 
conclusions based upon the samples examined, and made 
generalizations which have affected the outlook of pro-
fessionals who examine their studies. Typical is the report 
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made by Kenney, who studied mother and retarded child 
relationships. 128 She compared four groups of mothers with 
respect to their levels of ego development and their 
authoritarianism in child-rearing practices. The groups 
consisted of mothers and their children who were educable 
and adjusted in school; educable but maladjusted in school; 
non-retarded and adjusted in school; and non-retarded but 
maladjusted in school. Kenney concluded that mothers of 
maladjusted retarded children tended to be less mature and 
had lower levels of ego development than did a matched 
group of mothers of maladjusted, non-retarded children. The 
implication Kenney saw was that a mother's ability to 
understand and accept a retarded child relates to the 
development of her own personality as she deals with the 
varied stress situations that the introduction of a deviant 
child into the family inevitably brings. Coping is 
described by Kenney as a very complicated process. She 
describes the sequence of responding to stress situations 
as cyclical, and concludes that these stresses may have a 
cumulative effect upon the mothers' internal personality. 
Kenney's study of parental stress concluded that parents 
respond in one of three major ways to the stress of coping 
with a handicapped child, to accept, deny, or disguise the 
child's mental retardation. 
6) 
The report of a symposium on counseling the mentally 
retarded and their parents, published in the Journal of 
£Iinical Psychology, 129 found that parental difficulties in 
dealing with retarded children stemmed from the setting of 
unrealistically high goals for the young chi Id; over-
protection of the chi Id; overindulgence of the child: and 
·maladjustment of the parents, manifested as alcohol ism or 
emotional disturbance. 
Meyerowitz studied parents• "awareness" of mental 
retardation in their children. 130 He examined the parents 
of 186 children who were about to enter the first grade in 
public school. The children had Binet I.Q.'s ranging from 
60 to B? and had been placed in either regular or special 
education classrooms by random assignment. Each family was 
interviewed three times during a two-year period. The first 
interview took place about one month after the child had 
begun school. The second interview was at the end of the 
first school year, and the third interview was at the end 
of the child's second school year. The interview questions 
related to the parents' awareness of the limited abilities 
of their retarded children. It was noted that the parents 
thought that their retarded children responded "obliquely" 
and immaturely to their environment. Parents had low 
expectations of their retarded children's completing school 
but did not seem to have concerns about the limitations of 
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their children after they attained adulthood. In fact, the 
parents' expectations for their children's professional and 
occupational performance was not statistically different 
from the expectations of matched criteria parents of normal 
children. The parents of children who were placed in 
special education classes appeared to have a greater 
awareness of their children's problem, but in spite of 
this. fifty-five percent of the parents were judged to be 
unaware of the limited abilities of their retarded 
children. In order to attain an effective resolution of the 
problems of stress and conflict between the families of 
retarded and other physically handicapped children and 
social systems the families deal with, there must be a 
reasonable understanding by parents, as well as by 
professionals as to the true capacities of the children. 
Given the varied ways that professionals interpret studies 
and the variety of statistics that are produced relative to 
the performance of retarded and handicapped children and 
the understanding of professionals with regard to the 
capacities and understandings of parents, it seems as 
though it will always be difficult to resolve the conflicts 
that arise between families and society in the endeavor to 
Provide education for children with handicaps. 
bjterature From Psychology and Counseling 
Journals in the field of psychology and counseling abound 
in substantive articles on how to interview parents and how 
to conduct parent conferences. These articles commonly 
discuss provisions for reassurance of and support for 
.parents. Working through specific problems is deemed a 
shared experience, and a more open and direct communication 
in a counseling relationship. is recommended. These 
articles are not generally written from the parents' point 
of view nor for the parents. nor do they advise what 
parents should expect from an interview or conference with 
a teacher or a doctor. Parents are generally ill-prepared 
for such meetings. Many writers refer to counseliR-9 and 
p s y ch o 1 o g i ca 1 i n t e r v e n t i o n a s c on du c t e d pr i mar i 1 y i n 
clinical or institutional settings with traditional 
psychotherapeutic techniques. Less restrictive writers view 
counseling as embracing almost any human relationship in 
which individuals or groups are working together to solve 
problems or to share experiences for growth and learning. 
Counseling usually begins when parents seek an accurate 
diagnosis of their child's defect beyond the medical 
interpretation of their pediatrician. Anderson describes 
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"shopping behavior" of parents which often occurs as a the 
k . t d. . l} l Th. b h . result of see 1ng an accura e 1agnos1s. is e av1or 
refers to "parents making visits to the same professional 
or to a number of different professionals or clinics in 
such a manner that one visit follows another without 
resolution or a resolvable problem." For various reasons a 
great deal of time, energy, and money may be expended in 
this process. An initial diagnosis may be reviewed and 
found to be inaccurate or incomplete. Parents may decide to 
visit another professional or clinic. The most common 
reason, however, is that a 1 though the diagnosis was 
accurate, the parents either refuse to accept the results 
or the professional fails to adequately explain the results 
to the parents, thus setting up a situation of conflict 
between the family and the professional institutions of 
society. Barsh reports that many parents prefer team 
consultations, as opposed to single professionals, in order 
t . . d h k . f t· 132 Kt . t o compare op1n1ons an c ec 1n orma ion. a z po1n s 
out that parents may not feel inclined to ask questions and 
interact when confronted by several professionals in a 
lar-ge, informal 133 group. In interviews of twenty-three 
mothers of retarded children, Korch and Negrete investigate 
the types of visits that mothers make from the time of a 
retarded child's birth onward, and the degree of the 
mothers' satisfaction with these visits. 134 Out of 453 
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visits to various professional people, mothers are found to 
be satisfied with 75 percent of their visits. Some of the 
visits take place prior to any suspicion that something is 
wrong with the child. They do not appear to be initially 
negative toward professional help when that help is invoked 
for the usual injuries and illnesses of childhood. Their 
satisfaction decreases, however, with further diagnosis, 
and in later non-diagnostic visits to professionals for 
complaints that are not easily defined in the diagnosis of 
their child. Mothers commonly complain that although it is 
obvious that something is wrong with their child, they are 
often told that nothing is wrong, and professionals seem to 
lose interest in both the mothers and the children after 
several visits. The mothers complain that the amount of 
time professionals spend in examining their children is 
insufficient, and that the professionals do not take an 
adequate amount of time to explain the diagnosis to the 
mothers. The mothers are seldom offered guidance in dealing 
with their immediate problems, and they sometimes leave the 
interview with no hope for the future. This report reveals 
that professionals curtly instructed some parents of older 
children to institutionalize their child. Many mothers also 
state that the doctors do not seem to be as interested in 
the injuries and illnesses of their retarded children as 
they are in those of normal children. A study of 260 
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parents designed to assess the counseling parents receive 
reveals that only half of the parents were satisfied with 
the diagnosis received from the initial visit to the 
. 1 l 3 5 profess1ona . Hewett asserts that the manner in which 
handicapping conditions are interpreted to parents is a 
primary indication of the quality of any diagnostic 
. 
136 Sh d "b clinic. e escr1 es two models. One, the virtuoso 
model, which offers a team of highly-trained specialists 
who meet with parents and provide detailed and thorough 
information on all facets of the handicapping condition 
which, although it facilitates communication between 
professionals, is often inadequate to convey information to 
parents. Parents are generally not impressed by a group of 
professionals who are trying to impress each other with 
their diagnostic skills, and parents seem to gain very 
little understanding or insight into the problem from 
hearing detailed laboratory reports and test results. A 
second model, an interaction model of interpreting 
diagnostic information to parents, appears to be 
preferable. Hewett stresses that diagnostic efforts are 
generally useless to the retarded child unless the results 
and implications are adequately explained to parents. 
"Certain terms glibly used by professionals to describe 
general levels of retardation are meaningless to most 
Parents." Edgerton and Berconci, in their 1975 study, find 
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that the method of presentation and the type of 
handicapping condition strongly influence the amount of 
information mothers understand. 137 A study by Farber 
investigates the variables which determine whether 
recommendations made during child psychiatric consultations 
l 38 
are carried out or not. In this study the author found 
.that fifty-two percent of the recommendations from the 
initial consultation are not carried out. Recommendations 
are most likely to be accepted if both parents are present, 
rather than a mother or a father alone. It also appears 
that more recommendations are followed when the child is 
under the age of nine, and far fewer when the child is over 
the age of thirteen. Parents are also more likely to follow 
recommendations when they have the opportunity to discuss 
the child's problem with others and are also far more 
inclined to follow recommendations if they agree with the 
professional's diagnosis and evaluation of the problem. It 
is clear that unless parents understand and accept the 
information that is presented, very little can be done for 
the child. Kanner describes a counseling approach called 
d . . t t . l} 9 Th. . d . th aca em1c reor1en a ion. is 1s use w1 remedial 
readers, and contains several important features designed 
to help children develop more desirable behavior. 
Few studies concentrate exclusively on the concerns of 
Parents. One exception is Millman's study which describes 
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open-ended group meetings in which ten to twelve parents of 
children with minimal brain dysfunction attend sixty or 
ninety minute sessions each week for as long as they 
l 4 o B · k 1 · . t . t d f t f desire. r1c 1n 1nves 1ga e groups o paren s o 
'th l . d' b'l't' 141 children w1 earning 1sa 1 1 1es. In this study. new 
parents are seen individually, then with other new parents. 
and finally as part of an existing group. Usually parents 
of children with similar difficulties and age are placed 
together. During the meetings. parents acquire knowledge 
regarding particular learning problems and have the 
opportunity to share feelings. Bricklin points out that 
certain aspects of the sessions are often difficult for the 
parents since established ways of receiving and responding 
to their children are difficult to change. However, parents 
and children alike have the capacity to change, according 
to Bricklin. One of few studies using a control group is 
that of Lewis, who examines group counseling techniques 
with sixty-two parents of mentally retarded children. 142 
The control group in this case did not participate in group 
counseling. nor in two objective tests. During ten weekly 
ninety-minute sessions for each of three groups, parents 
introduce and discusse topics in a non-structured 
atmosphere. The data from the study show that attitudes 
towards child-rearing improved for two of the three groups. 
Those parents not participating in group procedures had 
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"less enlightened attitudes." Lewis concludes that "parents 
seemed to emerge from the group experience with increased 
self-direction, confidence, and optimism, all of which are 
goals of counseling in general." Other studies based on 
parent participation and comparing the interventions of 
direct counseling with children and those of indirect 
.counseling through teachers and parents are those of Taylor 
as well as those of Love, and Bugentha1
143
·
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·
145 Each of 
these studies shows that children are more effectively 
counseled and change is more effectively facilitated 
through the use of teachers and parents in the counseling 
process, as opposed to direct counseling of children. The 
majority of studies concerned with counseling interventions 
and psychological therapy for the families of handicapped 
children in school environments are directed at assisting 
families or children in the process of adjusting to the 
problems presented by the child's handicap or the parent's 
adjustment to the handicap, rather than resolving conflicts 
between families and society. Nonetheless, in each study 
there appear to be variables taken into consideration which 
address certain stresses between families and society. In 
almost every case these conflicts are dealt with 
indirectly. For example, when parents appear to have 
difficulty understanding a technique used by a teacher or a 
therapist in assisting a child in a behavior-modification 
7Z 
m counseling progra • intervention may take the form of 
educational processes for the parents in order to reduce 
the stress and conflict between the family and the 
institution. Most of the research deals with children with 
behavioral disorders or certain learning disabilities, 
while other handicaps such as mental retardation and 
physical impairments have received relatively little 
attention. 
The trend appears to be moving toward increasing 
parental participation in the counseling process, and there 
is an increased amount of attention, as studies and program 
descriptions have indicated, that parents must play an 
essential role in efforts to remediate their child's 
problems. Indeed, some studies have shown that parental 
counseling would be more beneficial in many situations than 
would direct therapy or remediation for the child. 
There is a significant trend toward an increased focus 
on parent-child interactions in relationships. Parents and 
children are not counseled in isolation. Instead, a model 
is employed utilizing behavior modification techniques 
emphasizing the development of new patterns of behaving and 
interacting for both parents and children together. In this 
approach, parents themselves learn behavioral principles 
and techniques which are actively applied with their 
children at home and consequently promote desirable and 
7} 
appropriate behaviors. This approach is in contrast with 
attempting to work indirectly through weeks or months of 
vague discussions about assumed causes such as guilt or 
rejection or fear in order to modify behavior. 
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The literature of psychology, education, law, 
philosophy, and the accounts of parents themselves 
regarding their concerns pertaining to the rearing of 
handicapped children is generally expressive of the 
concerns which each field deals with in the parenting 
process or in the remediation of difficulties that arise 
because of the interaction between parents and children or 
between parents and institutions. The author was 
nevertheless unable to find any specific works which deal 
exclusively with the resolution of conflicts between 
society and parents engaged in the rearing of handicapped 
children. Almost every work which is concerned with areas 
of parental or child behavior in the case of the 
handicapped child has an element of concern regarding the 
resolution of conflicts between families and schools, or 
families and hospitals, or families and other agencies 
designed to assist parents in the process of rearing their 
children. Some works which are designed to help parents 
develop the skills they need in addressing those conflicts 
that they have with social institutions because of the 
special needs of their children offer lessons in 
assertiveness and describe techniques for overcoming the 
7~ 
obstacles presented by those groups which by their nature 
and structure would inhibit the fulfillment of their 
child's full potential. One such work is Ta~i~s_Q!:Llh~ 
~orld, Empowering Strategies For Parents of Children With 
Disabilities by Joyce Slayton-Mitchell. 146 This text offers 
a basic course in assertiveness training designed primarily 
.for mothers of handicapped children. It assists them in the 
process of taking on the world through taking on the family 
world first, then the medical world, the school world, the 
church world, the work world, the bureaucratic world, and 
then adjusting themselves to "stabilize," "mobilize." and 
"activize." Mitchell provides a very practical handbook for 
parents and gives many specific examples wherein parents 
can assert their own interests or the interests of their 
children and gain access to the services they require. The 
book appears to have great potential for helping parents 
who might otherwise be timid in approaching medical or 
educational professionals. Surely the conflicts between 
families and society relative to the rearing of handicapped 
children are multifaceted and numerous institutions with 
numerous orientations, be they medical, educational, 
psychological, religious, philosophical, or legal must be 
dealt with. Parents cannot be expected to have expertise in 
these areas. By the same token, neither can professionals 
in those various different fields have expertise as 
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parents, and certainly not as parents of handicapped 
children. The nurturing of an increased awareness on the 
part of society in general that parents have an important 
position in the lives of their children is therefore basic 
to the establishment of an environment in which the 
conflicts between the parents and society can be resolved. 
CHAPTER ) 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND PERCEPTIONS WHICH LEAD TO CONFLICT AND 
CASES DEMONSTRATING CONFLICT BETWEEN FAMILIES AND SOCIETY 
RELATIVE TO THE REARING OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 
SOCIOLEGAL CONFLICTS 
Conflicts may arise between the parents of handicapped 
children and professionals whose duties require them to 
take a special interest in such families. These conflicts 
stem from differences in attitude and reflect differences 
in interests that are grounded in the nature of their 
separate positions. Parents see their rights and duties 
from a different perspective than professionals do. 
Professionals view their duties and obligations towards 
children and families from a different perspective than 
parents do. 
The rights and duties of parents are of special 
concern to all social service and legal professionals whose 
Practices are child and family centered, but just as 
Parents are not always perfect in the discharge of their 
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responsibilities, neither are the legal and social service 
professions. Although laws and administrative regulations 
maY be established specifically to insure the best 
interests of children, the execution of legal or social 
service interventions can result in situations detrimental 
to the children they are intended to serve. This ironic 
result does not diminish the propriety of the interest or 
the need to intervene effectively on behalf of children 
whose needs are not met by parents. 
When in the perception of society, parents fail to 
provide appropriate care for their children, then society 
attempts to intervene. Unfortunately there is often little 
consensus about what is best or even good for all children. 
This lack of consensus seems to be evident throughout human 
history, in every culture, location, or circumstance. 
Society's view of what is acceptable governance of children 
on the part of parents has changed over the years within 
cultures and nationalities and continues to vary from group 
to group and from legal system to legal system. There is 
variety in the approaches to human psychology that guide 
iudg ment in legislation affecting children and families. 
There is variety in methodological approach to problems of 
child and family psychology and welfare. 
The norms of child governance are grounded in parental 
rights and obligations which may be viewed differently by 
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parents and by professionals. In general, parental rights 
rnaY be respected on the basis of the fact of biological 
reproduction. The offspring is, in effect, a literal part 
of the body of the parent. The physical association is 
naturally accompanied by a psychological association. But 
the physical and psychological development of the child 
cannot be assured by the mere fact that a biological parent 
exists. There must be a bond of caring and communication 
between parent and child. Because of the physical and 
emotional frailty of human infant existence, parenting is a 
long-term commitment at the very least. Where there is a 
failure on the part of the parent, either because of 
circumstances within the parent's control or circumstances 
beyond the parent's control, then society expresses its 
interest by intervention on behalf of the child. Whether 
the child is found in the home of its biological parents or 
in the home of its legally adoptive parents, the respect of 
society for parental rights and the concern of society for 
the welfare of the child may come into conflict when a 
failure to meet the minimal standards society deems 
necessary for chi Id growth and development is evident. In 
spite of a harmful or potentially harmful situation for a 
child at home, the intervention of society may result in 
little more than the imposition of legal authority to 
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destroy the last threads of a potentially wholesome parent-
chi ld relationship, leaving the child with less than it 
could hope for before the intervention. 
One instance of intervention that receives a great 
deal of public attention today is that following a report 
of child abuse. An examination of the statistical record of 
the incidence of child abuse in the United States over the 
past two decades and a number of interventions on the part 
of social service agencies point to a growing problem of 
what appears to be too little effective intervention and 
services which come too late to be truly effective. Too 
often children are returned to the parents who abused them 
even though the chances of repeated abuse are great. Even 
life threatening abuses may not preclude the return of a 
child to its parents Children who are neglected 
nutritionally to the point of starvation may not 
necessarily be safe from further abuses. Even after a child 
is taken from an abusive parent, that parent may have a 
continuing right to visit and interfere in the life of the 
child. 
On the other hand, society may be critical of its 
appointed authorities and accuse them of interfering too 
much or without sufficient cause into the lives of 
families. When some intervention may be deemed necessary, 
the extremes of familial disruption and the placement of 
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children in separate foster homes may be more harmful than 
the neglect they experienced at home. In some cases there 
ma.Y be legal representation of children and parents. thus 
precluding personal contact. In cases of medical neglect, 
decisions may be made on the basis of medical orientations 
of judges and other juvenile authorities without consi-
deration of the preferences of the parents. There are even 
cases where parents seeking legitimate medical care for 
their children were prevented from obtaining necessary 
physician's services because of some social service 
authority's suspicion that some abuse had taken place and 
then the suspicions were found to be unjustified. 
In the event that abuse or neglect is suspected, 
intervention includes placement of children in foster 
homes. The feelings of children, their needs for security 
and consistent role models, and their need for parents who 
have confidence in their own ability to provide a 
continuing and nurturing environment may be lacking in 
foster placements that move children, separated from their 
siblings, from home to home. By returning children to bio-
logical parents after many years in foster care without 
regard for the attachments formed in a long-term placement, 
authorities may do great damage to the child's 
Psychological development. 
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The great potential for harm where too little is done 
and the concern for potential harm where too much is done 
necessitate the provision of some basis for judgment and 
some system to the decision-making process that offers 
protections, checks and balances. In spite of standards of 
fair warning and restrictions on the exercise of power, the 
state has not always been able to curb the zeal of social 
workers and insure that intervention is made only where 
there is a capacity to provide a "less detrimental 
alternative" to the situation of abuse or neglect in which 
they find the child. The interventions of society must be 
restricted to objectively definable grounds, with the 
result that in some children in need of protective services 
are being left out in order to prevent the arbitrary 
inclusion of other fami ies where intervention would be 
harmful. In the United States today one is more likely to 
find the state erring on the side of non-intrusiveness. The 
recorrrnendations of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit are for "the 
correlative principles of least intrusive invocation of the 
law, least-intrusive adjudication and least intrusive 
d . ·t· 11147 Th .. l 1. dt f ·1 1spos1 ion. ese pr1nc1p es are app 1e o am1 y 
units as they are found to exist and not necessarily as 
they may be legally constituted or biologically founded. 
Goldstein, et al, recommend that we attempt to regard each 
8} 
situation from the child's point of view and with respect 
for age, developmental phase and background. 
Commentary on the limitation of society to substitute 
for parents is not new. Jeremy Bentham. writing in 1840, 
expressed an opinion on the status of children which 
reflects the need for watchful care on the part of parents 
and the limited ability of society to provide substitutes 
for parents: 
The feebleness of infancy demands a continual 
protection. Everything must be done for an imperfect 
being, which as yet does nothing for itself. The 
complete development of its physical powers takes 
many years: that of its intellectual faculties is 
still slower. At a certain age, it has already 
strength and passions, without experience enough to 
regulate them. Too sensitive to present impulses, 
too negligent of the future. such a being must be 
kept under 1 ~ij authority more immediate than that of the laws ... 
Parents, being those closest to their children, are 
generally accepted to be the appropriate authority for the 
rearing of children. They act as representatives of their 
children before the law and introduce their children to the 
institutions of society. This authority may be based on a 
biological relationship and reflect the physical connection 
between parents and children. Freud saw the human infant as 
"sent into the world in a less finished state," compared to 
other species and therefore more subject to "the dangers of 
the world." 149 This situation necessitates, in Freud's 
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view. a burden of responsibility upon parents which will 
result in the growth of a psychological bonding stemming 
from a physical dependence. The pleasure for the child in 
being cared for by the parent leads to an attachment to the 
caregiver. This leads to the wish for approval and love, a 
desire on the part of the child to please the parent in 
order to gain more approval. The child's responsiveness to 
educational efforts rests on this reciprocal basis. 
Identification with parents results from the child's 
appreciation of the love relationship and gives rise to 
l t 1 d · 1 · t . l 5 O Aft h . 1 dh d th impu se con ro an socia iza ion. er c i oo , e 
years of adolescence present the painful struggle to become 
. d d t d . t "d t"t 151 in epen en an gain a separa e i en i y. 
It is indeed these circumstances which necessitate 
familial privacy and autonomy according to Goldstein, Freud 
and Solnit. 147 When society intervenes in the affairs of 
the family and the family's integrity is weakened in the 
eyes of the child, then the child's capacity to have his 
needs met deteriorates. There may be a premature 
destruction of the child's belief and trust in the security 
and power of his parents. This is invariably detrimental to 
the development of the child. For this reason the law must 
do everything possible to maintain a recognition of the 
Privacy rights of the family. 
Goldstein, et al., point to two purposes as the basis 
of freedom from state intrusion into the affairs of the 
family: that parents must enjoy an "uninterrupted 
opportunity to meet the developing physical and emotional 
needs of their child so as to establish the familial bonds 
critical to every child's healthy growth and development," 
and to insure the "continuing maintenance of these family 
ties--of psychological parent-child relationships--once 
they have been established." 147 
Unfortunately, the mere assignment of the parent-child 
relationship by virtue of birth or adoption does not 
guarantee the establishment of significant psychological 
ties. When parents are separated from their children for 
long periods of time, or when children are abandoned, the 
legal or natural tie does not prevent the establishment of 
psychological bonds with others who do not share any legal 
rights relative to the child. According to Goldstein, et 
al., such bonds should enjoy the same consideration and 
protection of privacy as accorded to functioning biological 
or adoptive relationships. In the 1977 case of §.!:!!l..ih v. 
declared: 
A biological relationship is not present in the case 
of the usual foster family. But biological relation-
ships are not exclusive determination of the 
existence of a family. The basic foundation of .the 
family in our society, the marriage relationship, is 
nf course not a matter of blood relationship. 
<T>he importance of the familial relationship, to 
the individuals involved and to the society, stems 
from the emotional attach- ments that derive from 
intimacy of daily association, and from the role it 
plays in 'promot(ing) a way of life' through the 
instruction of children, ~i§.££~~1!! v. Y£~~~· 406 
U.S. ZO,, Z}l-}} <197Z), as well as from the fact of 
blood relationship. No one would seriously dispute 
that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship 
between an adult and a child in his or her care may 
exist even in the absence of a blood relationship. 
At least where a child has been placed in foster 
care as an infant, has never known his natural 
parents, and has remained continuously for several 
years in the care of the same foster parents, it is 
natural that the foster family should hold the same 
place in the emotional life of the foster child, and 
fulfill the same socializing functions as a natural 
family. For this reason we cannot dismiss the foster 
family as l~Zmere collection of unrelated 
individuals. 
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Goldstein, et al., find the state an inadequate 
parental substitute. "As E.!!.~~!lLE.!!.i~iae the state is too 
crude an instrume.nl to ffecome an adequate substitute for 
flesh and blood parents. The legal system has neither the 
resources nor the sensitivity to respond to a growing 
child's ever changing needs and demands. 11147 Recognizing, 
however. the critical nature of human growth and 
development and how essential autonomous parents are in the 
life of a young child, society also recognizes that some 
parents' failures in fulfilling their obligations and 
duties to their children must be tolerated. Family privacy, 
a basic element of American society and an essential part 
of parental autonomy. may mask an exploitation of the 
Position of power held by parents over their children. 
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parental hatred for children, unconsciously or consciously 
expressed anger towards others but directed at children, is 
a real situation in many families today. When parental 
anger becomes potentially harmful to children then privacy 
is not a benefit but is rather a threat to the child. Thus, 
society may justify the expression of its interest by 
intervention. The danger here is that society can 
substitute one harm for another. Because of the inability 
of the law to provide the necessary combination of 
reciprocal affection, the feeling of being wanted and the 
stimulation of inborn capacities, a child's development may 
be at risk when a child is removed from its parents. For 
these reasons Goldstein. et al., ask the question: "What 
ought to be established and by what procedure before the 
'best interests of the child' can be invoked over the 
rights of parents to autonomy, the rights of children to 
autonomous parents, and the rights of both parents and 
h .ld t f · 1 . ?" 147 c 1 ren o am1 y privacy. 
When is it truly justifiable for society to intervene 
on behalf of a chi Id? There are several criteria that any 
intrusive action must meet, according to Goldstein, et al.: 
when there is an over-riding societal interest, as in the 
case of immunization requirements for children, or the 
requirement to receive education. Parents are given "fair 
warning" that this is the expectation of society, and the 
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1 aw w i 1 1 i n t er v en e i f there i s a fa i 1 u re on the part of 
parents to honor these requirements of society. When 
interventions are considered necessary, there are 
protections for the family and procedures of due process to 
protect the autonomy of the family in the case of a 
dispute. Even the cases mentioned, education and 
immunization, have been disputed. 
Unlike the obvious societal interests of education and 
community health, those concerns related to the personal 
lives of family members and occurrances within the walls of 
the home are more difficult to express in terms of 
legislation, and the enforcement of laws in such areas is 
even more difficult. Laws regarding the "abuse" and 
"neglect" of children are by their very nature imprecise, 
and "legislative enactments which simply make 'denial of 
proper care' the standard for investigating or determining 
'neglect,' and 'significant change of circumstances' the 
standard for modifying custody after divorce, provide 
neither meaningful advance warning to parents nor adequate 
.d f t d . . t t. . .,t 5 3 gu1 ance or cour s or a m1n1s ra 1ve agencies. 
This unlimited Earens patriae discretion in familial 
life is used to enforce the interests of society and 
supplant parental judgment with standards of intervention. 
Unwarranted intrusions on family integrity must therefore 
be prevented by fair warning for parents and children and 
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bY restrictions on the powers of state officials. Goldstein 
asks: 
What must be established to overcome the strong 
presumptions in law (a) that parents have the right, 
the capacity. and the obligation to care for their 
children in accord with their own notions of child 
rearing; and (b) that children have the right to 
uninterrupted an~.frrmanent membership in a family 
with such parents? 
This is the question that legislators must answer 
prospectively. 
Parents who are convicted of a sexual offense against 
~heir child or who are acquitted by reason of insanity 
present grounds for state intervention on behalf of the 
child. These grounds refer to infringements upon a child's 
psychological development and recognize that a child's 
sexual development is not in the same category as an 
adult•s and needs to be free from premature erotic ex-
periences or the seductions of a disturbed parent. 
Goldstein, et al suggest that investigations into 
allegations of sexual abuse must proceed with extreme 
caution and with respect for the integrity of the family. 
Only after sexual abuse has been proved should any action 
be taken to provide an alternative placement for the child. 
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This does not refer to physical abuse. The following 
example illustrates the importance of respect for family 
integrity: 
Michelle was admitted to Lincoln Hospital "with 
severe injury to the vaginal area ... the hospital 
reported Michelle as an abused child whose injuries 
were most likely the result of rape, and the 
circumstances surrounding this incident were 
unexplained by the parents. The undisputed evidence 
shows that these allegations are misleading in 
significant respects, that on the afternoon of the 
incident in issue--which was a partial school 
holiday--Maurice was in and out of the home doing 
errands, Marie was washing dishes, and Michelle was 
first using the vacuum cleaner and then taking a 
bath. Marie heard Michelle exclaim from the bathroom 
and saw that she was bleeding. Mrs. Vulon came home 
shortly thereafter, and although the bleeding was 
not extreme took Michelle to Prospect Hospital .... 
The hospital physician called by petitioner 
testified that the bleeding was attributable to a 
laceration of the vagina of about an inch; that he 
could not estimate the source of the laceration with 
any certainty except that rape was ~ot the cause; 
that the condition was probably due to "trauma" of 
some other type and could have been self-inflicted. 
The erroneous suspicion of rape -which persisted 
apparently because of a failure to consult this 
knowledgeable physician--underlay petitioner's 
allegation as to the parents' failure to explain the 
circumstances of Michelle's bleeding. Mrs. Vulon did 
explain the circumstances to petitioner and other 
interrogators to the extent she could ascertain them 
from the children. There is no indication that she 
knew or could have known anything more than she 
recounted. What she failed to do was to accept the 
mistaken allegations of rape an to aid the Bureau in 
its exploration of this suspicion. According to 
petitioner, the parents "refused to believe that 
their child had been raped. They stated that they 
would not go into any conversation about rape with 
their children. They explained that in their 
country, a child did not learn about sex until the 
chi Id was about 15 years of age; nor did the mother 
want me to discuss this with the child .. 
Petitioner's attorney argued that neglect should be 
inferred from the parental failure to explain the 
ba~is for Michelle's' bleeding ... Prosecution of this 
p e t i t i on was 1 a r g e 1 y at t r i bu t ab 1 e , i t i s c 1 e a r , t o 
the parents' refusal of Bureau's request that they 
consent to their children's examination by the Court 
psychiatrist. Such examination apparently was viewed 
in part by the Bureau as a possible method of 
determining whether Maurice committed the non-
existent rape. So intent was the Bureau on its 
proposal that its attorney approached the Court~ 
e~rte before the hearing to ask it to order such 
examinations ... 
This Court believes from observation of these 
parents and children that they have an affectionate, 
mutually-respecting and beneficial relationship. A 
good faith appraisal by responsible and concerned 
parents, such as the Vulons, of the best way to 
handle a problem of child development on which 
reasonable men can differ in their value judgments, 
is not neglect .... While it was necessary and proper 
to conduct some investigation of whether Michelle's 
unusual condition indicated abuse or lack of care, 
the State cannot, without more justification than 
here appears, override the liberty of the parents. 
protected by the Constitution, to bring up their 
c~i~dre1 5ts they think best .... Petition di sm1 ssed. 
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According to Goldstein, et al., in the above case there 
was no grounds for intervention. The confidential 
relationship between parent, patient, and physician should 
be safeguarded. Parents should not have to fear that if 
they seek medical care for their children they will risk an 
investigation by the state. Little has been done to truly 
protect children through laws that require professionals to 
report suspected child abuse. 
When parents inflict injury, repeatedly fail to 
Prevent injury, or attempt to inflict injury on a child, 
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then there are grounds for intervention by the state. Such 
injurY may be passive, as in the case of long confinements 
or starvation, or direct, as in the case of beatings. 
Children cannot judge what is dangerous to them. They may 
willingly drink poisons or climb and fall from dangerous 
heights if unsupervised. Parents must value and protect the 
.well-being of their children as they value and protect 
their own well-being. When parents are repeatedly 
neglectful of their children or deliberately harmful to 
them, then the state has an obligation to protect the child 
from injury. According to Goldstein, there must be "serious 
bodjly injury" and not just the appearance of emotional or 
psychological neglect which is too imprecise to warrant 
. t . t. 147 in rusive ac ions. 
The following examples illustrate the need for 
restrictions in defining parental abuse: 
Miss ih~~· a 22-year-old unmarried "hippy", as she 
neared the end of an uneventful pregnancy, decided to 
keep her baby, having initially expressed the wish to 
have it adopted. The hospital social worker reported 
to the state's protective services that there was 
reason to feel worried about the child's safety and 
well-being because of Miss Shay's change of mind 
about adoption and because she was eccentric in her 
attire as well as her attitude toward food and 
cleanliness . 
•. . . Miss Shay's "peculiar behavior" was of 
considerable concern to the protective services. In 
order to have time to discuss with the mother how 
babies should be cared for. the social worker 
convinced her that it would be desirable to 
hospitalize the child for observation in the ward for 
abused and neglected children--even though, in the 
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opinion of the baby's doctor and the public health 
nurse, the infant girl was "well nourished and 
behaving normally." One evening, fearful of losing 
her child, the mother took the baby and walked out of 
the hospital. Unable to find public transportation, 
she began hitchhiking home with the baby in her arms. 
The police picked them up on the road . 
. . . Two weeks later the social worker petitioned 
the court to place the baby under the guardianship of 
the Welfare Commissioner. The court granted the 
petition, and r~' two-month-old infant was placed in 
a foster home. 
Clearly, guidelines could preclude some of the 
difficulties that can result from such interventions as 
described above. Nonetheless, guidelines are subject to 
interpretation. The statute cited above regarding what 
constitutes neglect was obviously broad enough to allow for 
a range of interpretations. Parenting is not a precise 
science, and there is as much variety in approaches to 
parenting as there are parents in the world. In order to 
have true meaning, guidelines may need to address 
principles of intervention that recognize parental rights. 
A justification for intervention is the safeguarding 
of the chi Id's physical well-being through necessary 
medical treatment. Should parents refuse to authorize 
medical care which is non-experimental and necessary to 
sustain the life of the child. there is grounds for 
intervention by the state. Goldstein includes the 
requirement that "the anticipated result of treatment is 
what society would want for every child--a chance for 
normal healthy growth or a life worth living." 147 When 
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death would not result from the failure to provide medical 
intervention then there would be no legal justification for 
intervention to force parents to relinquish their 
authority. 
Goldstein. et al., place the total burden for the life 
or death decision in the hands of the parents if there is 
anY question as to the quality of life of the child in 
question. According to them, physicians and/or the state 
should not intervene when parents refuse to authorize 
treatment unless there is clear concensus that the life and 
functioning of the child will in all liklihood be "normal" 
after treatment. 
No one has a greater right or responsibility, nor 
can anyone be presumed to be in a better position, 
than a child's parents to decide what course to 
pursue if the medical experts disagree about 
treatment. The same is true if there is no general 
agreement in society that the outcome of a proven 
treatment is clearly preferable to the outcome of 
no treatment. Put somewhat more starkly, how can 
parents in such situations be judged to give the 
wrong answer when there is no way of knowing the 
right answer? In these clrcumstances, if the law's 
guarantee of freedom of belief is to be meaningful, 
parents must have the right to act on their belief 
within the privacy of their family. The burden must 
always be on the state to establish that what may 
be rig~!7 for them is necessarily right for 
others. 
The grounds offered by Goldstein, et al., are 
concerned with unacceptable judgments on the part of 
parents with regard to medical treatment necessary to 
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preserve the life of the child. An example of intervention 
which met the criteria of the suggested grounds is that of 
Judge Murphy of the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia in In re Pogue. 155 Blood transfusions to save the 
life of an otherwise normal infant were authorized by the 
court when the mother refused to authorize the transfusion 
.either for either herself or for the child. Judge Murphy 
did not, however. order blood transfusions for the mother. 
The decision was made to allow the child to live to the age 
of majority in order to make such decisions for himself. 
The parents were declared temporarily incompetent to care 
for the children, but the mother's right to refuse 
treatment was acknowledged. 
Accepting the grounds for intervention offered by 
Goldstein would also allow parents to refuse medical 
intervention for a child with a congenital malformation 
where treatment would save its life but offer no chance of 
cure. Here, Raymond Duff, a pediatrician, is referred to: 
Families know their values, priorities and resources 
better than anyone else. Presumably they, with the 
doctor, can make the better choices as a private 
affair. Certainly, they, more than anyone else, must 
live with the consequences ... If they cannot cope 
adequately with the child and their other 
responsibilities and survive as a family, they may 
feel that the death option is a forced choice ... But 
that is n~) 6necessarily bad, and who knows of a better way? 
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Goldstein, et al., place the responsibility for 
providing those services a handicapped child will require, 
if it is treated and its life is preserved, upon the 
shoulders of society if parents reject treatment. If the 
parents resign totally from responsibility for the child 
when the state insists upon treatment, then the state is 
also accountable to find an adequate placement for the 
child. This creates a serious dilemma because the state 
itself has no proper capacity to be a parent, and the 
availability of adoptive parents for handicapped children 
is Jimited. 
In those cases where the state would seek to compel a 
handicapped child to undergo medical treatment against the 
wishes of his parents and where death is not an issue, but 
rather the correction of some deformity, Goldstein, et al., 
recommend respect for the autonomous decision of the 
parents: 
Under the Family Court Act of New York, Judge Elwyn 
declared 15-year-old Kevin Sampson "a neglected 
child." He made this finding in order to establish 
his authority to veto a decision by Kevin's mother 
not to force her son to undergo a series of 
operations which had been recommended by the 
Commissioner of Health and by duly qualified 
surgeons to correct a facial condition called 
neurofibromatosis . 
... He wrote: "I am persuaded that if this court 
is to meet its responsibilities to this boy it can 
neither shift the responsibility for the ultimate 
decision onto his shoulders nor can it permit his 
mother ... to stand in the way of attaining through 
corrective surgery whatever chance he may have for a 
normal, happy existence, which ... is difficult of 
attainment under the most propitious circumstances, 
but w i 1 1 u n quest i on ab 1 y be 1 Jf!P o s s i b 1 e i f the disfigurement is not corrected. 
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I n the v i e w of Go 1 d st e i n , e t a 1 . , Gen u i n e hum i 1 i t y 
would not have allowed a judge to believe that he, rather 
than Kevin's mother. was best qualified to determine the 
meaning of "a normal and happy existence" for her son. 
. l .5 7 
In the case of Iafelice by Iafelice v. Zarafu, the 
court held that "Physician's failure to disclose that an 
infant would require institutional care for the rest of her 
life even if a life-saving operation was successful does 
not create liability for the "wrongful life" of the child 
based upon a lack of informed consent." 
Wrongful death has always been an issue in the law. 
But wrongful life is a relatively new concept. On October 
2,1980, Renee Iafelice was born prematurely and suffered 
from hydrocephalus and interventricular hemorrhage 
resulting in brain damage. Physicians implanted a plastic 
tube in the brain which drained the excess fluids into the 
peritoneal cavity, a common procedure for the treatment of 
hydrocephalus and necessary to sustain life in such cases. 
Her parents were informed that the procedure was life-sus-
taining and had given their written consent for it. They 
nevertheless sued to recover damages "for the 'wrongful 
life• of the child and the cost of caring for her in the 
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state of total disability." The court rejected the parents' 
appeal: 
The mistaken premise of this appeal is that allowing 
the child to die untreated was a legally viable 
alternative. It rests upon the report of plaintiffs' 
medical expert that intracerebral bleeding involving 
brain tissue on the 27th day of life was "ominous 
and bode<d> an extremely poor prognosis in terms of 
future intellectual and neurological functioning of 
the infant." But nothing in the record suggests that 
a doctor should have been able to foretell the full 
dramatic extent of Renee's eventual disability, and 
we find no support for the belief that a newborn 
child may be put to death through benign neglect on 
the mere expectation that she will, in some 
unquantified way, be a defective person. As the 
Supreme Court wrote in Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 
430, 404 A.2d 8 <1979), "it is life itself that is 
jealou1~~Y safeguarded, not life in a perfect 
state." 
In the case of Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School 
District a California Court held that a school could not 
exclude or prevent a child from attending classes solely on 
the grounds that he posed a risk of transmission of the 
AIDS virus to his classmates or teachers. 158 
Ryan Thomas had become infected with the AIDS virus 
through a blood transfusion at Oakland Children's Hospital. 
The AIDS virus had led to pulmonary and middle ear problems 
and chronic lymphadenopathy. These were brought under 
control and physicians notified the school that no medical 
reason should justify his exclusion from school. It was 
not&d that the AIDS virus is not transmitted through the 
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air but only through infected blood, semen, or vaginal 
fluids, and possibly mother's milk. Also, no case of 
transmission in a school setting had ever been documented. 
On September l, 1906, Ryan was permitted to attend 
school in a regular kindergarten class. Six days later Ryan 
was involved in a fight in which he bit another child 
without breaking the skin. The school informed the parents 
that Ryan would have to be kept at home because another 
bite would pose a significant risk. 
A psychological evaluation was recommended. It was 
determined that Ryan's aggressive behavior was attributable 
to "his level of social and language skills and 
maturity ... below those of his classmates." The psychologist 
could not "predict the form of future aggressive behavior," 
and recommended that Ryan be tutored at home. 
The school district attempted to balance the interests 
of the family and those of the school and community. The 
district refered to the information published by the 
Centers for Disease Control pertaining to the education of 
children with the AIDS virus. Two of these recommendations 
are: 
Decisions regarding the type of educational and care 
setting for HILV-III/LAV infected children should be 
based on the behavior, neurological development, and 
physical condition of the child and the expected 
type of interaction with others in that setting. 
These decisions are best made using the team 
approach including the child's physician, public 
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health personnel. the child's parent or guardian, 
and personnel associated with the proposed care or 
educational setting. In each case, risks and 
benefits to both the infected child and to others in 
the setting should be weighed ... 
... For the infected preschool-aged child and 
for some neurologically handicapped children who 
lack control of their body secretions or who display 
behavior, such as biting, and those children who 
have uncoverable, oozing lesions, a more restricted 
environment is advisable until more is known about 
transmission in these settings. Children infected 
with HILV-IIl/LAV should be cared for an educated in 
settings that minimizy 50 xposure of other children to blood or body fluids. 
The school district failed to present any further data 
or evidence that could prove that the AIDS virus could be 
transmitted by human bites. The court made the following 
conclusions of law: 
l.The School District is a recipient of federal 
funds within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 794, 504 of 
the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 197}. 
Z.Ryan Thomas qualifies as a "handicapped person" 
within the meaning of Section 504. 
J.Ryan Thomas is "otherwise qualified" to attend a 
regular kindergarten class within the meaning of 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197}. The 
defendants failed to prove otherwise, and failed to 
prove that Ryan posed a significant risk of harm in 
the classroom setting. 
4. Ryan was subjected to different treatment from 
other students at the school and he was excluded as 
a consequence of his "handicap." 
~.Defendants did not comply with the criteria of 45 
C.F.R. 88.4Cb>. It provides in relevant part: A 
recipient shall place a handicapped person in the 
regular educational environment created by the 
recipient unless it is demonstrated by the recipient 
that the education of the person in the regular 
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environment with the use of supplementary aids and 
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 
The court noted that Ryan was handicapped under the 
meaning of Section '04: "one who has a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of his 
major life activities, as well as any person with a record 
of, or who is regarded as having, such an impairment." 
The court granted a permanent injunction allowing Ryan 
to attend his regular classes and further awarded 
$4Z,}97.00 to his parents to cover attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
In the case of Johnson v. Sullivan. a federal district 
court in Oklahoma held on June ZZ, 1987, that a denial of 
medical treatment based on disability or socio-economic 
status may violate the United States Constitution. 1 ' 9 This 
highly significant case involves the non-treatment of 
children with spina bifida and represents a dilemma that 
has sparked world-wide debate over the past twenty-five 
years. Children born with spina bifida, (more specifically, 
myelomeningocele), present at birth with a protrusion of 
central nervous system tissues and fluids at a point along 
the spine. The protrusion may occur anywhere along the 
spine, but generally the higher up the lesion, the more 
severe the defect. The incidence of myelomeningocele varies 
with ethnic groups, the Irish having the highest incidence. 
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Those of African descent generally have a lower incidence. 
The range of occurrence is generally from six per thousand 
to one per thousand. Causes are described as multi-
factorial, there being some genetic and some environmental 
factors. A few teratogens have been found causative. 
Improved vitamin supplementation in early prenatal 
development may reduce risk in some individuals. 
The treatment of myelomeningocele was for many years 
thought to be a futile effort. Although some physicians did 
close the backs of these infants, even hundreds of years 
ago, their prognosis was always poor. Surprisingly, some 
did survive. They were paraplegic and had no feeling in 
their lower limbs. Some would survive and live many years 
into adulthood with no treatment at all. Children with 
myelomeningocele usually suffer also from hydrocephalus or 
"water on the brain." In about 85 percent of cases, without 
relief from this condition the head swells, the brain 
deteriorates and the child does not live long. There have 
been exceptions from time to time, even cases of 
individuals living to adulthood with very large untreated 
heads and with intelligence sufficient to lead an 
independent life. 
In the late 1950's, the first successful shunts. or 
tubes to drain the excess fluids in the head, were 
introduced. These were improved over the years with valves 
10} 
and better materials. They were not without their problems 
and would frequently become infected. necessitating 
replacement. In any event, the birth of a child with 
myelomeningocele generally meant many years of burden to 
the family in the care and training of a disabled and often 
retarded child. Physicians, acting in their traditional 
role, usually did everything that was within their means 
and within the bounds of sound judgment to sustain life and 
facilitate procedures for promoting the comfort and well-
being of these children. 
As utilitarian considerations began to be expressed 
under the socialized medicine system of Great Britain and 
as British society contemplated the ever increasing cost of 
health care and the demands that a growing population of 
disabled individuals placed upon education, health care, 
social services and families, it was almost inevitable that 
physicians would respond and answer the call for relief. 
One such physician was Or. John Lorber, Chief of Pediatrics 
at the Sheffield Children's Hospital. Dr. Lorber had been 
in the vanguard of aggressive treatment for children with 
myelomeningocele and had made significant contributions to 
the improvement of their care. He began, however, to 
advocate selection at birth for treatment of myelomenin-
gocele based upon criteria designed to predict the quality 
104 
of life. Only those children who met these criteria <lower-
l eve 1 1 es ions, no other CNS i nvo 1 vement, no sev~re 
hydrocephalus, and no other anomalies) would be treated. If 
children did not meet these criteria, Dr. Lorber would 
write an order on their charts for high dosages of chloral 
hydrate Ca tranquilizer> and water-on-demand. These 
children, drugged as they were, didn't demand anything. 
They simply dehydrated to death. They couldn't even produce 
enough tears to shut their eyelids. 
Society in Great Britain does not often question the 
actions of physicians. Malpractice suits are rare. but when 
Ors. Gross, Cox, Pollay and Barnes of the Oklahoma 
Children's Memorial Hospital in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
advocated the use of criteria similar to Dr. Lorber's, but 
with an even farther reaching social component, and 
reported that twenty-four children had died after hospital 
doctors recommended that no treatment be provided for them, 
the Spina Bifida Association of America and The Association 
for Persons with Severe Handicaps sued to enjoin the 
physicians from using their criteria to deny children 
needed treatment. 160 The criteria are described as "non-
medical, social, and economic criteria--including projected 
intellectual capacity, degree of paraplegia, family wealth 
and resources, an geographical location." Damages were also 
sought by plaintiffs, including infants who were denied 
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beneficial medical treatment, infants who were evaluated, 
their parents and guardians. 
Constitutional guarantees to due process and equal 
protection were allegedly denied. Federal prohibition of 
discrimination based on handicap by recipients of federal 
financial assistance, and federal statutes regulating 
experimentation on human subjects were allegedly violated. 
Damages for medical malpractice were also sought. 
A "quality of life" formula was used by the Oklahoma 
physicians in making their decisions. It was denoted in 
terms of a formula, giving it a scientific appearance: QL = 
NEx<H+S>. QL being quality of life, NE being patient's 
natural endowment, physical and intellectual, H being the 
contribution of home and family and S being the con-
tribution of society. "The nonmedical criteria thus 
included family wealth and resources, projected 
intellectual capacity, projected ability to walk, 
geographical location, and political and fiscal matters, 
such as alleged reduced government spending for medical 
care and school districts' purported inability to provide 
services for handicapped children. These criteria bore no 
relationship to the determination of whether the child 
would have benefited from medical treatment." 
Using such non-medical criteria, treatment for babies 
could be quite different in spite of their identical 
106 
medical diagnosis. The plaintiffs alleged that these 
actions by a state-run hospital were without rational basis 
and violated the equal protection clause of the United 
states Constitution. They also claimed that the infants 
were deprived of a constitutional right to life and liberty 
without procedural safeguards. The parents were deprived of 
their constitutional right to the companionship, care, cus-
tody. and management of their children because they were 
not told of the criteria nor given time and information 
necessary for an informed decision regarding the treatment 
of their children according to their assertions. 
The court refused the request of the hospital and 
doctors to dismiss the claims of the parents that their 
constitutional rights had been violated. Neither did the 
court dismiss the claim that the plaintiff advocacy groups 
had standing to sue and that a court order enjoining the 
hospital from continuing to engage in the discriminatory 
treatment of children could be sought. 
Some of the claims of the plaintiffs were dismissed, 
namely claims for violations of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which prohibits discrimination 
based on physical disability. The court relied on United 
States v. University Hospital, State University of New York 
~!-l!2n~-~~22~ 161 in which it was held that "when the 
intervention of a parental decision, well based on ade-
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quate medical briefing or not, necessarily lies in the path 
of the infant's receipt of the benefit, it cannot be said 
either that the infant is otherwise qualified or that 
discrimination is solely because of handicap." Also 
dismissed were claims of human experimentation without 
safeguards and consent. The doctors were also held to have 
sovereign immunity as state employees. The plaintiffs are 
now appealing the dismissal of the Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act claim. 
Had the physicians who were parties to in this case 
never reported their work in a professional journal, the 
plaintiffs might never have gathered together to present 
their case. The fact is that such procedures are quite 
common throughout the United States. They are done 
discreetly and without public announcement. Physicians who 
treat neonates are constantly weighing in their minds the 
efficacy of interventions to preserve the lives of those 
with debilitating conditions. The trend is toward 
consideration for the demands or perceived needs of the 
parents rather than the best interests of the children. Dr. 
Lorber's criteria have been shown to be medically unsound. 
Like the criteria of Dr. Gross, et al., both medical and 
social factors determined the criteria. Dr. Lorber sought a 
medical solution to a social problem. Dr. Gross and his 
associates sought to openly define the social elements that 
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were just as much a part of Dr. Lorber's criteria. Or. 
Lorber did not cease to treat all but the most promising of 
children with myelomeningocele because of any lack of 
medical feasibility, but rather as a method of dealing with 
the perceived burden upon society that these children 
posed. 
Conflicts Perceived by Parents Relative to the Rearin2_£f 
---
!:heir Handicapped Children 
How children are able to cope with their sickness or 
handicapping condition may often depend on how well their 
parents can cope with their afflictions. The behavior of 
parents is crucial to the way the child copes with his 
. t. 162 
cond1 ion. 
When I heard about my son's 
cras1 6 ~ourse in Christianity, help. 
illness, 
but i t 
I took a 
didn't 
The only thing I really wanted to do last night 
was will both of my children; 1 l 4didn't think I could 
stand another minute of them. 
How parents react to their children's defects depends 
a great deal upon their own background and experiences with 
the handicapped and their feelings about themselves. 
Clara was born in May, 1972, at home. As soon 
as saw her I realized that something was very 
wrong. I could not believe my eyes. The features of 
my second child were those of a Mongol. My rejection 
was total and complete. I just did not want to know 
anything about her. 
I thought that she was going to be a cabbage, 
burdening my husband and myself for the rest of our 
lives ... we were 1%~ing to have to live with a permanent child ... 
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A totally different approach may come when an 
otherwise healthy child is unexpectedly taken i 11. The 
family of a twelve-year old on vacation noticed their son 
was becoming lethargic and miserable. They took him to a 
local doctor, thinking he might have some "flu." Within 
twenty-four hours they were told that he had leukemia. For 
this family the date of diagnosis became a special 
anniversary. There was Christmas, and birthday, and 
Diagnosis Day. Many parents reckon the child's life, not 
from his birthday, but from his day of diagnosis. 
Another common experience at the time when parents are 
told of their child's condition is one of blotting out all 
other information after the initial revelation of their 
child's illness. Parents may hear one word, like blind, or 
tumor, and then not hear anything else for the next half 
hour. 
One area of conflict between the family and society is 
that of the financial burden of caring for and rearing a 
handicapped child. With financial demands being greater 
because of the cost of caring for a child, there is an 
increased burden for the husband to earn more, or a 
resentment that the wife is unable to go back to work as 
soon as she might have liked to, or that she is totally 
unable to go back to work because she is caring for the 
child who needs constant attention at home. If the husband 
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works overtime, there is always the feeling, expressed or 
unexpressed, that he is escaping home difficulties by 
staying at work. Some fathers find that they must give up 
opportunities for advancement in their career because they 
fear that moving away from a trusted medical facility will 
be detrimental to the welfare of their children. A survey 
of parents of children with cystic fibrosis revealed that 
one-third of the fathers had given up opportunities for 
advancement in their careers because they wanted to stay 
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near a hospital they trusted. Families may still find it 
necessary to cease all social life once they have the 
responsibility of a sick or handicapped child in the home. 
They cannot find anyone who will babysit: "All our friends 
are frightened that something might happen." However, it 
may be the parents who are more frightened than any 
potential babysitter. The concern is very real to them. As 
long as a child is unable to walk, there is a lack of 
independence for the family. When a mother has a child who 
is growing large and heavy but is still not ambulatory, 
then the mother is reluctant to go where a lack of ambu-
lation causes difficulty, either on public transportation 
or in a car where she would be required to lift the child 
into the car. Such problems are experienced by all parents 
with infants, but parents expect normal children to grow up 
and be able to care for themselves. The handicapped child 
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maY remain like a baby, getting heavier and stronger all 
the time, and the chronically sick child, because of his 
dependence on medical care, remains his parents' 
responsibility. 
The parent of a child with a life-threatening disease 
can never predict what will happen if everything in life 
continues just as it is at any moment. Parents feel that 
they cannot plan for a vacation with any certainty, and 
they cannot bear to contemplate the long-term future. It is 
often very emotionally traumatic, even heart-breaking, to 
hear a child who is likely to die within a year talk about 
what he is going to do when he grows up. A different set of 
questions is brought about by the child who does not have a 
life-threatening condition. The parents ask whether or not 
their child's children will also be affected. Will their 
child be able to have some degree of independence, 1 ive in 
a house on his own, get married, or take out life 
insurance? Will he become better or worse? At first, these 
questions may be asked by parents. When children reach 
adolescence, these questions are very important to them 
alsD. Another group of questions is aroused by those 
children who have a mental handicap as well as a physical 
handicap. One asks if they will ever learn to walk, or 
talk, or be able to go to an ordinary school. Will they be 
able to manage to work? Will they be able to get married or 
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have children? These questions can produce chronic anxiety 
in a family. They are constant and nagging questions. One 
anticipates that medical science will make some advances. 
Whether or not these advances will be able to help one's 
child is difficult to ascertain. Another question parents 
often ask: "What will happen to the child when we die?" 
Not all parents express a feeling of isolation simply 
because they have a sacred handicapped child, but most 
report a feeling that they are being pushed towards 
It . 167 i so a 1 on . They are made to feel different, and they 
find that other families really do not understand or seem 
to want to understand what they are going through. The most 
common request sent to In Touch, a circular written for 
parents of the mentally handicapped, has been from parents 
who wish to be put in touch with others whose child has a 
condition similar to theirs. People's attitudes have 
contributed to this isolation. People generally have little 
experience in their daily lives with chronic sickness or 
severe handicap. They have no framework within which they 
might deal with these situations. Ignorance may lead to 
fear, and fear may form a powerful barrier. As one mother 
put it: "You would think cerebral palsy was catching the 
way people behave.u 168 Some isolation may be the result of 
the behavior of the family itself. The energy required, 
both physically and emotionally, in caring for the sick or 
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handicapped child both by night and by day can be 
exhaustively taxing. There is less time, therefore, for 
establishing relationships with other people. The whole 
family may focus on the handicapped child, whereas before 
his coming there might have been many activities, such as 
athletics or entertainment or hobbies in which the family 
engaged. At a parents' discussion group one father was 
talking about his job and he was asked if he ever thought 
about his sick daughter during his working day. He paused 
and replied, "I never think about anything else. 11169 
The element of guilt is difficult to define. Many 
professionals anticipate that parents will experience some 
degree of gui It either because of having produced a 
congenitally handicapped child or because of having been so 
negligent as to permit a child to become ill. Dr. Reith 
relates: 
One psychiatrist states that if parents place their 
child in a hospital they will feel guilty because 
unconsciously this means that they are trying to get 
rid of him. Whereas another psychiatrist has 
maintained that if parents keep their child at home 
they will have guilt feelings because they are 
deprirdng it of the best medical and nursing 
care! 
Landsdown has described four situations in which guilt is 
likely to occur. 
11 5 
When the chi Id's condition is known to be inherited and 1 . 
the parents suspect that there is a risk but do nothing 
to find out more. 
My first reaction on being told was to 
remember that my mother had told me that two 
cousins had died of it, and I blamed myself 
for not thinking of it. 
z. When mothers have continued to smoke, drink heavily, or 
take drugs during pregnancy. 
}. When parents have delayed seeking medical help at the 
first indication of abnormal behavior. 
4. When parents feel that they are not doing the utmost 
possible for the child, either by obtaining the best 
medical care or by insuring that social education 
. . f t b 171 prov1s1ons are as per ec as can e. 
Parents may find themselves subject to increased 
feelings of revulsion or anger or a feeling that life is 
just all too much. It may be a reaction to a specific 
situation or to a series of situations which wells up and 
threatens to become uncontrollable. One mother, who had 
lost two boys, was told that her third child was mentally 
h d · d 172 M . t t. d t d b 1 b d an 1cappe . any s1 ua ions are un ers an a y eyon 
the ability of an individual or a couple to cope with. Such 
a case was that of the unmarried mother of two boys under 
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five. both handicapped, neither of whom would ever be able 
17} 
to walk. One mother of a child born with an ugly blemish 
over her left eye was abandoned by her husband the day the 
174 girl was born. These are the parents who are revolted by 
their children's inadequacies and are sometimes incapable 
of carrying on for another hour. These are not ''unnatural" 
feelings as one might imagine They are common, 
biologically normal, and have to be faced. 
Parents must also deal with the limited understanding 
of their neighbors and friends. "How can you possibly 
punish him? He has cancer." Some parents may indeed find it 
impossible to discipline a sick or handicapped child as 
they do one who is normal. This may result in very unhappy 
little boys and girls who do not enjoy a life in which they 
always get their own way, who have tantrums when others 
thwart them, and who receive the message that even in 
naughtiness they are different from other children. Some 
parents may have deeply rooted feelings of which they are 
themselves not fully aware and which make them want to keep 
the child a baby, for it is acceptable to have a totally 
dependent baby and so it feels more comfortable to pretend 
that there is nothing wrong with the child, that he is just 
still very young. 
The problem of denying the illness may be a cause of 
conflict between the family and those outs id~. Some 
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families do, from time to time, play with the idea that 
there is really nothing wrong with their child. These are 
the parents of children who, for long periods of time seem 
to be quite well. They look healthy, run around with 
friends, eat and sleep well, and get on well at school. At 
times 1 ike this some parents even stop the child's 
.treatment. They usually start again quickly when the child 
suffers a relapse. Some families will accept a physical 
diagnosis but stubbornly refuse to believe what they are 
told about a child's mental state. No matter how many tests 
are given they always find an excuse: the child is shy, 
doesn't like hospitals or clinics, has a cold, had a cold 
last week, is lazy, playing everyone up. Sooner or later 
they have to come to terms with the extent of the handicap 
and this can be very difficult for them to accept. 
Another situation of conflict arises with brothers and 
sisters. By the time they are eleven years old, five of 
every six children have a brother or sister. Nearly all 
children who have siblings spend more time with them than 
they do with their father, and once they are ten, they see 
more of their siblings than they do of their mother. 175 In 
the last few years there has been a gradual accumulation of 
knowledge about the sibling of sick and handicapped 
children. Most of it has come from interviews with their 
176 parents. The birth of a normal brother or sister in a 
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normal family can make the handicapped child feel jealousy 
and revert to a much younger behavior. Some children start 
to wet the bed again. or demand to be fed from a bottle, or 
even stop talking. One study of a series of children 
suggested that over half were disturbed. to some extent. by 
the arrival of another child. 177 It is not surprising then, 
that the birth of a handicapped child, or one who is 
clearly sick, or the development of an illness in an 
otherwise healthy child, can lead to problems. As the 
family balance is shifted. jealousy can develop in the 
normal child. Landsdown points out a number of influences 
that the handicapped child may have on siblings: 
1. Children who are younger than the patient are generally 
more vulnerable than those who are older. This is 
probably because the attention often given to younger, 
healthy children is diverted to the handicapped child. 
2. Girls are more vulnerable than boys, perhaps because 
they are seen as substitute mothers. 
3. The siblings of the handicapped child whose condition is 
inherited or life-threatening, who has, for example, 
muscular dystrophy, are more powerfully affected than 
are the siblings of a child having a chronic, non-fatal 
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condition like cerebral palsy. Children fear that they, 
or their children, might develop muscular dystrophy. 
and they are often given far too little information to 
help them to allay such fears. 
4. A major problem develops when one child has a 
degenerative condition and then a sibling develops the 
same condition and can anticipate what will happen to 
him. Margaret Atkin, a social worker who has helped 
many such families, quotes John Dryden to illustrate 
this point: 
With unerring doom. 
He sees what is, and was, and what is to 178 come. 
5. There is no characteristic disorder evident in siblings, 
but attention-seeking behavior, jealousy, and 
regression to an earlier stage can all be expected. 171 
The element of fear is a significant attribute of the 
conflict parents have with society over the rearing of 
their handicapped children. Parents may feel rejected by 
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society as a whole or by social and professional groups. 
The professional community or the community in general may 
have fears related to the integration of the handicapped 
into their environment. Fear is one of many parents' first 
responses to the birth of a handicapped child. They may 
fear that they are unable to cope with the difficulties of 
rearing a handicapped child. They may be apprehensive and 
fearful of the changes that the presence of a handicapped 
child in the family will bring about. As the years pass, 
the nature of parental fear may change in content, in 
quality, and in intensity, but because of the uncertainty 
with which a family with a handicapped child must always 
live, there will always be a certain degree of fear. 
Parents agonize about their own limitations and about the 
restrictions that their handicapped child will impose upon 
them. Parents are fearful of the world's responses to their 
child's manifestation of limited skills and methods, 
abnormal appearance and comprehension different from the 
expected response to the chld without a handicap. They 
worry about their child's future, about themselves, and 
about the siblings. The siblings themselves may also 
express fear and anxiety about the part the handicapped 
Child will take in their lives and in the 1 ife of the 
family as a whole. The mother of a child with spina bifida, 
for example, trembles when she contemplates her daughter's 
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adolescence and adulthood. 115 Her daughter is four now. She 
cannot walk by herself, although she is learning to get 
around with a walker. The mother believes that the worst 
problems will come later. "People tell me things will get 
better, but don't see how they can." She dreads the 
inevitable decisions. "Ought my daughter to go to the local 
public school?" for example, or "Would she thrive better in 
a special setting?" The mother knows that as the years pass 
the child will grow more conscious of her own differences. 
"Right now it's mainly I who feel it," the mother has told 
the mother's group, "but as she gets older, I'm worried 
whether kids will tease her, and how she'll feel when they 
run off to play and she can't. Right now, they'll run off, 
and she's left sitting by herself in the corner. feel sad 
for her, but she doesn't seem to notice." Parents of the 
more severely handicapped children, the profoundly 
retarded, the autistic, and those with multiple 
disabilities may face a different set of issues. When 
1 ifelong dependence seems inevitable, the prospect of 
institutionalization darkens the horizon. One mother said, 
Sometimes I think I will die from hurting to think 
of his future without us, for now he has love, good 
health, happy times, and lots of work <therapy) to 
do. What does he have to look forward to if he 
cannot im- prove, a bed wit~ 5 bad smells and only a dimness of life around him?" 
l2Z 
Josh Greenfield, whose son, Noah, is autistic, talks 
to another parent about what lay ahead. After surveying the 
possibilities, they agreed: "Most of us, for all our hopes 
and dreams, are still fattening up our children for the 
inevitable institutional kill." 179 In her book about her 
son who suffered from hemophilia, Susan Massie describes 
her fears: 
There is nothing to do but learn to live with fear 
in constant dread of the unknown. Such a way of life 
does strange things to the personality. Fear can 
grip and dominate you until you are unable to move 
in any direction. A person living with hemophilia 
can finally become paralyzed with fright, like a rat 
in a maze who is met with an electric shock at every 
innocent looking exit, until finally he simply turns 
franticrJdY in circles, afraid to try any more 
doors ... 
Parents fear for themselves, for the prospect of 
growing old, declining in strength and even dying. The 
parent of normal, healthy children anticipates a natural 
cycle of growing up and leaving home. Children who require 
an extraordinary expenditure of energy and may exhaust the 
physical strength of their parents will nonetheless grow 
older and demand less as their parents also grow older. A 
child's severe disability disrupts the natural cycle and 
the child may remain dependent beyond the parents' 
strength, or health, or lifetime. Parents may have to 
contemplate their old age long before they would otherwise 
do so. Helen Featherstone, in her book about her retarded 
son. recalls: 
J remember, during the early months of Jody•s I ife, 
the anguish with which I contemplated the distant 
future. Jody cried constantly, not irritable, hungry 
cries, but heart-rending shrieks of pain. Vain 
efforts to comfort him filled my nights and days. 
One evening when nothing seemed to help, I went 
outside intending to escape his misery for a moment, 
hoping that without me he might finally fall asleep. 
Walking in the summer darkness I imagined myself at 
seventy, bent and wrinkled, hobbling up the stairs 
to minister to Jody, now over 40, but still crying 
and helpless. Parents' thoughts linger tin. The 
costs--human, as well as monetary, of raising such a 
child, and on the probability that 11l_~ey will 
ultimately fail to provide what he needs. 
Parents may have difficulty dealing with their own 
fear regarding their capacity to even love their child or 
face the reality of their child's likely future. Greenburg, 
in his account, relates an interesting story regarding the 
reality of his son's schooling: 
We visited the nearby school for retardates, a red 
brick building set on the side of a hill, like a 
bunker. There is little space. In a railroad-flat 
setup, they have three classes: younger children, 
older children, and adult retardates. The classes 
for the children look like happy bedlams, mongoloids 
running around, kids screaming, their muscles 
twitching. We came in time to watch one of the adult 
retardates celebrate his birthday. The singing of 
"'Happy Birthday", the blowing out of candles, the 
serving of the ice cream and cake. Of course, they 
were all like children. Those close-eyed, sweetly 
vacuous heads. I almost cried. I refused to imagine 
that Noah, my 8 fon, belonged in such a place with 
such a group. 
The parent in such an encounter may find himself 
recoiling from the retarded children and wondering whether 
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he will be able to care for his own child when his child is 
older. like those he sees. 
Fear is also generated unnecessarily by friends and 
professionals who want to persuade parents to believe 
particular things or behave in certain ways. Those who 
believe that institutionalization serves the best interests 
of parents and children often paint an excessively 
pessimistic picture of a disabled child's prospects. Jn 
Helen Brown's book, Y~i~~Q~~~~-~hll..9_. she describes how 
her doctor urged her to give up her infant daughter, 
asserting that "this child will be a vegetable. If you 
spend the rest of your life taking care of her, she'll 
never . ,,182 H l . t h d recognize you. er neuro og1s , w o encourage 
the Browns to take Karen home, assured them that she would 
be handicapped only by a slight limp. Both the pediatrician 
and the neurologist were incorrect. Professionals and 
friends and relatives who tell their frightful tales do so 
in good faith. In many cases they hope to persuade 
conscientious parents to institutionalize their children, 
and they choose an argument designed to diminish parental 
guilt. They see institutionalization as a necessary step 
for the good of those whom they care for. If the parents do 
place their child in an institution, a dark view of the 
child•s developmental potential may help reconcile them to 
a difficult choice. Parental fears can be debilitating. 
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Those who attempt to dispel I these fears often fail because 
the fears are so firmly grounded in reality. The parents' 
grim image of available residential care, for example, 
often reflects reality only too accurately. Some parents 
respond with resentment toward the bleak picture painted by 
manY professionals who fail to show them that the future 
~eed not be so bleak as it has been pictured. Claire and 
Joseph Canning, whose daughter Martha has Down's Syndrome, 
believed that their grief would have been more bearable "if 
just one person had come to us to tell us that despite our 
sadness there was hope, that this was not the end of the 
world. but rather 183 a challenge." Grandparents of the 
handicapped child can be especially difficult for the 
parents to deal with. One instance of this difficulty is 
the experience Betty Piper had with her mother-in-law and 
father-in-law and even with her own mother: 
I remember the tears of my father-in-law and 
the reluctance of my mother-in-law to visit me in 
the hospital when Jeff was born. I remember the hurt 
and the anger I felt as my mother rattled on about 
what she and a friend had had for dinner the night 
before and how hot and humid it was in the hospital. 
She talked about going to the beach, while all I 
could think about was whether our baby would live. 
I was shocked when my mother-in-law demanded to 
know 'who signed for that baby's operation'. 
Ignoring my bewildered silence she pressed on with 
unconcealed hostility. "Someone had to sign." Then I 
finally dredged up. "I guess Carl did. I don't 
remember who did ... 
"y 
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have burdened my son for life." she 
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These conflicts between the parents of handicapped 
children and their own parents are understandable in the 
context of the grandparents' point of view. Having had more 
experience in life, they see the birth of a handicapped 
child from the larger perspective of the effect that this 
child will have on the total family. They see how radically 
a child's defect will alter family life. The mother and 
father of a handicapped child have an unqualified need for 
comfort and understanding as they cope with their confusion 
and disappointment. It is understandable that they may 
become infuriated when their own parents withdraw to mourn, 
or worse, strike out at them in anger. But the grandparents 
have also lost what they had hoped for in a normal 
grandchild. The retarded child, as he grows older, may 
present more problems for his siblings as they attempt to 
handle other children's assessment of the retardation. One 
mother describes a conversation she had with the siblings 
of her retarded son: 
One day after school Chris confronted me. There was a 
white 1 ine around his mouth. He suddenly looked very 
small and vulnerable for eight years old. 
"Mom," he asked, "what is a vegetable?" 
I knew immediately what was coming. In spite of 
my intentions to always give honest answers, I heard 
my s e 1 f s t a 1 1 i n g . V e g e t a b 1 e ? 0 h , y o u k n o w , p e a s , 
carrots ... 
"No, not that kind! You know what I mean. The 
kids on the bus said my brother is a vegetable." 
"It's just a word." Suzanne, then ten years old, 
broke in. "It's a word some of the kids use when they 
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want to hurt you or be mean and nasty. Like dumb-dumb, 
rattle-brain and ...• " she swallowed, "retard." 
"Do the kids say things J ike that?" I wi1~ed I hadn't asked. Their faces told the whole story. 
When a community is supportive of the family of a 
handicapped child, they expect a certain standard of 
behavior on the part of the family. Lucy Forrest described 
to a mothers group the ways that neighbors and strangers 
had helped her and her husband Kevin to implement a 
demanding treatment plan for Christopher: 
Volunteers came in daily to pattern the 1 ittle 
boy: contributions helped the family finance bi-
monthly trips to a distant clinic, but this support, 
given freely during the early months when the 
Forrests devoted every minute to their baby, almost 
evaporated when they started to pick up the threads 
of their pre- vious life, specifically when Lucy 
began to repaper their new house. Some of the 
volunteers acted shocked and even hostile. Their 
reaction wounded the young couple; they felt that 
the world exacted a heavy price for its sympathy, 
asking that they devote their entire 1eives and give 
up pleasures others take for granted. 
The Forrests' experience points to parallel perils on 
a larger scale. When the families of handicapped children 
accept organized public assistance, providers of services 
for disabled children may elicit significant anger and 
bitterness from the children's parents and cause heartache 
for the whole family. Although families of severely 
impaired children had in the past little hope of assistance 
from the public sector, and parents without the financial 
capacity had to depend on luck and charity to meet their 
ll8 
child's needs, services have improved in recent years. 
federal laws now guarantee appropriate education for all 
children, regardless of their disability. Nonetheless, 
parents and children in many areas continue to require 
services that are either unavailable or else available only 
in a form that mocks the humanity of those needing the 
services. The quality of residential facilities for the re-
tarded hurts parents deeply and demonstrates how little the 
larger society values these children. This hurt can turn to 
anger. Of all the sources of conflict and targets of 
parental anger, the medical profession is usually the first 
to be named. Parents express anger about the manner in 
which their doctor or doctors present the initial 
diagnosis. According to Janet Bennett, "Hardly anyone is 
pleased with the way they find out about their child's 
handicap." 187 The parents complain about the doctor's 
reluctance to believe them and to respect their burning 
desire to know what is really wrong. Parents complain about 
cowardice and equivocation. They complain that doctors 
swing from one infuriatingly unrealistic extreme to the 
other. They complain that hospital staffs treat them 
without tact, consideration, or even common humanity, 
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Robert and Susan Massie took their infant eon to a major 
hospital to learn why he had continued to bleed after a 
routine test. 
The hospital personnel treated us with that 
blend of condescension and coldness that I have now 
learned to know well and to hate. They took Bobby 
away. No one would explain what was going to be done 
to hi~. Mysteriously, they said only, "We are going 
to take some blood." He was taken from my arms, my 
roly-poly, jolly baby, and rolled away down the 
hall. Then, chillingly, I heard from far down that 
hall the terrible screams. I was filled with panic. 
The screaming went on and on. We asked what was 
happening. "They must not be finished yet," was the 
curt answer. After nearly an hour, I was so agitated 
that Bob said, "I'm taking you downstairs so you 
won't have to hear it anymore." We went to the 
cafeteria. When I came up I could still hear his 
screams; by now they were hoarse. Beside myself, 
ignoring the nurses who called after me, "you can't 
go down there," I ran down the hall in the direction 
of the noise and into a room with other babies and 
cribs. I found Bobby, still screaming, exhausted 
from crying so long. He was all alone. I snatched 
him up, rocked him, and kissed him. In a few moments 
his crying stopped. I found out later that the 
procedure itself had taken only ten minutes. They 
had taken blood from the jugular vein and dumped him 
back in his crib, leaving him to cry, although we 
had been only a few yards down the hall and could 
have calmed him quickly. It was the first of many 
such experiences. In the years ahead I was seared by 
the lack of understanding, by the lack of 
compassion, yes, the cruelty--the cruelty, that 
comes from the rigid and arbitrary rules practiced 
in some of the best hospitals we have . 
... <The doctor's) eyes looked down at the floor 
as he hurriedly came in. There were no 
preliminaries. He announced coldly and matter-of-
factly, "The child has classical hemophilia. There 
llO 
will be compensations, you may be sure." And with 
these enigTliic words, he turned on his heel and 
walKed out. 
~nger. Pain and Loneliness 
When parents do not Know the diagnosis of their 
child's lness they may be frightened. They may be 
vulnerable. They have already suffered days, or perhaps 
even months or even years, of doubt and searching from 
physician to physician. They may stand exposed and 
powerless before the experts. Indifference, condescension, 
and equivocation wound them deeply. 
Parents may experience anger that is beyond what they 
themselves feel is appropriate for the damage that they are 
subjected to. An example is that of a mother who, upon 
learning that her child had toxoplasmosis, expressed anger 
towards her physician when he reassured her that her future 
children would be free from infection. "I knew he was 
pointing out one of the few bright spots in a darkening 
sky, but I had not asked about my childbearing future. I 
remember thinking angrily, 'I don't care about future 
children.' I love this baby. Don't dismiss him as though 
someone else could replace him." 
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Helen Featherstone offers an interesting explanation 
of parental anger and the direction it could constructively 
taKe: 
Parents' anger, when expressed clearly and 
forcefully, can help keep professionals honest and 
teach them the limits of acceptable behavior. Some 
doctors apologize and change their ways when they 
learn they have hurt a child or a family. Even when 
discussion brings no res- elution, the parent who 
complains appropriately avoids the curdled taste of 
undigested anger. However, doctors command more 
respect than parents, both in the agencies serving 
the disabled and in the world at large. This great 
disparity in power shapes the relationship of 
physician to parent and reduces the likelihood of 
honest exchange. Many parents see the inwardly or 
complain to friends but avoid confronta- tions with 
the pnofessionals themselves. These mothers and 
fathers worry about losing services or acquiring a 
disparaging label. Their fears reflect reality all 
too well. Organizations sometimes take criti,~~ as 
evidence of a parent's emotional disturbance. 
Siblings Perceptions 
The siblings of handicapped children stand with one 
foot in the world of normal individuals and the other in 
the world of their exceptional family. Ordinary children 
will sometimes treat a handicapped child cruelly and 
associate his siblings with the handicapped child. The 
sibling may be forced to mediate, to explain, and sometimes 
to choose between conflicting loyalties. This can make him 
angry with the "normal" world, with his disabled sibling, 
and with himself. A young college student whose brother 
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suffers from severe hearing loss and deformities of both 
arms described an incident he had experienced: 
This summer I worked at a playground. One day a 
bunch of kids and I were playing. Everybody stands 
in a circle and throws a ball to one another. And 
all of a sudden these little kids started dropping 
away from the circle. I was playing with them so I 
did not really pay much attention to why some kids 
were dropping out. It's just slowly getting more and 
more quiet and I turned around: my brother was 
standing there. Of course, this is summertime, he 
has short sleeves on and these kids, even now I'm 
tempted to say these little creeps, it really upsets 
me--they made a circle around my brother, just made 
a circle around him and started looking at him, and 
I just did not know what to do. On the one hand I 
felt like saying, and it upsets me now to think that 
I would say what I wanted to say, "Get up and get 
out of here." Even now that I say it, it is totally 
disgusting and at the same time I wanted to say to 
all those little kids, "If you don't move now I'm 
going to throw you all over the fence." Even now I 
have not resolved it--more than anything else it 
shows me that I have not really come to terms with 
the whole thing. Furthermore, it gives me some 
appreciation for what mr9arother has to go through. 
He has to go everyplace. 
Reflections on the Family Process with a Handicapped Child 
There are conflicts which arise between parents and 
the professionals who serve them and their handicapped 
children. By virtue of the situation itself, some of these 
conflicts are unintentional, but they arise out of the 
process in which both parents and professionals deal with 
the child's difficulties. Parents, at the time of their 
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child's diagnosis, have a great need for information. At 
the most basic level, they need a labeling of the dif-
ficulty. They also want to know as much as possible about 
the origin or etiology of his disability and what it's 
going to mean for their child's life. Some of these 
questions cannot be answered right away, and the resultant 
uncertainties can be a source of further conflict. Parents 
will often suspect a difficulty before anyone else, but the 
official diagnosis comes from a professional, or perhaps 
from a school. Physicians play an important role in the 
life of most children or families. They see the child at 
birth, for immunizations and checkups, and parents most 
frequently will discuss their concerns about their child 
with their physician before they consult another 
professional. Parents, however, frequently complain that 
physicians fail to respond candidly to their concerns. 
The clinical picture the child presents is often a 
confusing one, and the physician shares the parent's 
uncertainties. Sometimes a wait-and-see attitude is 
appropriate. But some doctors will postpone actually 
confronting parents with an unpleasant reality even when 
the problem is obvious and apparent. In a study of twenty 
children with Thalidomide deformities, Ethel Roskis reports 
that the doctor in the delivery room assured more than half 
of the mothers of their children's normality. 191 Consider-
1}4 
ing the obvious nature of these children's deformities, one 
must assume that some of the obstetricians consciously 
deceived the mothers. When the diagnosis is not clear, as 
is typical in the case of slow development or minimal brain 
damage, parents and physicians sometimes collaberate 
unconsciously, minimizing the significance of the problems: 
Thus, until this point, we had essentially 
denied to ourselves the existence of a problem 
serious enough to require seeking help for it. We 
had built up a fine rationale for explaining Joan to 
ourselves. Her prematurity, her individual rate of 
development, a probable immaturity of her nervous 
system, and frustration based on lack of language 
were some of the alibis that lulled us into 
inactivity. 
We plodded on with the eager anticipation and 
fervent hope that each new day would release some 
words we hoped lay merely dormant within Joan. This 
expectation remained unfulfilled. The days continued 
to be long and miserable. They varied only in that 
some f'iffe more intolerable than others. None were 
good. 
Reassurances can immobilize some parents, even when 
they apparently appreciate it. The parents of a boy with 
Down's Syndrome waited six months before hearing of their 
son's handicap. The mother later suspected that the doctor 
had attempted to test her own readiness for diagnostic 
information by remarking on the baby's brightness at the 
three-month checkup. The effort backfired: instead of 
talking about her worries, the mother clutched at the 
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encouraging comment "as a drowning man would ai a 
"193 
straw. 
Physicians may hesitate to confront parents with the 
truth when they so "greedily devour little morsels of 
assurances." When a physician finally does offer a 
diagnosis, after weaving his way through the intricacies of 
a confusing clinical problem, he may not have met entirely 
a parent's need for information. Parents do not always 
understand the diagnosis at first. The interviews may be 
brief. They may be in shock having heard their child 
labeled, even if they themselves noted the problem 
previously and asked for a diagnosis. They may not think 
clearly, or listen, or ask appropriate questions. Medical 
jargon may also be a hindrance to good communication. 
Parents often declare that they do not understand what went 
on in their interview with their physician. Professionals 
often use language designed to protect their patients from 
unpleasant stereotypes and in the process cause them to 
miss the point altogether One mother reports her 
encouragement when the doctors summed up her child's 
problems with the phrase "delayed development." To her the 
word £~1~~~£ suggested that her child was now slow, but 
would catch up later. She thought of a train that was 
delayed: it is late, but eventually it does arrive. She 
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realized later the bleak truth. "That's not what it meant 
at all. It means that she is a retarded child. 11194 
Some professionals who are undecided about the 
benefits of an early diagnosis may feel that "a few more 
good years" may be helpful. Usually parents know that 
something is amiss with their child, and they may incubate 
fantasies which undermine their happiness as effectively as 
the truth would. They may be more reassured by a convincing 
diagnosis. Most parents are eager to find out more about 
the causes as well as the cures of their child's problem. 
Sometimes this aggressive curiosity is upsetting to some 
professionals. They worry that further knowledge might 
provoke more self-reproach. The professional often responds 
that the treatment of the condition is more important than 
its origin. But parents who do not know the cause of their 
child's disability may torture themselves in all sorts of 
ways. They may fear that they are not capable of bearing 
normal children. A truth which is difficult to bear can 
often rescue a parent from self-destructive fantasies. In 
the case of the Thalidomide babies, Ethel Roskis found that 
twenty mothers felt greatly relieved when they learned that 
a drug they had taken during pregnancy had caused the 
deformities. They had presumably suspected something even 
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worse. Professionals who withhold information or evade 
questions imply that they doubt the good sense of the 
parents. When they discuss the child's problems candidly, 
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theY convey respect. Kelley, et al., report that one mother 
said. "In a sense we do become experts on our children. And 
it really helps to know that somebody in the professional 
world thinks that you're intelligent and that you can 
handle the information, whatever it happens to be. 11195 
PARENT-SCHOOL CONFLICTS 
Parents of children in special educational programs 
have frequently been in conflict with schools. They have 
fought hard to obtain appropriate services for their 
children and they have fought equally hard at times to get 
their children out of special education programs when they 
have felt that these programs were not in the best interest 
of their children. 
Parents of minority handicapped children have often 
been faced with the double problem of finding appropriate 
educational services and dealing with discrimination in the 
schools. Two landmark cases, Ql~~~-~~-~i~i~-~£~£~_£f 
Education <1970) and Larry P. v. Wilson Riles <1971), both 
brought in the state of California, dealt with the 
disproportionately high minority enrollments in programs 
196,197 for the educable mentally retarded. These cases were 
decided in favor of the parents and caused dramatic changes 
in educational programming and the way educators go about 
identifying EMR children. Public law 94-142, passed in 
1975, incorporated many of the points made by plaintiffs in 
these cases. Nondiscriminatory assessment, placement into 
the least restrictive environment, and the assurance of due 
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process and parental participation were issues brought up 
in these cases which 94-142 was designed to address. 
The problem of racial segregation was one of the 
primary reasons behind the abolishment of self-contained 
classes for EMR children. 198 The mandate in the Diana case 
directly affected EMR enrollments in California. Between 
1969 and 1980, enrollments decreased from 55.519 to 19,370. 
The correction of the disproportionately high minority 
enrollments was only slightly facilitated. Black student 
enrollment in EMR declined from 27.1% to 23.2% and Hispanic 
enrollment decreased from 28.2% to 22.6% in this time 
frame. 199 In 1982 it was found that 17.5% of the children 
classified as mentally retarded in California schools were 
Black even though Blacks constitute only 9-10% of the 
school population. This discrepancy was not found for other 
ethnic minority groups. 
In 1983 the U.S. Department of Education reported that 
the number of children classified as mentally retarded in 
the schools had declined by 33% since 1976. 200 Projections 
based on an Office for Civil Rights survey in 1978 
estimated that 3.46% of Black children were classified as 
EMR while only .98% of Hispanic children and 1.07% of White 
children had received that designation. In New Jersey 17.8% 
of the total school population was Black, but 43% of the 
children designated as EMR in that state in 1983 were 
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Black. In Ohio it was found that for every White child in 
an EMR program there were 3 Black children enrolled.ZOl 
Even when EMR children are "mainstreamed" they are 
often educated in racially segregated settings. It has been 
noted that little in America has changed for Black children 
in the public schools since the 1954 Br~~~-Y~-~~rd_of 
Education case. Kenneth Clark noted that most Black 
--~-----
children "are still required by various evasive devices to 
attend racially segregated and inferior schools."ZOZ In 
1980 15% of all Black children in California attended 
schools with 90-100% Black enrollments. Schools with pre-
dominantly minority enrollments were attended by 61% of the 
minority children in the state, an 87% increase since 1968 
in the number of minority children attending schools with 
50% or more minority children. "The degree of isolation has 
become critical, with 43% of all Hispanic students and 43% 
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of all Black students attending segregated schools." 
The problem of reverse discrimination was noted by 
204 MacMillan and Meyers. Part of the mandates handed down 
in California subsequent to the Diana case included quotas 
for ethnic representation in EMR classes proportional to 
total enrollment in the school district. When a school 
district was "at quota" for minority children in EMR 
Programs, and a regular classroom teacher encountered a 
child with a severe academic problem, a recommendation was 
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made to the parents for an educational assessment for 
possible special education placement only if the child was 
Caucasian. Thus services may not be provided to minority 
children in need of them for fear of upsetting the quota. 
Parents applied to the courts for relief when they 
felt that their children were being discriminated against 
by being classified as mentally retarded. It was felt that 
these children's low scores on intelligence tests were the 
result of cultural bias and reflected lack of opportunity 
for these children. In reaction, educators, fearful of 
being labeled segregationists, accommodated these children 
with IQs between 70 and 90 in the regular educational 
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programs and simply tolerated their nonach1evement. 
Learning disability programs could not touch these 
children because, in order to accommodate a child into an 
LO program, there must be a marked discrepancy between 
achievement and IQ. The lowest IQ band which would permit a 
severe discrepancy to be established averaged 82.7. 
According to Forness. "It is therefore quite posslble that 
children with IQs in that general range might never qualify 
as LO, no matter how low they score on achievement 
206 
measures." 
The basic concern of MacMillan et al. expressed in their 
examination of the impact of the Ql~~ and h~££Y-1:~ cases 
on educational provisions for minority children is that 
l4Z 
large number of lower socioeconomic status minority 
children are denied adequate education: 
regardless of what they are called or where they are 
taught ... With the press for excellence coupled with 
the lack of substantive instructional improvement 
for low SES children with chronic achievement 
problems, we conclude that appropriate instruction 
for these chil267n is as elusive today as it was in 
the late 1960s. 
The reasons for children to leave special education 
programs were examined in a two year follow-up study by 
Walker, ~1-~1~208 Parents of 1,829 children in special 
educational programs were interviewed and asked to rate 
their satisfaction with their child's overall educational 
program. Apparently, how the parents felt about their 
children's education did not significantly affect their 
staying in a special education program. Those most 
frequently terminated from special education and completely 
mainstreamed were those whose problems could most easily be 
dealt with and for whom maturation had a most significant 
effect. Of those originally classified as speech impaired 
only 46% remained after two years. Thirty-three percent 
were terminated and 21% were reclassified. There were 
higher termination rates for children in grades four 
through six which, the authors suggest, may be the result 
of a lack of services after elementary school. The learning 
disabled and behaviorally or emotionally disturbed were the 
next most likely to be terminated or reclassified. Very few 
14} 
of the children in programs for the mentally retarded, 
visually impaired, or physically or mentally handicapped 
were terminated from special education. The authors felt 
that this "reflects the permanency of their problems: for 
example, a mentally retarded child does not 'get better' 
through treatment or maturation." 
A shift was noted from physical or multiple 
impairments to mental retardation, but far greater than 
this was a pattern of reclassification of children whose 
parents' independent report of the child's major problem 
did not correlate with the school's assessment. The authors 
could not determine with certainty, but suggested that the 
lack of congruence may stem from: 
the parent's inability to communicate at an IEP 
<individualized educational planning session), the 
school's nominal preference for a category that may 
not perfectly characterize the child's problem, or 
the school's inability to communicate clearly ~g 8 the parent what precisely is wrong with the child. 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN PARENTS AND SOCIETY IN ETHICAL DECISION-
MAKJNG 
Euthanasia and the Handicapped Newborn 
According to Dennis J. Horran and Steven R. Valentine, 
infanticide of handicapped newborn infants, either through 
neglect or by direct intervention, has become a common 
practice in hospitals across the United States. 209 Recent 
advances in prenatal diagnosis enable physicians to detect 
the presence of many genetic defects during pregnancy. They 
are consequently also enabled to eliminate a handicapped 
child before birth through abortion. There is, however, an 
increasing incidence of the killing of handicapped children 
after birth. Horran and Valentine contend that the practice 
of destroying unborn handicapped infants, often referred to 
as eugenic abortion, will increase as screening programs 
for pregnant women also increase. American law appears to 
be quite contradictory in its treatment of infanticide and 
eugenic abortion. Either through neglect, omission, or by 
direct act, infanticide is illegal and punishable under 
both criminal and civil law. Eugenic abortion, however, 
like all abortion, was made legal as a matter of 
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constitutional law by the Supreme Court's decision in ~2~ 
2 l 0 
v. ~~Q~· There has ensued in American courts a 
---
proliferation of so-called "wrongful birth" actions 
wherein parents claim that. " .but for the failure of a 
physician to detect handicaps in prenatal diagnosis, the 
child born with defects would have been aborted." These 
actions place the physician in a defensive position. In 
order to protect himself he must employ the latest 
technique of comprehensive prenatal screening for genetic 
defects and, should the mother so desire, perform or 
arrange for another to perform a eugenic abortion. He may 
be liable for massive damage awards to parents who claim 
that such a fetus would have been aborted had the doctor 
conducted the relevant prenatal screening. Thus, the 
physician who abandons the handicapped child that it might 
die is required by law to conduct what some have labeled "a 
search and destroy mission" against the handicapped child 
which is unborn. Professor John A. Robertson, who has made 
possibly the most comprehensive legal analysis of 
withholding care from the defective newborn, comments on 
the Duff and Campbell paper from the New England Journal of 
Medicine. 211 • 212 Robertson points out how surprising it is 
that, under these circumstances, physicians fai 1 to inform 
the family of the rights and obligations associated with 
these problems, and the legal ramifications of considering 
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death as a possible solution to the problem presented by 
the handicapped newborn because the child born is a person 
under the law. Indeed, any decision regarding the welfare 
of the child presupposes the child's constitutional rights. 
No matter how defective, such children have the same rights 
under criminal law and under the Constitution that anyone 
else might have These simple truths are seldom 
comnunicated to the parents who must share the burden of 
reaching a decision. One might even argue that the 
handicapped child has more rights because of his dependent. 
and possibly retarded and immature status, and consequently 
has a stronger moral claim upon parents and society than a 
healthy child would have. The hospital, the parents, and 
the physician are all responsible for meeting their 
obligation to care for the child. Although it may seem to 
some to be morally sensitive to respect the final decision 
of the parents or to respect the decision of the parents as 
final, the parental decision to withhold future treatment 
will neither insulate nor protect the physician or the 
hospital or its personnel from a potential liability suit, 
either civil or criminal. Considering such a case, one must 
first determine whether the child in question is treatable 
or non-treatable. If there is no treatment for the 
condition, then the fact that no treatment is given should 
not bring about the condemnation of those who p~rsue a 
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course of non-treatment for the child. Such cases as 
multiple congenital anomalies that add up to a hopeless 
case with a prognosis that offers no prospect for recovery 
or relief through treatment do not bring into operation 
either civil or criminal sanctions of the law. Withholding 
treatment in such cases would be considered sound medical 
judgment, based only on medical factors and not social 
factors. When treatment is useless the physician cannot be 
mandated to treat. In treatable cases where the prognosis 
is or may be guarded, but where an acceptable form of 
medical intervention that can correct the condition of ill-
being that otherwise would cause death is available to the 
physician, then to neglect such a child would be murder if 
the child dies. Professor Robertson finds potential 
liability for the parents as a result of such an omission 
or such a decision, and sees all the conditions being met 
for homicide by omission. First, the omission of a legal 
duty to protect another, which the parent has to the child; 
second, a willful or knowing failure to act, with knowledge 
of the potential result--withdrawal of treatment, which 
will result in death; and third, the failure or omission as 
the probable cause of the child's death. If the omission is 
intentional, the consequences might be a first or second 
degree murder charge. If the omission is careless or 
negligent <that is, if the state of mind of the people 
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participating in the decision-making process is such that 
theY are not capable of making a rational decision) it 
could be classified as gross negligence, the charge being 
involuntary manslaughter. The problem for the physician 
commences when the parents make a decision adverse to 
treatment. The physician and the hospital have a duty to 
the child which arises out of the contractual relationship 
they have with the parents of the child. A physician and 
hospital agree to render medical services, and the parents 
agree to pay for them. The physician's obligation is to 
ensure the medical welfare of the child as long as the 
child is in the care of the physician or the hospital. If 
the parents refuse treatment, the physician has the option 
of withdrawing from the case so that the family may remove 
the child from the hospital. This does not relieve the 
professional from an obligation to report the neglect or 
abuse of the child. He must struggle then with the problem 
of whether, even if the child is withdrawn from the 
hospital, he should inform the authorities that the child 
will not receive proper medical treatment. The hospital may 
seek the court's help in the appointment of a guardian who 
can then consent to the treatment on behalf of the child. 
Tort law or personal injury law may also be applicable in 
these cases. A failure to treat can amount to the 
corrmission of a willful or intentional tort, or a negligent 
omission, 
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or abandonment of a child. 209 The physician and 
the hospital are not protected simply because the parents 
have consented to the withdrawal of treatment. When sued 
bY someone on the child's behalf for not having rendered 
treatment, which failure to treat resulted in the child's 
death. the hospital could come into court and say, "The 
parents couldn't give us consent." If a child remains 
physically in the custody of the hospital in one of its 
rooms. and, therefore, under the care and treatment of one 
of its physicians, there is a responsibility that must be 
exercised. If parents objected to treatment or if parents 
consented to withholding treatment it would only mean that 
the parents would be barred from gaining from the action. 
Should a child die in such a case, there would be a 
legitimate cause for action, namely a wrongful death. In 
the case of a death of a small child and a court action for 
wrongful death, the law often presumes pecuniary damages. 
Such money. if any. would not go to parents who consented 
to withholding of treatment. They would be barred from 
such recovery by virtue of their own consent. However, 
other family members who did not participate in the 
withholding of consent could bring such action, and, 
indeed, if all family members withheld their consent, then 
a pub! ic guardian could bring such an action. 21 } 
Jt is imperative that the physician act as a physician 
using sound medical judgment rather than as a determiner of 
social well-being. According to Gustafson, the norm for 
treatment in such cases should be the same for the child 
with atresia in Down syndrome as for the child with atresia 
who is normal 
Zl4 
and healthy. Treatment should not be 
withheld for quality-of-life reasons. If mental retardation 
is being looked upon by some people as a reason in and of 
itself for non-treatment of a child at the option of its 
parents, then the physician is not acting in the best 
interest of the child as his patient. In the case of 
duodenal or esophageal atresia, if the condition is not 
repaired, one cannot feed the child normally. Nothing can 
be taken by mouth although intravenous feeding by gavage 
could maintain life optimally. The other option is not to 
feed. This has been universally condemned by ethics 
cormientators. Generally the failure to treat leads to the 
choice not to feed, and the failure to feed leads to the 
hastening of death. According to Hans Jonas: 
Now, as to the outright hastening of death by a 
lethal drug, the doctor cannot fairly be asked to 
make any of his ministration for this purpose, nor 
the hospital staff to connive by looking the other 
way if someone else provides the patient with the 
means. The law forbids it, but moreso <the law being 
changeable), it is prohibited by the innermost 
meaning of the medical vocation, which should never 
cast a physician in the role of ~ 1 ~isp~nser of death, even at the subject's request. 
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These issues have been complicated by the United 
states Supreme Court's legalization of abortion which casts 
the physician in the role of the dispenser of death. In the 
minds of many judges abortion is legally normative, just as 
any other "medical procedure" required by the applicable 
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standard of care. Thus, a failure on the part of the 
physician to include abortion or abortion referral as an 
alternative to birth with handicaps could render him liable 
in Tort to the defective child or to its parents because of 
recent developments in United States law. 
Infanticide 
B~~~ Doe is the anonymous designation for those 
infants whose court cases earn public attention and news 
coverage. Their plight is the plight of thousands of other 
infants who do not elicit public recognition. Baby Doe is 
like the unknown soldiers of wars past whom we annually 
honor in remembrance of the sacrifices of the other 
thousands who cannot be identified. And the Baby Does, like 
the unknown soldiers, have had mothers and fathers who have 
cared for them, worried about them, and contended against 
obstacles to their welfare in the way that they, as 
parents, have thought best. Both groups of parents have 
mourned the loss of their loved ones. And just as there are 
those who hold that young men should not have to die in 
war. there are those who hold that many Baby Does need not 
die in hospitals. 
On Apri 1 9, 1982, a baby boy with Down's Syndrome was 
born in Bloomington, Indiana. American society would not 
have accepted that condition alone as sufficient cause for 
justifying the neglect which led to his death. But it was 
sufficient cause to move the baby's parents to find in his 
blocked esaphagus <an easily repairable condition) 
justification for allowing their baby to starve to death. 
The pediatricians recommended unblocking the esophagus. But 
the parents, after consulting with their obstetrician, 
refused the corrective surgery for their infant. Their 
decision was based on the premise that their child had no 
chance of having "meaningful life." 
Representatives of the hospital, not wanting to be a 
party to the parental decision, notified the state 
authorities. The state appointed lawyers to defend the 
child. The lawyers had to move fast if they were to save 
this infant life, but their petition was refused by two 
state courts, one being the Indiana Supreme Court. One 
judge declared that parents "have the right to choose a 
medically recommended course of treatment for their child 
in the present circumstances." 217 The pediatricia~s tried 
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to convince the parents to permit the operation. The baby 
was starving. He had been transferred to a private room 
because the nurse could no longer stand to hear his cries. 
The chi Id's lawyers went to the United States Supreme 
Court to argue the case. The doctors made one final attempt 
to save the infant. Carrying intravenous equipment and 
other apparatus for giving the child nourishment, they 
rushed to the bed of the dying child. They later submitted 
this report of their attempt to save him: 
Baby Doe's shrunken, thin little body with dry, 
cyanotic skin, extremely dehydrated, breathing 
shallowly and irregularly, lay passively on fresh 
hospital linens. Blood was running from a mouth too 
dry to close. Death by starvation was near. Too late 
'. o r _f l u ~9. ~ . To o l a t e f o r s u r g e r y . T o o l a t e f o r 
1ust1ce. 
At Yale-New Haven Hospital reporters of the Hartford 
~ourant found cases where parents had given their newborn 
children lethal overdoses of morphine or phenobarbital. The 
reporters also found that one couple, whose child had been 
treated against their will, had given their baby increased 
doses of an anti-convulsant sedative. After six days the 
baby had died. The doctor in the case sided with the 
Parents, saying that the child was "socially dead and would 
never come alive." The parents declared: "We did it out of 
love." 
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Dr. Hugh Jolly of London's Charing Cross Hospital 
places babies who "might not enjoy a good quality of 
life ... on a 'water only' diet, with sedatives if 
necessary." He refers to this as "conservative treatment." 
In 1983, a nurse reported the following description of 
the termination of babies with Down's Syndrome: 
The doctor would see the baby's head coming out 
through the birth canal realize it had Down's 
Syndrome, and signal us to let it die. The mother's 
legs would be up so she couldn't see what was going 
on. We would get a little wave of the doctor's hand-
-a signal to us not to use suction on the baby. 
<Then) they'd say to the mother, "We're just going 
to give you something to relax you," and the next 
minute she'd be unconscious. When she ca~9 around, they'd say the baby had died on delivery. 
The case of baby Jane Doe took place at Stonybrook 
Hospital in New York. She was born with spina bifida. She 
needed treatment early in ife in order to prevent 
hydrocephalus, an accumulation of fluids in the brain which 
is often secondary to spina bifida. Her back, presenting 
with a bifid spine, also needed to be closed in order to 
Prevent infection. At first her parents agreed to 
treatment. Later, after consulting with another physician, 
they withdrew their permission and asked for a more 
"conservative'' treatment with antibiotics. They were told 
that without surgery their baby would die within two years. 
1,, 
A suit was filed claiming that the child was the 
victim of discrimination on the grounds that she had been 
denied necessary medical care because of her handicapping 
condition. The news media sympathized with the parents and 
reported that the parents had had to make an "agonizing 
decision" because the child could not be expected to enjoy 
"meaningful social interaction" and that if she were given 
treatment she would live only twenty years at most, and 
those years in pain and suffering. The public seemed to 
side with her parents. 
The federal government sought for evidence of 
discrimination. Parents of other children with spina 
bifida, who knew what the potential of such babies is, 
pleaded with Baby Jane's parents to permit the necessary 
surgery. There were even offers to adopt the infant. The 
pessimistic assessment of the baby's potentiality reported 
in the news media was later contradicted. Medical auth-
orities experienced in the management of infants with spina 
bifida came forward with assurances that, given the 
necessary medical treatment, Baby Jane's chances for normal 
intelligence and independent ambulation with braces were 
very good. There was nothing extraordinary about the 
recommended treatment. Only those surgical and medical 
Procedures normally anticipated in the case of a child with 
Spina bifida were proposed by those attempting to defend 
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the rights of baby Jane Doe. One attorney examining the 
case stated: 
Not only have they said that the child is being 
medically neglected as no otherwise nondisabled 
child would be neglected, they admit she is being 
treated differently than children with problems 
exactly like hers are normally treated--all because 
doctors and the courts deem that ... the parents have 
a private righ!2 ~o preside over the death of an 
unwanted child. 
At the root of the issue of infanticide in the 
practice of medicine is the response of physicians to 
pressures from the public and the trend toward assessing 
"quality of life." Prejudice is generally based upon the 
imposition of one's own self-image on others. That which is 
in our midst and unlike ourselves is suspect and possibly 
threatening. Professional people perceive their fellow 
creatures through the lenses of their professions. Some 
physicians may relate to people as biological entities, and 
their scientific practice may not relate well to the 
concept of the human soul and the sanctity of life. 
Physicians may be forced to recognize legal personhood as 
defined by the courts while at the same time finding it 
difficult to deal with the personhood of an infant so 
defective that they cannot personally relate to the child 
as a fellow human being. Some physicians find a kind of 
Psychological effrontery in the proposition that the 
defective are related and like themselves. It is as though 
theY irrationally fear accidentally becoming themselves 
defective or capable of generating a defective child and 
thereby being themselves defective by implication. 
In 1903, Dr. Peter Singer wrote in Pediatrics: 
If we compare a severely defective human infant with 
a dog or a pig ... we will often find the nonhuman to 
have superior capacities ... Only the fact that the 
defective infant is a member of the species Hom~ 
sapiens leads it to be treated differently from the 
dog or pig. But species membership alone is not 
relevant ... if we can put aside the obsolete and 
erroneous notion of the sanctity of all human life, 
we may start to look at human life as it really is: 
at the ~ua~~!Y of life that each human being has or 
can attain. 
When a society decides that the lives of its defective 
members are worthless, many physicians are wi 11 ing to 
relinquish their traditional life-saving role and justify 
their participation in a technocratic final solution 
derived from that decision. Ors. Raymond Duff and A.G.M. 
Campbell were the first in the United States to describe 
large-scale withholding of treatment from defective 
newborns in response to social interests. 212 In 1973, they 
reported that forty-three children, some with Down's 
Syndrome and others with spina bifida, had been neglected 
until dead at Yale-New haven Hospital. They offered the 
following explanation as justification for their decision 
to withhold treatment: 
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We believe the burdens of decision-making must be 
borne by families and their professional advisors 
because they are most familiar with the respective 
situations. Since families primarily must live with 
and are most affected by the decisions, it therefore 
appears that society and health professionals should 
providzifnly general guidelines for decision-
making. 
One fallacy in this explanation is that it 
underestimates the influence physicians have on their 
patients and on the families of their patients. The average 
patient looks to the advice and "guidelines" of the 
physician in order to determine a course of action. Esteem 
for the physician's opinion is even more pronounced in 
Europe than it is in the United States. Physicians who 
aggressively recommend the treatment of birth defects 
assume the traditional responsibility of advice and 
guidance. They recognize that parents without knowledge or 
experience cannot be expected to bear alone the burden of a 
life-or-death decision. Dr. David McLone of Chicago's 
Children's Memorial Hospital explains that, although 
parents must be fully informed and brought into the de-
cision-making process, it is the physician's duty to 
recommend what is in the best interest of the E.!!.ii~!JJ:.. 
based on sound medical judgment and experience. Although 
the family's economic status and social needs are important 
and may necessitate the acceptance of social services and 
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the use of community resources, these needs should not 
. th 1 f h l'f 22 } determine e va ue o a uman 1 e. 
The findings from a survey conducted in 1977 by Ors. 
Shaw. Randolph, and Manard illustrate the extent to which 
physicians have moved from a sanctity-of-life perspective 
to a quality-of-life value system. 224 Nearly seventy-seven 
percent of pediatric surgeons and sixty percent of 
pediatricians who responded declared that they support the 
parents' decision to refuse surgery to correct the 
intestinal obstruction of their infant born with Down's 
Syndrome. Nearly twenty-four percent of the physicians 
surveyed responded that they would encourage parents to 
refuse corrective surgery for their infants born with 
Down's Syndrome and having intestinal obstructions. Fewer 
than four percent of these physicians answered that they 
would attempt to obtain a court order for treatment of the 
infants against their parents' wishes. Sixty-four percent 
stated that they would accelerate the dying process by 
withholding nourishment and care. 225 
One author addressed the issue of the parental right 
to decide whether or not an infant with Down's Syndrome 
should be treated: 
Parents traditionally have had authority over their 
children. Our courts have recognized these parental 
rights many times. Parents usually love their 
children and we assume that they will act in their 
children's best interests. Parents and families are 
also the people who bear the burdens of raising a 
handicapped child. They are the ones who must find 
the financial and emotional resources to deal with 
this new family member. In addition, each of these 
situations is extremely complex. There are many 
facets to be considered and only the family is able 
to analyze the many pieces of this 'tragic 
situation.' When we put all these factors together, 
doesn't it make sense that parents should have the 
right to decide their child's fate? After all, 
parents can decide the fate of their child before 
birth, why not give them the same power after birth? 
If the parents want their baby, then every effort 
should be made to save the child. But if they don't 
want this child, then we should 'let nature takes 
it's course.' Why not just carry the doctrine of 
'every child a wanted child' one step further? 2~t a born ch i 1 d i s u nwa n t e d , 1 e t i t d i e < or k i 1 1 i t > • 
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Melinda Delahoyde detects the danger in a doctrine 
that implies the absolute right of another to impose a 
death sentence on new life merely because it is unwanted. 
She is the mother of a child with Down's Syndrome, and in 
her book Fighting for Life, she writes: 
We 1 ive in a society where we destroy unborn 
children because they are the wrong sex. What makes 
us think that we can tolerate 1.6 million abortions 
a year and still have a society where parents 
unconditionally accept their newborn children? How 
can we think that the mentality of easy abortion and 
cheap 1 ife will 22~ infect our attitudes toward our 
newborn children? 
John Robertson, a law professor specializing in issues 
addressing children's rights, has listed the crimes that 
Parents and doctors may commit when neglecting a 
handicapped child: 
Every state imposes a duty upon parents to care for 
their children. When they fail to uphold this duty 
and their child dies, they can be prosecuted for 
manslaughter or murder. Care for a child cannot be 
withheld because of cost or parents' wishes. 
Parents can also be prosecuted under child abuse 
laws for failure to care for their children, and 
for cruelty or neglect in failing to provide 
necessary medical care. 
The doctor and hospital have a contractural 
obligation to provide treatment when they admit a 
patient or enter a case. This obligation remains in 
force even if parents do not give their consent to 
treatment for their child. 
If parents refuse treatment, the doctor and 
hospital may ask the parents to remove the child 
from their care or they may ask a court to appoint 
a guardian who can con- sent to treatment on behalf 
of the child. 
The doctor who counsels the parents to withhold 
treatment or who merely agrees with their decision 
can be guilty of failure to report child abuse in 
at least twenty states. 
Since reporting the abuse of the child might have 
saved the child's life, the doctor who fails to 
report nontreatment could be guilty of 
manslaughter. 
The doctor may be guilty of murder by omission 
because he did not uphold his duty to care for the 
child and, as a result of his nontreatment, the 
child died. 
The doctor has a legal duty to care for the child 
and to report when the child under his care is 
being neglected. The doctor could withdraw his 
treatment or decide not to treat the child only if 
he has notified public authorities who would act to 
protect the child. 
The doctor also has a legal duty to protect the 
child. By his providing information to the parents 
the child may be imperiled. 
The doctor may also be subject to prosecution for 
murder because he is an accessory to the death of 
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the child. A doctor who counseled or encouraged 
parents not to treat their child would be someone 
who "counsels, f~courages, or aids ... another to 
corrrnit a felony. 
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Nurses who withhold treatment are also at risk. In 
some cases, a nurse is responsible to act in opposition to 
doctor's orders if protection of the patient requires it. 
In another case the courts have found that nurses have a 
duty to at least report such a situation to their 
supervisor. 
Doctors could also raise a petition to a court to 
treat a child over the parents' objections. In such a case 
the court is likely to grant treatment as it did in the 
1974 Houil case l·n M . 227 I al ne. n this case, parents refused 
consent for surgery to correct a badly formed esophagus in 
their newborn child. The baby had an unknown measure of 
brain damage and no left eye or ear. In this case the court 
showed itself to be a strong protector of newborn life: 
At the moment of birth there does exist a human 
being entitled to the fullest protection of the law. 
The most basic right enjoyed by every human being is 
the right to life it- self. The issue before this 
court is not quality of life to be preserved. Being 
satisfied that corrective surgery is medically 
necessary and medically feasible, the court finds 
that the ~i}endants have no right to withhold such 
treatment. 
It would seem that our society is attempting to 
accommodate two irreconcilable opinions. One is exemplified 
16} 
bY those who advocate extending the doctrine of "every 
child a wanted child" to "Let the unwanted child die, or 
Kill it." The other is exemplified by the judge's opinion 
in the 1974 Houle case in Maine that the issue before the 
court was not quality of life but life itself. Both of 
these positions are responses to what are called parental 
rights. Resorting to the courts to resolve the question of 
wrongful death of the newborn has surprisingly led to 
appealing to the courts for what is now called "wrongful 
birth." And physicians are ironically the primary targets 
of both charges. United States courts have become 
battlegrounds for the forces of common law and precedent on 
the one side and the pressures of a society irreversibly 
influenced by technological developments on the other. 
Wrongful Life 
Anyone who believes that either "wrongful life" or 
"wrongful birth" is an oxymoron or a perversion of the 
legal theory of wrongful death is compelled to face the 
reality that these concepts have not only entered the 
consciousness of the public domain but have also entered 
the domain of court deliberations. 
The intercession of the court is attributable to 
Pub! ic demand. The physician's greatly increased powers to 
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sustain life because of new medical technology subject him 
to the charge of "wrongful life." The technological means 
of detecting defects in utero subject the physician to the 
charge of "wrongful birth" if he fails to avail himself of 
those means. 
It should be emphasized that charges based on both the 
concept of wrongful birth and the concept of wrongful life 
have !lQ.i been dismissed out of hand. The cases have been 
heard and opinions have been handed down. 
The handicapped child is himself the plaintiff in a 
wrongful life case. The defendant may be a physician, a 
hospital, a laboratory, or even his own parents. The 
defendant is charged with allowing the plaintiff to be 
born. The action is based upon his claim that life with the 
handicap is worse than no life at all and that it would 
have been better had he never been born. 
In a 1967 wrongful life case, a New Jersey court 
denied damages to a child born with Down's Syndrome. The 
judge's opinion was that: 
One of the most deeply held beliefs in our society is 
that life--whether experienced with or without a major 
handicap-- is more precious than non-life ... To rule 
otherwise would require us to disavow the basic 
assumption 2 ~§on which society is based ... {and} this we 
cannot do. 
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In contrast to the New Jersey court's opinion of 1967 
is the 1980 opinion of the California Court of Appeals. The 
court recognized the claim of wrongful life brought by a 
girl born with Tay-Sachs disease. Because the Supreme 
court's Ro~~~ ~~Q~ decision legalized abortion, and 
because prenatal detection made it possible for a physician 
to determine whether or not a mother was carrying a 
handicapped child, the court held that the child could 
claim that the parents should have aborted the chi Id 
instead of having allowed it to be born handicapped. The 
judge opined: 
If a case arose where, despite due care by the 
medical profession in transmitting the necessary 
warnings, the parents made a conscious choice to 
proceed with a pregnancy, with full knowledge that a 
seriously impaired infant would be born ... we see no 
sound public pol icy that should protect those 
parents from being answerable for the pain, 
suffering, and mtffrY that they have wrought upon 
their offspring. 
Even more acceptable to courts have been wrongful birth 
cases. In such cases parents sue their doctor for not 
giving them information about birth defects detectible in 
utero. 
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~ocietal Interventions and Working Towards Self-Respect 
Our society's definition of the rights of the 
handicapped has developed not only through judicial 
processes, but also through changing social attitudes and 
governmental policy. The right to enjoy freedom, self-
determination, and independence granted to the individual 
and to the family has been extended to the individual who 
is handicapped. Advocacy for the benefit of the handicapped 
has historically been the prerogative of charitable 
organizations which determined and controlled the kind of 
support they should receive. In sum, the non-handicapped 
have traditionally controlled the destiny of the 
handicapped. This tradition is based upon the conviction 
that the fortunate have an obligation to see to the welfare 
of the less fortunate and that the giver is more benefitted 
than the receiver. Despite the undeniable good bestowed 
upon the receiver, the pattern of dependency that was 
established was often perceived as demeaning and confining 
for the intended beneficiaries. 
Although great change has come about in the United 
States since the days of the "Benevolent Society" and the 
"Women's Welfare League for the Salvation of the 
Feebleminded," many characteristics of their motives and 
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methods remain and are, from time to time, recognizable in 
the motives and methods of organizations currently devoted 
to the same cause. One such characteristic is best 
described as eugenic expectation, the belief that society 
should strive for perfection and that any means toward this 
end may be justified. Abhorrence or fear of those members 
of society who do not measure up to expectations of 
"no rma l i t y 11 may be a t t h e r o o t o f t h e r e j e c t i o n o f t ho s e 
who do not act, speak, look, or smell quite the same as the 
rest of us. The case of Carrie and Vivi en Buck is 
dramatically illustrative of an attitude which is far from 
dead. 
Carrie Buck was only one among many victims of a 
discredited social theory--a theory which nevertheless was 
to be given practical application after it was propounded 
by an influential political movement of the 1890's. The 
practice of compulsory sterilization of so-called 
undesirable elements was accompanied by the imposition of 
national quotas set to discriminate against immigrants 
deemed mentally unfit because of the results of the I.Q. 
tests. The publicly proclaimed goal of excluding the 
"shiftless 11 and the "stupid" and of preventing the 
reproduction of any more like them was zealously pursued. 
Improved medical techniques for performing vasectomies and 
tubal I igations made a program of compulsory sterilization 
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easY to carry out. Some states passed laws mandating 
sterilization of those judged insane or mentally deficient, 
sterilization of those convicted of rape, and sterilization 
of those convicted of other crimes. Some states had lists 
of the defects deemed appropriate cause for sterilization 
that included alcohol ism, drug addiction, blindness, and 
deafness. Laws mandating sterilization were most vigorously 
obeyed in California and Virginia. Approximately 20.000 
forcible sterilizations had been performed in the United 
States by 19}5, nearly half of them in California. A 
private organization with an aura of officialdom called the 
Eugenics Record Off ice lobbied and campaigned for eugenic 
sterilization "to prevent the procreation of persons so-
cially inadequate from defective inheritance, by 
authorizing and providing for eugenical sterilization of 
certain potential parents carrying degenerate hereditary 
quali~ies." A model bill composed by Harry Laughlin, 
superintendent of the organization, called for 
sterilization of the "blind, including those with seriously 
impaired vision; deaf, including those with seriously 
impaired hearing; and dependent, including orphans, ne'er-
dowells, the homeless, tramps, and paupers." 
Harry Laughlin's cal for prevention of the 
procreation of the socially inadequate cannot be dismissed 
as a lunatic aberration of the times when some of his 
169 
reasoning is reflected in a United States Supreme Court 
decision. 
In 1927·, the United States Supreme Court voted eight 
to one to uphold the Virginia sterilization bill in the 
case of ~~~ ~ ~~ll·l}O The majority opinion was written 
by the then eighty-six-year-old Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare 
may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It 
would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the state for these 
lesser sacrifices ... Jt is better for all the world, 
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are 
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The 
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is 
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallop~~B tubes. 
Three generations of imbeciles are enough. 
Carrie Buck was eighteen in 1924 when Virginia passed 
its compulsory sterilization law. She was an involuntary 
inmate at the State Colony for Epileptics and the 
Feebleminded and the first person selected for 
sterilization under the new law. The basis for her 
selection was that, as Judge Holmes put it, she was "a 
feeble-minded White woman who was committed to the State 
Colony ... She is the daughter of a feeble-minded mother in 
the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate 
feeble-minded child." It was a matter of the inheritability 
of mental deficiency and the danger that this pollution of 
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the gene pool would pose to society if left to reproduce 
itself. 
In 1980, Dr. K. Ray Nelson examined the records of the 
institution where he served as director and where Carrie 
Buck had been sterilized. He discovered that over 4,000 
sterilizations had been done there and that the last had 
been in 1972. Carrie Buck was still alive and well at 
seventy-four years of age. Dr. Nelson found her to be as 
well as her sister who had also been sterilized under the 
same law. Doris had been told that her operation was for 
appendicitis. In her old age she learned why she had never 
been able to have a baby, something she had always wanted. 
It is now clear to anyone who examines the record of 
Carrie Buck's institutionalization that she is not now nor 
ever was retarded. Law professor Paul Lombardo, a leading 
scholar of the Buck v. Bell case wrote: 
As for Carrie, when met her she was reading 
newspapers daily and joining a more literate friend 
to assist at regular bouts with the crossword 
puzzle. She was not a sophisticated woman, and 
Jacked social graces, but mental health 
professionals who examined her in later life 
confirmed my impressionz;.; 0that she was neither 
mentally ill nor retarded. 
According to those who have examined the case retro-
spectively, Carrie Buck had originally been confined in the 
institution for the feebleminded because she was pregnant 
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with an illegitimate child. Carrie was herself one of 
several children born to her mother, Emma, out of wedlock. 
J.T. and Alice Dobbs were her foster parents. She had been 
raped by a relative of her foster parents and was blamed 
for her pregnancy. It is speculated that she was committed 
to the State Colony in order that her shame might be hidden 
and the identity of the rapist kept secret. Her mental 
capacities were not questioned at the time of her 
commitment. As for the motives of those who pressed for 
carrie Buck's sterilization, they are revealed in the claim 
that the sterilization was for the sake of sexual morality 
and the prevention of social deviance. Harry Laughlin of 
the Eugenics Record Office wrote in his "family history" of 
the Bucks: "These people belong to the shiftless, ignorant 
and worthless class of anti-social Whites of the South." 
An examination of the school report cards of Vivien 
Buck, Carrie Buck's illegitimate child who, at the age of 
eight. had died of enteric colitis, reveals that she had 
received good grades in her few years at school. It would 
seem, then, that every part of the United States Supreme 
Court's opinion has clearly been disproved. It is not 
difficult to see now that Society and the State reached 
unfairly and without just cause into the heart and soul of 
Carrie Buck's womanhood and destroyed her capacity to be a 
mother both physically and emotionally. It should be 
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remembered that the action against her was taken in the 
name of "enlightened science." 
Over the entrances to the museums which are all that 
remains of the Nazi concentration camps are the German 
words for Never Again, but there is little in human history 
that cannot repeat itself. Harry Laughlin's model eugenics 
bill. adopted by so many of our states, served as a basis 
for the infamous and stringently enforced 
Erbgesundheitsrecht <Right to Healthy Inheritance) and led, 
by the eve of World War II. to the sterilization of some 
}7,,000 people, most of them for "congenital 
feeblemindedness", but including also nearly 4,000 for 
blindness and deafness. In 1982. the National Institutes of 
Health held a conference at the Hilton Hotel in Washington, 
D.C. to discuss the possibility of prenatal detection and 
abortion procedures to prevent the birth of children with 
neural tube defects (spina bifida). Obstetricians stood and 
gave testimony of abortions they had performed just days 
before term if the slightest defect was detected. Lab-
oratory executives declared loudly and unashamedly that it 
is imperative to stop the "pollution of the gene pool." But 
it was the testimony of the very capable and happy-to-be-
alive "handicapped" and their parents, the "polluters," 
which dissuaded the government from proceeding with the 
enactment of mandatory testing. Today this issue has become 
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a moot point because most obstetricians order prenatal 
testing for birth defects in order to protect themselves 
from legal liabilities for the birth of a defective infant. 
~ Children have a right to kill themselves? 
Although all states have sanctions against attempting 
suicide and courts consistently find a countervailing state 
interest in the prevention of suicide by refusal to accept 
medical treatment, only two states hold completed suicide a 
crime. those states being Alabama and South Carolina. Dr. 
Hoberman describes a "movement in society at large and in 
legislatures and the judiciary to soften this prohibition, 
and to possibly identify or establish a right to ki 11 one-
lf n231 se . The effect that such a movement could have on an 
already increasing incidence of adolescent suicide is the 
concern addressed here. 
Two questions evolve from a concern about sanctioned 
suicide: What would the impact of sanctioned or assisted 
suicide be upon adolescents and should adolescents have the 
right to self-termination? A first step in dealing with 
these issues is an understanding of current trends in 
adolescent suicide. Contrary to popular beliefs, the 
youthful suicide victim is not the "brilliant but neurotic" 
young student, but rather an individual with a psychiatric 
disorder. In a review of over eight hundred suicide cases 
in Minnesota, Haberman and Garfinkel found that sixty-six 
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percent of them showed evidence of psychiatric disorder. 
Substance abuse, depression, and affective disorders led 
the list of related factors. 231 There is often a precipi-
tating stress or occurrence which the child is unable to 
cope with successfully. In the study by Hoberman and 
Garfinkel precipitators included an argument for twenty-
four percent, the breakup of a relationship for seventeen 
percent, trouble with the police for eight percent, trouble 
at work for seven percent, and trouble at school for six 
percent. Forty percent had used mind-altering substances 
within twelve hours of killing themselves. 232 Youth who 
complete suicide are also more likely to have access in 
their homes to lethal devices such as firearms or 
. 233 poisons. 
Despite the narrow range of possibilities that 
suicidal individuals see in coping with the pain and 
frustration they suffer and the desire to terminate 
consciousness in order to avoid that pain, they continue to 
express ambivalence. They often reach out to communicate 
their suicidal feelings to others. For every completed 
suicide there are hundreds of attempts. Although it may be 
a mistake to compare too closely those who attempt suicide 
with those who commit suicide, because they often seem to 
express different motives, the ambivalent nature of the act 
is apparent in both cases. Youthful suicide appea~s to be 
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more often spontaneous than contemplated. In the Hoberman 
and Garfinkel study only one third of the victims made any 
preparations or left any notes. Most committed suicide in 
their own homes, and in half of the cases there was someone 
at home or someone who was likely to get in touch with 
them. Twenty-eight percent of them made an active effort to 
avoid detection during the act. 
According to Hoberman, securing the right to kill 
oneself would have little effect on those factors directly 
related to youth suicide: 
The typical youth suicide is not an emotionally 
balanced youth who, over time, rationally deliberates 
over the meaning of life versus death and then chooses 
death, but rather an anguished young person who 
desperately wants to cut off his or her intense pain. 
Given this state of affairs. a right to suicide and 
the philosophical and legal arguments in its support 
will not matter to this disturbed young person. 
Certainly most, if not all young people, who commit 
suicide neither know nor care whether they have a 
right to do 2 J~: suicide is too much a desperate act of the moment. 
A sanctioned right to suicide might, however, have a 
more significant impact upon the indirect factors 
influencing youth suicide. The contagion effect resultant 
from the publicizing of a youth suicide is well known. 
Hoberman projects that the rate of youth suicide would be 
substantially influenced and would correlate directly to 
the "degree that a right to suicide is established and 
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receives attention as society and the judiciary wrestle 
with the definition and limits of that right." 
Questions about the evaluation of "quality of life" 
will also come into play. A legally sanctioned right to 
suicide suggests that 1 ife is not intrinsically valuable 
and that there may be circumstances in which the value or 
meaning of life may come into question. Young people may 
become desensitized to death through consideration of 
circumstances which the public may define as adequately 
painful, burdensome or limiting such that death may be 
desirable. If suicide is portrayed as an honorable escape 
from failure. as it is in some cultures, then the rate of 
suicide among youth may rise. That rate is higher even now 
in Japan where youth may be found to commit suicide more 
frequently upon the failure of school entrance 
examinations. If youth come to understand that society 
justifies suicide in cases where the "quality of life" is 
limited because of pain or "lifestyle limitations" they may 
have difficulty distinguishing between their own emotional 
suffering and the physical suffering of the terminally ill 
patient. 
Should adolescents be granted the right to assist in 
the suicide of another? Haberman suggests two arguments 
against this proposition: first that youth are "not 
equipped mentally, emotionally, or experientially to make a 
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decision of that magnitude," and second, there is the legal 
question. There is clear acceptance that certain behaviors 
which are permissible for adults may not be permissible for 
youth: the age at which driving or drinking alcohol is 
permitted, or when curfews may be imposed, for example. 
There are standards in society which are particular to the 
age. experience and abi 1 ities of those they affect: "The 
power of the state to control the conduct of children 
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults," was 
declared by the United States Supreme Court in Prince v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 234 And in ~ins~~-Y~-~~~ 
York: "A child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for 
. d' 'd 1 h . " f th . f . ht 235 in 1v1 ua c oice necessary or e exercise o rig s. 
It is the responsibility of the state to intervene on be-
half of the child that he may develop to adulthood and 
become a responsible citizen." 
Haberman points out some legal arguments that seem to 
potentially contradict the court's conclusions. Under the 
right to privacy, "personal decisions" by minors have been 
protected. Minors are allowed access to abortion without 
parental consent. Many people would argue that abortion is 
indeed the termination of life. Minors are not prohibited 
from procreation. A right to self-termination would 
arguably be included in the doctrine of privacy and the 
protection of personal decisions for adolescents. It 
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appears that the debate will continue. As long as adults 
are ambivalent about an issue, they will find adolescents 
following their example. 
CHAPTER 4 
A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 
PRESENTED BY IMMANUEL KANT IN HIS ESSAY. E~NQ~~~Nl~h 
PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS. 
Kant develops a theoretical approach to the 
principles of morality in the public and private 
relationships that people have with each other in his 
Fundamental Principle of the MetaEh~?_j_£_Of_~~~~~. 2 } 6 Two 
of his other works, The [~~~~~~~i~l_Erl~£ll~~ ~i 
Jurisprudence and The Science of Right, 2 } 7 also address the 
problem of determining the boundaries of right and 
obligation which human beings should ideally recognize and 
honor in all of their relationships. Concepts of human 
relations lie at the heart of almost all of Kant's work, 
even though his discussion may take the form of a 
theorectical conceptualization of existence, of the nature 
of things, or of the laws of logic. It is these concepts as 
they impinge upon man as a social being that were of 
Paramount concern to Kant, throughout his life. Even when 
he was near death, in 1804, he thanked the medical 
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attendant ministering to his needs and declared, "I have 
not yet lost my ~eeling for humanity." 238 
Although Kant's earlier work may be marked by a more 
dogmatic approach to human rights and obligations, and may 
reflect the influence of the writings of Leibniz and 
239 h" t k Wolff, 1s ma ure wor shows the influence of David 
Hume. There is no tinge of dogmatism in the new philosophy 
he developed. This philosophy is based upon a critical 
examination of the fundamental principles which govern 
existence, action, time, substance, and experience. 
It is not the purpose of this work to criticize and 
interpret the philosophy Kant developed, but an eclectic 
gleaning of his reasoned conclusions as to the principles 
governing existence and experience, and his insight into 
the intricacies of human right and obligation, wi II serve 
as the "Kantian perspective" through which an understanding 
of fam i I y - soc i et y con f I i ct i s at ta i n e d . Understand i n g i s 
the first step toward identifying those principles which 
might provide a basis for the resolution of the conflicts 
which arise between families and the state when the rearing 
of handicapped children is undertaken. 
If the Kantian approach is to be the vehicle for 
achieving understanding and resolution, then a definition 
of what such an approach constitutes must be established. 
Kant's method of reasoning is not unique, and the 
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principles he developed are not exclusively his own. It is 
the pattern of critically weighing and then affirming, of 
inquiring into the condition of knowledge, and then 
exprssing assumptions, that is characteristically Kantian. 
His is a theory of ideas critically discriminating between 
things sensed and things apprehended by means of pure 
reason. In this respect his theory is unlike the theories 
of either Leibniz or Locke. Kant held that the substance of 
our ideas is determined by means of the senses and that the 
form of our ideas is determined by our reason. The 
complexities of sensation are refined into ideas by means 
of reason. What is new and revolutionary in Kant's thought 
is the philosophical element of what was later recognized 
as the Romantic Revolution: 
It is with Kant that something really and positively 
new makes its appearance in post-Renaissance moral 
philosophy. In the process of summing up and 
concentrating in himself, the complex heritage and the 
long effort of three centuries of thoughts, he 
performed a revolutionary task in the realm of ethical 
philosophy, as in that of speculative philosophy. Not 
that he wished to destroy or overthrow anything in the 
realm of morals--on the contrary, his effort was to 
restore. But in order to construct his imposing 
edifice, he was, in fact, compelled to lffnsform 
completely the whole architecture of ethics. 
Kant's approach to philosophy, although prompted by 
the works of Hume, was indeed revolutionary. Prior to Kant, 
there had been agreement among philosophers that their 
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Knowledge of the world obtained its validity through 
objects, although there were radically divergent concepts 
as to what objects really are. For Plato, forms constituted 
the immaterial realities, or imitations of the absolute, 
which made up objects. For Berkeley, material objects 
existed only as ideas in the mind. For Aristotle, whose 
influence pervaded the expressions of almost all later 
philosophers, objects were themselves fundamental 
realities. There was not generally any dispute as to our 
ability to know objects, although some attempted to explain 
what seemed to be obvious that we do indeed know that 
objects really do exist. 
Kant's Critique .Q_f. E~~~ ~easo~240 was revolutionary 
because it did not assume as fact that we know that we have 
knowledge of objects in themselves. Such knowledge Kant 
declared to be impossible. Rather than an objective reality 
kn own b y o u r p e r c e p t i o n i n t h e m i n d , t h e u n i v e r s e , o r 
nature is actually a formal system made manifest through 
our senses. True knowledge for Kant was limited by human 
experience itself. To philosophize about matters beyond 
experience, such as the nature of God, the freedom of the 
will, or the immortality of the soul, would not be 
productive. This approach overturned the cherished dogmas 
heretofore espoused by philosophers, and led to the 
idealism which reflects the romanticism of the 19th and 
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zoth centuries. This, in turn. 1 ed to phenomenology, and 
through phenomenology to existentialism. Kant's concerns 
were not 1 imited to objects or facts of substance but 
included areas of moral philosophy. Moral philosophers 
prior to Kant had agreed that there were standards for 
judgment which could be found in some objective element. 
Human nature was the moral guide to action for Aristotle. 
Man's rational perception of natural law was reflected in 
the law of God for the scholastics of the Middle Ages. 
Although there was not consensus as to what exactly the 
appropriate value object should be, philosophers agreed 
that there was some guide by which man could choose as he 
sought for virtue and goodness. 241 
Kant. however, found it impossible to know objects 
except through experience. Even human nature as it exists 
in itself could not otherwise be known. except in 
experience. In order to avoid a purely subjective moral 
standard, one has to appeal to reason as a source of moral 
goodness rather than to a preconceived idea. A consistency 
of action, then, becomes an indication of morality rather 
than a value object. 
Translating this concept into language understandable 
to a public which expressed itself in the language of 
objects was a formidable task. Apparently Kant assumed that 
readers of his Foundation for Metaphysics of Morals~ which 
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was his first major work in moral philosophy, would have 
read his ££lils~~ £i E~£~ ~~~~£rr. and thereby would 
recognize his peculiar usage of certain expressions. The 
basic terminology must be mastered before one can begin to 
understand the philosophy itself. Kant's primary objective 
in the work, Foundation for~ Metaphysics of Morals is, as 
he himself states "to discover, and justify, the supreme 
principle of morality." Thus he attempts to discover an 
ultimate foundation for morality upon which the structure 
of moral law can rest, and which is based upon duty. To 
understand Kant's moral theory, there must be a clear 
understanding of what Kant means by speculative and 
practical reason. Both, as Aristotle points out, are 
activities of man's rational soul, but they concern 
different objects of thought. In speculative wisdom 
<Sophia), knowledge of eternal and necessary truths such as 
mathematics is manifest, whereas in practical wisdom 
<Phronesis), knowledge of right principles for living the 
good life is manifest. Both are conceptual, and may not 
necessarily relate to actual experience Practical 
knowledge comes through actual hands-on skill development. 
Kant distinguishes between these two by saying, "It may be 
sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge, 
or cognition as knowledge of that which is, 
knowledge as knowledge of that which ought 
and practical 
1 to be;" In 
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general, Kant uses the term ~E~£~l~iive reason to denote 
the rational faculty whereby we know things, or facts, and 
the term E~~£ii£~l ~~~~QQ to denote that faculty through 
which we can determine what we ought to do. Practical 
reason depends on actions that we may choose to do or not 
choose to do, but ought to do, whereas speculative reason 
has to do with what is, and was, and will be, indeed, a 
matter of fact. Knowing things, according to Kant, can be 
achieved by two means. We have two ways of Knowing facts 
and two ways of knowing what to do. We have an everyday 
way, that is, by experience through our senses. This is not 
pure reason, according to Kant. By pure reason he refers to 
that reasoning which is free from everything derived from 
experience. Thus, pure reason revolves around the activity 
of reason itself rather than an experience. Some may argue 
that reasoning itself is an experiential process. It is the 
framework of our Knowledge, or the construction of 
knowledge itself, that we cannot know through experience, 
that is the pure reason. How meaningful to us our 
experiences are is determined by a standard other than the 
experience itself. This condition for our empirical 
knowledge is not known by the experience itself, since in 
order to place the experiences we have into some context, 
we must have that framework within us, and to understand 
this framework we must do so independently of the ex-
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perience or the things that we experience--that is, by an 
activity of reason without necessary experience, in other 
words. by pure reason. Kant limits his examination of pure 
reason to the fundamental activities of reason as it forms 
in separate experiences into meaningful wholes. Kant 
distinguishes between speculative and practical reason. The 
activity of reason takes sensations from the senses, 
uniting them to form experiences of the universe. In this 
case. Kant refers to this activity as pure speculative 
reason, and his critique of pure reason outlines this 
principle. However, when the activity of reason, as it 
constructs rules of activity, is investigated, then Kant is 
dealing with pure practical reason, and this is his primary 
task in the foundation of morals in his ~~lils~~ ~i 
Practical Reason. When Kant refers to a critique of pure 
practical reason, he is referring to his investigation into 
the fundamental and purely rational prerequisites of all 
moral knowledge. In the Foundation for the Metaphysic of 
Morals, Kant seeks to establish the ultimate framework or 
condition which will justify all other moral laws by 
establishing their objective validity. Kant sets out by 
reasoning to discover a system of laws of choice and action 
in order to prove them to be a valid foundation for moral 
principles. His goal is to find an ultimate standard for 
moral judgments. Otherwise, morality would appear to be a 
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relative matter, merely a codification of preferences or 
customs requiring no particular insight as to why choices 
should be one way or another. 
Kant speaks of the concept of a E~l~~l as that which 
is derived from reason and that which is ~posteriori as 
that which is derived from our experiences If the 
necessity of something is derived from the meaning of the 
term itself, then one can see by reason alone that 
something may be true. That would mean a self-
contradiction. Because of the necessary nature of moral 
rules they are ~ E~iorl from Kant's point of view, and 
propositions of practical reason. Thus, they've derived 
their authority from reason rather than experience. 
Mora 1 s 
Kant finds the moral significance of every action in 
three elements--the source of the action, the result 
intended, and the motive for the action. The first element, 
the will, is the primary or ultimate objective of morality. 
Nothing in the universe--in fact, 
whatsoever--can we posii2ly conceive as 
good except a good will. 
nothing 
absolutely 
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BY SQQQ ~ill· Kant means that which actively and 
consistently chooses to do the right thing, to perform the 
good deed; and does so from the right motive. Kant 
justifies the pronouncement of good will as the absolute 
good: 
Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other i~~~i§. 
of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, 
resolution, peseverance, as qualities of 
temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in 
many respects; but these gifts of nature may also 
become extremely bad and mischievous if the will 
which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, 
constitutes what is called character, is not good. 
It is the same with the sifi~Qf_fQ~i~~~· Power, 
riches, honour, even health, and the general well-
being and contentment with one's condition which is 
cal led b.~E.E.i~~§.§., inspire pride, and often 
presumption, if there is not a good will to correct 
the influence of these on the mind, and with this 
also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and 
adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not 
adorned with a single feature of a pure and good 
will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give 
pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a 
good will appears to constitute the ~2~ispensable 
condition of being worthy of happiness. 
These characteristics appear to describe qualities of 
an individual, but they may be as easily applied to groups, 
or society in general. For example, a society may 
demonstrate its people's high level of intelligence, but if 
they are selfish in the application of that intelligence it 
is not of benefit, or good will. If intelligent people 
demonstrate disdain for the retarded, then they are, in 
spite of their intelligence, without good will. If a so-
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ciety is rich because of the blessings of the natural 
resources of its environment, it is not necessarily 
conducive to good wi 11 if those resources are not applied 
with kindness towards those who can benefit from them. 
There are even some qualities which are of service 
to this good will itself, and may facilitate its 
action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional 
value, but always presuppose a good will, and this 
qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them, 
and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely 
good. Moderation in the affections and passions, 
self-control and calm deliberation are not only good 
in many respects, but even seem to constitute part 
of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are 
far from deserving to be called good without 
qualification, although they have been so 
unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without 
the principles of a good will, they may become 
extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not 
only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly 
makes him more abomi2~~le in our eyes than he would 
have been without it. 
In order for an individual or a group to be morally 
good, a good will is not necessarily sufficient. There is a 
difference between a good agent and a good action, between 
the person or the group which acts or votes to act and the 
deed that is actually performed. The action is independent 
of the moral character of a person himself or of a group 
itself. Misappropriated funds can be used to care for the 
homeless as well as revenues honestly procured. An 
individual or a group can only receive moral credit, 
according to Kant, when the action is done for the right 
reason. Indeed, Kant maintains that the moral value of the 
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intent is of benefit, whether the individual or group 
succeeds with th~ action or not. 
A good will is good not because of what it performs 
or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of 
some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the 
volition, that is, it is good in itself, and 
considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher 
than all that can be brought about by it in favour 
of any inclinication, nay, even of the sum total of 
all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, 
owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the 
niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this 
will should wholly lack power to accomplish its 
purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet 
achieve nothing, and there should remain only the 
good will <not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the 
summoning of all means in our power), then, like a 
jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a 
thing which has its whole value in itself. Its 
usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add to nor 
take away anything from this value. It would be, as 
it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it 
the more conveniently in common commerce, or to 
attract to it the attention of those who ~re not yet 
connoisseurs, but not to recommend 2i415 to true 
connoisseurs, or to determine its value. 
Unless an individual has a good will or unless a group 
has a good wi 11, neither can receive moral credit for its 
actions. If one does have a good will, one may receive such 
credit in spite of the outcome. Kant wishes to establish 
that reason is the appropriate foundation of moral action. 
To give grounds to morality and reason, he must take the 
route of good will which is established through reason, 
giving an a E~i~~i grounds to morality. The concept of 
duty, or the moral "ought," is the second element of 
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morality for Kant. To act solely from duty constitutes the 
moral motive of the good will. Any concept involving the a 
e£i~r.l necessity cannot depend upon experience, but there 
must be some experience in each particular duty, otherwise 
we would not know what we ought to do. The moral necessity 
of action has its foundation in reason, not in experience, 
and the conceptual form of moral necessity is an ~priori 
concept of practical reason. And so, we discover the good 
will through duty. 
I omit here all actions which are already recognized 
as inconsistent with duty, although they may be 
useful for this or that purpose, for with these the 
questions whether they are done f£~~-Q~.!2: cannot 
arise at all, since they even conflict with it. I 
also set aside those actions which really conform to 
duty, but to which men have no direct incl...LD.~iion, 
performing them because they are impelled thereto by 
some other inclination. For in this case we can 
readily distinguish whether the action which agrees 
with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view. 
It is much harder to make this distinction when the 
action accords with duty, and the subject has been 
besides a dir~£i inclination to it. For example, it 
is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not 
overcharge an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever 
there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not 
overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so 
that a child buys of him as well as any other. Men 
are thus h~~~~.:L!_y served; but this is not enough to 
make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from 
duty and from principles of honesty: his own 
advantage required it; it is out of the question in 
this case to suppose that he might besides have a 
direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, 
as it were, from love he should give no advantage to 
one over another. Accordingly the action was done 
neither from duty nor fro~4~irect inclination, but 
merely with a selfish view. 
193 
There are three ways in which duty may be related to 
actions. Actions may conflict with duty and, therefore, 
would not involve a good will or they may be in accord 
with duty, but nonetheless not executed for the right 
reason--that is, because of a moral motive. The motive may 
be some inner compulsion, such as love or a sense of honor. 
Or the motive may be a desire for particular gain. Actions 
may also be done from duty, that is, in recognition of the 
ought. This is what Kant refers to as ~L£~ ~~i~ or aus 
Pflicht, or for duty's sake. All actions that are not 
motivated by pure moral interest are, according to Kant, 
inclinations or desires, that is, based upon self-interest. 
This would include benevolence, philanthropy, and parental 
love, and even selfish greed, the desire for sensual 
pleasure, and fear. Thus, there are only two reasons for 
performing an action, either because it is our duty or 
obligation, or because of some other reason, which Kant 
would refer to as an inclination, or a selfish motive. 
0 n t h e o t h e r ha n d , i t i s a du t y t o ma i n t a i n one ' s 
life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct 
inclination to do so. But on this account the often 
anxious care which most men take for it has no 
intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. 
They preserve their life ~~~i~-L~S~~L~~· no doubt, 
but not 2.~f..~~~~-~~i~-L~sui res. On the other hand, if 
adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken 
away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, 
strong in mind, indignant at this fate rather than 
desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet 
preserves his life without loving it--not from 
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inclination or 2 47ar, but from duty--then his maxim has 
a moral worth. 
Here Kant introduces the concept of a maxim, which he 
defines as a subjective principle of action. His personal 
rule or policy which people follow when they act is a kind 
of general policy and outlines a procedure for acting in a 
certain kind of situation. In Kant's example of a duty that 
an individual may feel to preserve his life, the contented 
man determines that as long as his life is pleasant. he 
will do what he can to preserve it. Another might say, 
"When my 1 ife becomes intolerable, I will commit sui-
cide." These are subjectively the maxims of the individual 
and do not suggest principles that he would impose on 
others. But if there is a duty to hang on to life, even 
when that individual lacks the inclination to do so. he 
would have to have a maxim such as, "I must try to live as 
long as possible." Such a maxim would be grounded in a good 
will moral foundation. Thus, he would be acting for duty's 
sake and not merely from inclination. And the maxim would 
have a moral value. 
To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides 
this, there are many minds so sympathetically 
constituted that, without any other motive of vanity 
or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading 
joy around them and can take delight in the 
satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. 
But I maintain that in such a case an action of this 
kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has 
nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level 
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with other inclinations, e.g. the inclination to 
honour, which, if it is happily directed to that which 
is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty, 
and consequently honourable, deserves praise and 
encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the 
moral import, namely, that such actions be done from 
duty, not from inclination. Put the case that the mind 
of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his 
own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of 
others, and that while he still has the power to 
benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their 
trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now 
suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insen-
sibility, and performs the action without any inclina-
tion to it, but simply from duty, then first has his 
action its genuine moral worth. Further still; if 
nature has put little sympathy in the heart of this or 
that man; if he, supposed to be an upright man, is by 
temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of 
others, perhaps because in respect of his own he is 
provided with the special gift of patience and 
fortitude, and supposes, or even requires, that others 
should have the same--and such a man would certainly 
not be the meanest product of nature--but if nature 
had not specially framed him for a product of nature--
but if nature had not specially framed him for a 
philanthropist, would he not sti 11 find in himself a 
source from whence to give himself a far higher worth 
than that of a good-natured temperament could be? 
Unquestionably. It is just in this that the moral 
worth of the character is brought out which is 
incomparably the highest of all, namely, that 2~ 8 is beneficient, not from inclination, but from duty. 
Here Kant introduces actions which may be good without 
having moral value. They may be done from praiseworthy 
motives, but they do not have moral value. they are done 
from desire or some other human motive. Such actions may be 
praised and their perpetrators considered honorable, but, 
according to Kant, our esteem is owed only to that virtuous 
person who acts from the moral motive. If an individual has 
indeed a moral motive for his actions and yet may also have 
some other human motive, that second motive does not negate 
the morality of the action. 
196 
The primary purpose of reason which is, according to 
Kant, man's ultimate goal is to have a good will in that we 
might be worthy of happiness. Man must have some goal which 
he can obtain on his own and that goal for Kant is man's 
worthiness to be happy, the goal that every man can achieve 
regardless of the vicissitudes of life. The kind of worth 
that Kant is speaking of in the worthiness to be happy is 
moral worth, which is the goal to be attained through 
reason. The goal of every being endowed with a rational 
nature is moral worthiness. And the necessary and 
sufficient condition for attaining this worthiness is the 
good w i 11 . 
Reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e. 
as one which is to have influence on the ~ill· 
therefore, admitting that nature generally in the 
distribution of her capacities has adapted the means 
to the end, its true destination must be to produce a 
will, not merely good as a means to something else, 
but g££Q_l!:!_li~lf., for which reason was absolutely 
necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole 
and complete good, must be the supreme good and the 
condition of every other, even of the desire of 
happiness. Under these circumstances, there is nothing 
inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact 
that the cultivation of the reason, which is requisite 
for the first and unconditional purpose, does in many 
ways i n t er fer e , at 1 east i n th i s l i f e , with the 
attainment of the second, which is always conditional, 
name l y , hap p i n e s s . Na y , i t may even red u c e i t to 
nothing, without nature thereby failing of her 
purpose. For reason recognises the establishment of a 
good will as its highest practical destination, and in 
attaining this purpose is capable only of a 
satisfaction of its own proper kind, namely, that from 
the attainment of an end, which end again is 
determined by reason only, notwithstanding that this 
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r;iay _inv~lv'2 4Wany a disappointment to the ends of incl inat1on. 
Kant introduces the concept of duty as the primary example 
or concept. By duty, Kant means the moral ought. 
In order to do this we will take the notion of duty, 
which includes that of a good will, although implying 
certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, 
however, far from concealing it, or rendering it 
unrecognisable, rather bring it out by ~~gtrast, and 
make it shine forth so much the brighter. 
When we do what we ought to do rather than what we feel 
like doing, then we are acting from duty. 
Morality appears to be for Kant that element in our 
life which urges us to do good rather than evil. To love 
and not to hate, to practice virtue rather than vice. In 
that we may willingly do so, because it gives us pleasure, 
the less we stand in need of a moral law. But when we ought 
to do something for which we have no inclination, then a 
moral command is needed. In those instances when we have no 
inclination for duty and yet do it, then it is that we 
receive what Kant refers to as moral credit. Kant offers us 
the proposition that, 
An action done from duty derives its moral worth, not 
from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but 
from the maxim by which it is determined, and 
therefore does not depend on the realization of the 
object of the action, but merely on the principle of 
volition by which the action ha2 5 raken place, without 
regard to any object or desire. · 
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Kant recognizes that it is impossible to determine 
whether someone acts purely from duty or whether there is 
also some hidden motive involved. Although one likes to 
hope that an individual's or group's motives are pure, 
nonetheless, one cannot be sure, and if moral worth should 
be determined by the motive, then the experience of the 
action will not give us a sure knowledge of the moral value 
of the action. 
In fact, it is absolutely impossible to make out by 
experience with complete certainty a single case in 
which the maxim of an action, however right in itself, 
rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception 
of duty. Sometimes it happens that with the sharpest 
self-examination we can find nothing beside the moral 
principle of duty which could have been powerful 
enough to move us to this or that action and to so 
great a sacrifice; yet we cannot from this infer with 
certainty that it was not really some secret impulse 
of self-love, under the false appearance of duty, that 
was the actual determining cause of the wi 11. We like 
then to flatter ourselves by falsely taking credit for 
a more noble motive; whereas in fact we can never, 
even by the strictest examination, get completely 
behind the secret springs of action; since, when the 
question is of moral worth, it is not with the actions 
which we see that we are concerned, but wit{5 2those inward principles of them which we do not see. 
According to Kant, everything in nature operates 
according to principles or laws. Those rational beings who 
can conceive of the idea of law and act on principle have 
the abi 1 ity we refer to as the will. This requires reason, 
and therefore the will and practical reason are generally 
considered the same ability. An imperative is an expression 
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of a command of reason. Commands of reason result from a 
rational awareness of an objective principle. 
All policy, whether it be individual or public, 
reflects some law. Everything that occurs follows some law 
of nature. The laws of nature are descriptive law. The laws 
of man are prescriptive. Knowledge of law and compliance 
with law are linked by the will which is associated with 
practical reason and is our capacity to comprehend 
principles and take appropriate actions. Sometimes we act 
in violation of one principle in order to adhere to 
another. This reflects some incons stency in our 
principles. 
The intent of our principles is to assist us in 
obtaining our goals. It is the natural goal of man to 
attain happiness. According to Kant, reason alone cannot 
lead us to happiness because we cannot control the 
vicissitudes of life. However, even though we may not 
achieve this natural goal, we can achieve our moral goal, 
or nrational purpose" which is to be "worthy of happiness." 
We run into difficulty when our inclination prompts us 
to choose a means for attaining happiness that is 
inconsistent with what our reason represents as necessary 
for being worthy of happiness. 
F i n a 1 1 y , t h e r e i s a n i mp e r a t i v e w h i c h c o mma n d s a 
certain conduct immediately, without having as its 
condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This 
zoo 
imperative is categorical. It concerns not the matter 
of the action, or its intended result, but its form 
and the princi.ple of which it is itself a result. and 
what is essentially good in it consists in the mental 
disposition, let the consequence be what i[5 fay. This imperative may be called that of Morality. 
Kant makes a comment in applying his principles of rational 
judgment in the search for happiness applicable 
specifically to the parenting of children. 
Since in early youth it cannot be known what ends are 
likely to occur to us in the course of life, parents 
seek to have their children taught a a£~at man~ 
ibl.~a~. and provide for their ~~ill in the use of 
means for all sorts of arbitrary ends, of none of 
which can they determine whether it may not perhaps 
hereafter be an object to their pupil, but which it is 
at all events possible that he might aim at: and this 
anxiety is so great that they commonly neglect to form 
and correct their judgment on the value of the things 
which may be chosen as ends. 
There is one end, however, which may be assumed 
to be actually such to all rational beings <so far as 
imperatives apply to them,~~ as depedent beings), 
and therefore one purpose which they not merely may 
have, but which we may with certainty assume that they 
all ~ctua~~~ have by a natural necessity, and this is 
happiness. 
When we feel that in order to gain happiness we must 
do some particular thing, the necessity of that action 
depends upon the nature of our desire. To be necessary, 
however, by virtue of reason, the action must be done as a 
result of our will to be worthy of happiness, whether or 
not happiness is actually gained. The act must be necessary 
on its own merits also, and we must will to do it because 
it is necessary. 
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The categorical imperative of Kant suggests that 
action may be categorically and unconditionally necessary 
regardless of our desires or inclinations. The value of the 
action is within the action itself which encompasses the 
motive for doing it. There is an unconditional and moral 
necessity in the command of the moral imperative. 
There is, therefore, but one categorical imperative, 
namely this: act only on that maxim whereby thou canst 
~!~1h~-~~m~~i~m~-~lll_ih~i_l!_~h£~lQ_~~££mI_~ 
universal law. 
Kant thus condenses the essence of his categorical 
imperative into the universal law which applies to 
everyone. Kant admonishes us to act on maxims that we would 
want to have as universal laws of nature; to treat others, 
whether directly or in our decisions which affect others as 
an end and not as a means; to act in such a way that we 
would want to live in a community governed by the 
principles we live by. How we view individuals is 
significant and determines the decisions that we make that 
affect them. Kant offers significant commentary on the 
relationships between individuals and society: 
Rational beings, on the contrary, are called e~~~£n~~ 
because their very nature points them out as ends in 
themselves, that is as something which must not be 
used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts 
freedom of action <and is an object of respect). 
These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose 
existence has a worth for us as an effect of our 
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action but £~1I£il~I-~nQ~. that is no other can be 
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substituted, which they should subserve m~~~l~ as 
means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess 
absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and 
therefore contingent, then there woul~5 ge no supreme practical principle of reason whatever. 
Kant offers a rationale for his designation of human 
beings as subjects worthy of respect. He indicates that a 
rational being has intrinsic worth: the only absolutely 
good thing is the good will. Reason is the foundation of 
the good will, and, therefore, it has an intrinsic value. 
Human beings, because they are rational beings who are 
capable of reasoning, therefore have an intrinsic value. 
Therefore, every man, every human being, is an object 
having absolute value, because as a rational being, human 
beings are the foundation of their own good will, which is 
an absolute good. The worth of a rational being is not 
dependent upon having a good will, but rather because human 
beings are rational beings and, as such, can have a good 
will. 
Free Agency and Self-Determination 
The moral authority of practical reason is founded in 
freedom. The concept of duty presupposes a freedom of 
choice. If there is true freedom of the rational will, then 
morality can have genuine meaning in practical law. Man 
would not have freedom if he was simply the pawn of his own 
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desires. People should freely determine their duties and 
choose to do them. Duties which are chosen are examples of 
free action. 
The will is a kind of causality belonging to 1 iving 
beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom is 
a property of such causality in so far as it can be 
efficient, independent of foreign causes determining 
it; just as E.!J.x.~l£~l-~~£~~~li~ is the property that 
the causality of all irrational beings has of being 
determi~ to activity by the influence of foreign 
causes. 
Kant's proof of freedom as an~ erio!:_j_ principle is based 
upon the relationship of rationality to a free will and 
man's rational being and therefore moral agency. This is 
the basis of his proof, because free will is necessarily 
related to rationality, and thus Kant proves the 
universality of free will and that every human being is 
subject to a moral law. 
Now I say every being that cannot act except under the 
idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical 
point of view really free, that is to say, all laws 
which are inseparably connected with freedom have the 
same force for him as if his will had been shown to be 
free in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive. 
Now I affirm that we must attribute to every 
rational being which has a will that it has also 2 ~~e idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. 
Kant sees freedom of will as a necessary and fundamental 
condition for mora 1 1 i fe. Being able to choose 
independently of the laws of natural causality, we are able 
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to meaningfully be judged subject to the moral command of 
reason. 
CHAPTER ~ 
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS IN THE FAMILY AND SOCIETY IN 
A CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 
An elucidation of the conflicts which arise between 
society and the parents of handicapped children has thus 
far been presented from the perspective of the parental 
perception of those conf 1 i c ts. It is proposed that a 
foundation for judgment in the attempt to resolve parental 
and societal differences is to be found in Immanuel Kant's 
essay, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. 
A summary of pertinent portions of the essay therefore 
followed the presentation of the problem as seen by the 
parents of handicapped children. Kant's guiding principles 
to be honored in human relationships, both public and 
private, are specifically applicable to the relationship 
between society and the parents of handicapped children 
because Kant's principles are formulated from a thorough 
examination of what constitutes rights and what constitutes 
obligations in the conduct of human affairs. 
The issues joined in parental-societal conflict vis a 
the handicapped child also devolve from definitions of 
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the rights and obligations of each of the three parties to 
the conflict. Although differences may be the result of a 
hurtful attitude, ignorance, anxiety, frustration, pride, 
or the inability to cope with an apparently overwhelming 
situation, what perpetuates those differences is the 
failure of one of the three to fulfill the obligation to 
treat the other with the kindness and understanding 
necessary for an alleviation of the pain of the conflict. 
This is the failure to have what Kant calls "good will," 
the "indispensable condition." 
The rights and obligations of children, parents, and 
society must be determined on the basis of principles 
established through sound reasoning and a valid perception 
of natural law. Kant's work provides a rationale for the 
formulation of duties and obligations based upon the 
paramount value of good will. But how can this formulation 
be translated into maxims applicable to the conflictive 
situations that the families of handicapped children and 
society find themselves in? An examination of the concept 
of children's rights may help in finding an answer to this 
question. 
What exactly is a "right?" In speaking of the rights 
of chi 1 d re n , parents . and soc i e t y i t i s he 1 pf u 1 to adopt 
the approach taken originally by W.N. Hohfeld, namely, that 
of "right relationships" or the relationships between right 
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holders and right 260 regarders. One must also sustain an 
awareness that a.right may be at one time held by one and 
regarded by another and at another time regarded by the 
previous holder and held by the previous regarder. There 
maY be mutual rights, as is often the case when fathers and 
mothers share rights to determine the upbringing of the 
child. There may be exclusive rights which an individual 
does not share with others because those rights pertain to 
outcomes that affect only the one person. But what affects 
any one individual will eventually affect society unless 
that individual ives alone on an island. The concept of 
solely indiv dual rights is, then, subject to 
qualification. 
Hohfeld divides rights into five groups: claims, which 
are also referred to as rights "in the strictest sense" of 
the term; liberties <or privileges); E~~~£~; i~~~~ii~~; 
The claim is defined as a right to the 
assertion by one individual <the right holder> of the 
demand on another <the duty bearer) to forbear. Thus, 
should the claim be in force or exercised, and the act 
of forbearance not done, it would be moral <or legal, 
in the case of legal right), other things being equal, 
to use coercive measures to extract either the 
specific performance <i·~·, the act of 2 tprbearance 
claimed), or compensation in lieu of it." 
Children's claims <or rights "in the strictest sense") 
are defined according to Hohefeld's reading of societal 
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consensus as the right to expect of their parent~ or 
guardians the necessities of life: a home, nourishment, 
education, medical care, and in some sectors of society, "a 
proper moral climate." Defining the necessities of life 
more specifically is difficult. That which we call a "home" 
might be anything from a Navajo hogan in the Arizona desert 
{and there are many of these native American homes which 
are filled with love, tradition, good nutrition, and 
appropriate parental discipline> to the most fashionable of 
mansions <and some of these offer little more than junk 
food and a schizogenic environment>. What constitutes 
adequate "nourishment" may be physiologically determined, 
but the availability of the best of foods does not 
necessarily guarantee the healthiest of diets. Bulemia and 
anorexia are more common among the affluent than among the 
poor, and overeating, with all of its psychological 
consequences, is found in every socioeconomic stratum. 
There is no clearly indisputable definition of "proper 
medical care." Although the courts will generally rely on 
expert testimony in determining what is proper, parents may 
believe that they have the right to provide alternatives to 
modern medicine such as folk medicine or faith healing. 
Even among board-certified medical specialists there is 
controversy concerning the appropriateness of many surgical 
and therapeutic interventions, particularly in the 
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treatment of the handicapped infant. Education has often 
been the subject of dispute between parents and the state. 
one need only recall the many suits brought against the 
Amish people because of their methods of education, which 
society seemed to find objectionable. At the same time it 
is even more important to recall that the Amish people are 
now vindicated through the same judicial process which sub-
jected them to the suits they contested. Even the education 
offered in major metropolitan school systems has come into 
question. And when we try to reach an agreement on what 
constitutes a "proper moral climate" a consensus seems more 
difficult to find than with any of the other necessities of 
life deemed the legal right of children to claim. 
Out of respect for the individual rights of lesbian 
mothers, homosexual fathers <ten percent of all homosexuals 
are parents> utopian communal "groupies," and even those 
judged to be patently "criminal elements," American society 
has shown itself reluctant to judicially curtai 1 the right 
of parents to raise their children as long as the parents 
are not physically abusive. And it is true that children 
are known to have been reared under the most unusual of 
moral circumstances and yet have grown up to be productive 
citizens. This fact does not, of course, silence the mor-
al concerns which society frequently voices in many forums. 
We are nonetheless loath to interfere with the sanctity of 
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the home or to curtail individual rights. But we have more 
recently become increasingly aware of the devastating and 
long-term harmful effects that emotional abuse and sexual 
misconduct in the home have on children. The courts have 
moved to protect children, and laws have been enacted which 
address the rights of children to be free from such 
assaults upon their psyches. Unfortunately, the assault 
must generally be blatant and recognizable to those outside 
the home before protective measures are undertaken. 
Parents may also have claim rights with regard to 
their children. They may have a claim upon society for 
certain provisions that families alone would be unable to 
provide. This may be particularly true in the case of the 
handicapped child. It is certainly typical of the adopted 
handicapped child, in which case the support of the child 
may be subsidized by the state. Parents may have claim 
rights to the respect of their children. Although respect 
is hardly enforceable by the laws of society, the laws of 
the family may demand it. Parents certainly have the right 
to expect the same protection of the law if they are in 
conflict with their children as they would if they were in 
conflict with any other adult member of society. 
Society may have a claim upon parents with regard to 
their children. Neighbors may complain if babies cry too 
much. Society may insist, out of concern for the economic 
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productivity of the whole community, that parents train 
their children and educate them so that they wi 11 be able 
to contribute to the community later in life. Parents are 
expected to prevent the delinquency of their minors and can 
be held accountable for damages their children may inflict. 
Society may express claim upon children for certain 
behaviors and conformity to certain expectations. 
Houlgate differentiates between claim rights that are 
"positive" and claim rights that are "negative." 262 The 
former are the rights to positive actions on the part of 
other persons and the latter are the rights to demand other 
persons' omissions or forbearances. Positive rights impose 
on others a duty or obligation to provide or protect. 
Negative rights include such things as privacy, freedom 
from abuse and the right to an undamaged reputation. 
Another formulation of the claim right is that of 
Lawrence Becker's "capacity claim" which he describes as 
calling attention to one's capacity or the assertion of 
one's competence to perform some function of life as in the 
meaning that they feel they ~~E~lQ have such rights as 
adults have and they wish to assert their capacity to be 
regarded as having such rights. 263 
Lib~Lii~~· also called ELi~il~ges by some, imply no 
duties on the part of others. but rather freedom from 
duties for the holder of the liberty and freedom from the 
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claim rights of others on those with the iberties. 
Liberties may be secured by claim rights to hold the 
liberties, but such claim rights are separate from the 
liberties themselves. 
Powers represent those rights which one may hold in 
relationship to others to assert in making just demands or 
to require certain actions or non-actions of another. As 
Becker puts it. "the existence of a power right is the 
existence of a state of affairs such that one person <the 
right holder) may morally <or legally) alter at will some 
of the rights, duties, liberties, powers or immunities of 
another person <the liability bearer>. 263 
Immunities represent freedoms from control of others 
relative to a legal relationship. Children are, for 
example, immune from the willful alteration by their 
parents or custodians of their claim rights. This irrvnunity 
also constitutes a lack of power or an inability on the 
part of others. 
Mixed rights are those which combine other rights such 
as the combination of liberties, powers and capacity rights 
<as in the case of the right to marry>. Houlgate discusses 
the importance of due process as an example of a mixed 
right: 
It consists of such legal rights as the right to be 
assisted by counsel, to a speedy trial. to a public 
trial, to confront opposing witnesses, to a trial by 
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jury. to be free from double jeopardy, and to non-
sel f-incriminat ion. Not only is the right to due 
process a mixture of rights, but some of the specified 
rights are combinations of kinds of rights. Thus, we 
find not only a liberty <the right to confront 
opposing witnesses), an immunity <the right to be free 
from double jeopardy), and claims <the right to a 
speedy trial, the right to a public trial>. but also a 
right that is a m_ixt~r~ of_ liby6~y and claim <the 
right to non-self-1ncr1m1nat1on>. 
Consideration of rights on the basis of the processes 
by which they are justified leads to distinctions between 
moral and legal rights. When a right is upheld on the basis 
0 f a rec o g n i zed statute . i t may be referred to as a 1 e ga 1 
right. However, such rights are not universal and will vary 
according to the legal system appealed to. Even within 
legal systems there may be debate over the justification of 
rights. A legal realist may hold that only those rights 
which are enforced or upheld by the courts are indeed 
rights. Others may hold that all rights which they believe 
the legal system ought to recognize under natural law are 
indeed rights. A contemporary legal positivist would 
proclaim as rights those which are actually 
either implicitly or explicitly, by the legal 
"recognized, 
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system." 
Those rights that are justified by an appeal to moral 
reasoning and are considered separate from any statutory 
presence are moral rights. There will always be debate and 
differences of opinion both as to what these rights are and 
as to what process of reasoning supports the moral 
argument. Some may take a utilitarian approach and consider 
214 
moral rights those which are in the best interest of the 
greatest number. Others may follow arguments on the basis 
of a different concept of justice, or prudence, or 
fairness. 
Human rights are those rights which are accepted as 
moral rights "held equally by all human beings 
unconditionally and unalterably." 262 Such rights may also 
be referred to as natural rights. 
In any discussion of rights, whether they be 
children's or adults', it is important to establish the 
basis of the right being examined and to determine whether 
it is grounded on a legal statute or is simply accepted as 
universal moral law. Rights always have cultural and 
societal foundations. If one accepts that there are 
universal human rights that apply equally in principle to 
all human beings or that there are laws of life which 
originate with God or a power beyond human power, then it 
is important to recognize that human beings are not 
universally n agreement as to the definition or 
application of such rights either in theory or in practice. 
There are, however, some rights which, despite cultural 
differences in the way they are expressed seem to be 
recognized by a great majority of all the peoples on this 
earth. 
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Basic rights of all children: 
The basic rights of all children are declared in the 
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 
these words: "Mankind owes to the child the best it has to 
264 give." But there is little agreement as to how mankind 
should fulfill that debt or what mankind is willing to 
sacrifice in the process of fulfilling it. The United 
Nations document adopted by the General Assembly in 1959 
reflects previous documents formulated by the International 
Union for Child Welfare in 1923, adopted by the League of 
Nat i on s i n l 9 2 4 . and r e v i s e d i n l 9 4 8 . I t r e cog n i z e s 
attitudes shared by many cultures and many nationalities 
regarding the rights of children. 
The basic principles outlined in the document encom-
pass areas of non-discrimination; securing rights to 
develop in health, with freedom and dignity for both child 
and parent; the right to appropriate education including 
special consideration for the handicapped; the right to 
protection from harm or neglect, exploitation or premature 
employment: and the right to be free of unjust servitude 
either physical or mental. 
Every aspect of the United Nations declaration applies 
equally to those children who are born with handicaps, or 
who develop handicaps later in life. Special attention is 
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also given specifically to the handicapped child or those 
"physically, mentally, or socially handicapped." Such 
declarations are worthy expressions of worldwide societal 
consensus. But declarations do not always guarantee 
p~actices that reflect their principles. Actual societal 
behavior in a given nation may be quite different from that 
nation's political appearance and the image projected by a 
leader who is aware of world public opinion. 
The United Nations declaration of the rights of the 
child offers a formulation of moral and political thought 
and reflects traditions grounded in the religions of the 
predominant cultures of the modern world. Many of the 
expressions are given in open-ended terms, subject to 
interpretation such as "special protection," "in a healthy 
and mo r a 1 man n e r , " or " t e n de r y ea r s . " Th e p r i n c i p 1 e s a 1 s o 
imply that those who are responsible for the children are 
enabled by an adequate economic capability. The declaration 
does specify that it is preferable for children to grow up 
under the care and responsibility of parents, and it 
assigns accountability to all individuals, organizations, 
and governments to recognize and strive for the observance 
of the principles "by legislation and other measures 
progressive 1 y ... " 
Finding the means for applying to governmental 
processes the principles enunciated in the United Nations 
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Declaration of the Rights of the Child necessitates an 
appeal to the mpre fundamental principles applicable in 
human relationships and individual morality, in the city, 
state, or national government, and in the rules that 
families adopt for their own governance. We turn to Kant's 
concepts outlined in the E~rr~~~~rr~~ELlrr£lEl~~-£f_~h~ 
Metaphysics of Morals in our search for these means. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE CONCEPT OF PARENTING FROM A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Kant addresses the issue of parent-child relations in 
his Principles of Private Right 264 and places the family as 
a legally necessary entity among the duties of man. 
From the Duty of Man towards himself-that is, towards 
the Humanity in his own Person--there thus arises a 
personal Right on the part of the Members of the 
opposite sexes, as Persons, to acquire one another 
really and reciprocally by Marriage. 266 
It is presumed, based upon such a union that offspring 
will naturally follow in the course of human events and 
thus an associated duty. 
In like manner, from the fact of Procreation in the 
union thus constituted, there follows the Duty of 
preserving and rearing ~hl..1_£~~~ as the Products of 
th . u . 266 1s n1on. 
Kant then proceeds to a congenital Right of the child 
to expect parental accountability based upon the child's 
incapacity to take care of himself. This is natural Law 
grounded in the Personhood of the individual. 
Accordingly Children, as Persons, have, at the same 
time, an original congenital Right--distinguished.from 
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mere hereditary Right--to be reared by the care of 
their Parents till they are capable of maintaining 
themselves; and this provision becomes immediately 
theirs by Law, without any particular juridical Act 
. . d t d t . . t 265 being require o e ermine 1 . 
The next step is recognition of personal "Freedom", 
which is not the product of biological procreation alone. 
For what is thus produced is a~~£~£~· and it is 
impossible to think of a Being endowed with personal 
Freedom as produced merely by a physical process. And 
hence, i~ ih~ EL~£ii£~l £~l~ii£~· it is quite a 
correct and even a necessary Idea to regard the act of 
generation as a process by which a Person is brought 
without his co~~~~i into the world, and placed in it 
b th 'bl f ·11 of others. 265 y e respons i e ree w1 
Thus, children, because they are brought into this 
world without consent, according to Kant, must be so reared 
by their parents that they learn the nature of their 
existence through respect for their individual freedom. 
This Act, therefore, attaches an obligation to the 
Parents to make their Children--as far as their power 
goes--contented with the condition thus acquired. 
Hence Parents cannot regard their ~hil.Q as, in a 
manner, a Thing £f ih~iL £~~ ~~~i~S· for a livi~ 
being endowed with Freedom cannot be so regarded. Nor, 
consequently, have they a Right to destroy it as if it 
were their own property, or ~~~~-i£_l~~~~-li_i£ 
chan£~: because they have brought a Being into the 
world who becomes in fact a Citizen of the world, and 
they have placed that Being in a state which they 
cannot be 1 eft to treat with indifference, even 
according to the natural conceptions of Right. 266 
Although Kant's view does not reflect any concept of 
premortal decision-making or choice, but rather birth 
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"without consent", he does ascribe innate rights to 
offspring by virtue of the personhood and citizenship in 
society with which each individual is endowed at birth. 
We cannot even conceive how it is possible that God 
~ create FREE Beings; for it appears as if all their 
future actions, being predetermined by that first act, 
would be contained in the chain of natural necessity, 
and that, therefore, they could not be free. But as 
men we ~L~ free in fact, as is proved by the 
Categorical Imperative in the moral and practical 
relation as an authoritative decision of Reason; yet 
reason cannot make the possibility of such a relation 
of Cause to Effect conceivable from the theoretical 
point of view, because they are both suprasensible. 
All that can be demanded of Reason under these 
conditions, would merely be to prove that there is no 
Contradiction involved in the conception of a CREATION 
OF FREE BEINGS; and this may be done by showing that 
Contradiction only arises when, along with the 
Category of Causality, the ~o~£iil£~_£i-1i~~ is 
transferred to the relation of suprasensible Things. 
This condition, as implying that the cause of an 
effect must precede the effect as its reason, is 
inevitable in thinking the relation of objects of 
sense to one another; and if this conception of 
Causality were to have objective reality given to it 
in the theoretical bearing, it would also have to be 
referred to the suprasensible sphere. But the 
Contradiction vanishes when the pure Category, apart 
from any sensible conditions, is applied from the 
moral and practical point of view, and consequently is 
in a non-sensible relation to the conception of 
Creation. 
The philosophical Jurist will not regard this 
investigation, when thus carried back even to the 
ultimate Principles of the Transcendental Philosophy, 
as an unnecessary subtlety in a Metaphysic of Morals, 
or as losing itself in aimless obscurity, when he 
takes into consideration the difficulty of the problem 
to be solved, and also the necessity of doing justice 
in this inquiry to the ultimate relations of the 
Principles of Right. 267 
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What are the duties of parents from Kant's point of 
view? Clearly t.here is a right to be the primary rearing 
party. Some parenls might question why anyone would want to 
secure a legal £ig~i to perform such a thankless job. And 
we should remember that Kant had neither a wife nor 
children. Nonetheless, Kant's vision is universal and he 
sees the importance of the commitment of parents to 
children in the continuum of human society. The Duty of 
parents is prescribed because of the inability of children 
to provide for themselves. Education is specifically 
enumerated as a duty of parents in order to bring the child 
into a position of self-support. 
The Rights of the Parent 
From the Duty thus indicated, there further 
necessarily arises the Right of the Parents to THE 
MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING OF THE CHILD, so long as it is 
itself incapable of making proper use of its body as 
an Organism, and of its mind as an Understanding. This 
involves its nourishment and the care of its 
Education. This includes, in general, the function of 
for~ing and developing it practically, that it may be 
able in the future to maintain and advance itself, and 
also its moral Culture and Development, the guilt of 
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neglecting it falling upon the Parents. 
When the child reaches an age at which he can 
legitimately support himself, then the parent's right to 
command. according to Kant, is terminated. Those who have 
raised children to adulthood know well how difficult the 
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transition to self-sufficiency can be in spite of much 
training and preparation. One must assume that those 
children who never attain an age of accountability because 
of mental retardation or incompetence may remain under the 
control of their parents and never attain the emancipation 
on the same basis as other children. 
All this training is to be continued till the Child 
reaches the period of Emancipation (emancipatio), as 
the age of practicable self-support. The Parents then 
virtually renounce the parental Right to command, as 
well as all claim to repayment for their previous care 
and trouble; for which care and trouble, after the 
process of Education is complete, they can only appeal 
to the Children by way of any claim, on the ground of 
the Obligation of Gratitude as a Duty of Virtue. 268 
The children's duty to parents after achieving 
emancipation is, according to Kant, of less weight and 
power legally, being a "Duty of Virtue" on the part of 
children as compared to the "congenital Right" which 
obligates parents to provide for their children. Children 
have claim upon their parents while in their years of 
dependency, but parents do not have claim upon their 
children when in iheir years of dependency on the same 
basis, .e. "congenital right." Parents may claim that 
children have a duty to them "on the ground of the 
Obligation of Gratitude." This is a "Duty of Virtue" and 
not a "congenital right." For example, if a child is 
abusive to a parent, as long as the child is in his years 
2 2 '} 
of dependency the parents have a duty to provide for and 
care for the ch.ild. If, on the other hand, the parent is 
abusive to the child, then the child could be relieved of 
anY duty on the basis of gratitude to care for the parent 
in old age. 
Children, although not the £rOEerty of parents, are 
their E£~~~~~i£rr and as such their "subjects." Thus 
parental rights are described as "personal right(s) of a 
real k i nd. " 
From the fact of Personality in the Children, it 
further follows that they can never be regarded as the 
Property of the Parents, but only as belonging to them 
by way of being in their possession, like other things 
that are held apart from the possession of all others 
and that can be brought back even against the will of 
the Subjects. Hence the Right of the Parents is not a 
purely Real Right, and it is not alienable <l~~ 
~ersonalissimum). But neither is it a merely Personal 
Right; it is a Personal Right of a real Kind, that is, 
a Personal Right that is constituted and exercised 
after the manner of a Real Right. 269 
"Real Rights" refer to power over concrete things, 
which children are not. Nonetheless, not having gained 
sufficient ability to have full power over themselves, 
children may be administered over with a similar degree of 
control as would be applied to concrete posessions. 
It is therefore evident that the Title of ~_E~~~£rr~l 
Right of a Real Kind must necessarily be added, in the 
Science of Right, to the Titles of Real Right and 
Personal Right, the Division of Rights into these two 
being not complete. For, if the Right of the Parents 
to the Children were treated as if it were merely a 
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Real Right to a part of what belongs to their house, 
they could not only appeal to the Duty of the Children 
to return to them in claiming them when they run away, 
but they would be then entitled to seize them and to 
269 impound them like things or runaway cattle. 
Children gain their freedom from the command of their 
parents upon reaching the age of natural majority. By the 
same token parents regain their freedom from obligation to 
their children at the same time. 
The Children of the House, who, along with the 
Parents, constitute a Family, attain ~~~~ii~· and 
become MASTERS OF THEMSELVES <majorennes, sui juris}, 
even without a Contract of release from their previous 
state of Dependence, by their actually attaining to 
the capability of self-maintenance. This attainment 
arises, on the one hand, as a state of natural 
majority; with the advance of years in the general 
course of Nature; and, on the other hand, it takes 
form. as a state in accordance with their own natural 
condition. They thus acquire the Right of being their 
own masters. without the interposition of any special 
juridical act, and therefore merely by Law<~>; and 
they owe their Parents nothing by way of legal debt 
for the Education, just as the parents, on their side, 
are now released from their Obligations to the 
Children in the same way. Parents and Children thus 
gain or regain their natural Freedom; and the domestic 
society, which was necessary according lo the Law of 
Right, is thus naturally dissolved. 270 
Children in this majority or other individuals who may 
wish to work and abide in a household, may, according to 
Kant, enter into a contract with the master of the house. 
But their relationship relative to duties and obligations 
is limited to the terms of the contract. 
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Kant describes familial relationships in terms that 
seem legalistic matters of right, duty, and obligation. 
This pattern, however, does not necessariy exclude the full 
range of emotional possibilities that families may enjoy. 
The key elements in Kant's discussion of parent and 
child relationships are the principles of freedom by virtue 
of reason and the independence of the individual attained 
through maturation and training by parents. Children are 
born with the right to attain their majority with the 
assistance of parents who are obligated to clothe, feed, 
house. and educate them. 
But what is the good of the family structure? For what 
purpose, ultimately, does Kant see this particular design 
pursued? Although he begins his discourse on parent-child 
relations by stating the necessity of rearing children by 
virtue of the natural processes of life and regeneration, 
there is a distinction given to man which separates him and 
the society of his family from all other species. That 
quality is reason which permits freedom through the 
exercise of agency. The imperative which compels man to 
choose right principles to govern himself within the 
context of that family structure and to seek willingly the 
welfare of his children is reflected in a desire for 
happiness which, according to Kant, is not a guaranteed 
state in life. The thrust of human effort, however, should 
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be directed toward that goal which is indeed attainable 
according to Kant, namely worthiness to be happy. 
The highest good <~~~m~~-bon~~l attainable in life 
which can be comprehended through moral reason is 
"worthiness to be happy." 
CHAPTER 7 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASES PRESENTED FROM A KANTIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
After reviewing the literature of conflict between 
families and society relative to the rearing of handicapped 
children, presenting a series of cases and discussing their 
related conflictive issues, presenting a brief synopsis of 
a philosophical approach to human relations and the Kantian 
view of the family, attention is now focused on a re-
examination of the issues posed by the cases presented in 
light of the Kantian perspective. The cases, the 
perspectives from which they arise and find expression, and 
the positions taken by the parties involved reflect 
substantial moral dilemmas. By superimposing a framework 
constructed of Kantian principles over these cases, a view 
towards resolution of the apparent conflicts can be 
elucidated. 
In the realm of socio-legal issues this work began 
with a presentation of conflicts which arise between 
parents and professionals. Clearly, a societal consensus 
with regard to the appropriate roles of parents and society 
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would alleviate much of the conflict. Kant does not provide 
us with specific details of parental and societal roles, 
but his principles offer direction sufficient to understand 
his view and expectations of children and parents. 
Kant expects that people will have children as a 
matter of course and human nature and that children will 
obtain, by virtue of their person, freedoms. Parents should 
accept their responsibilities to provide for and nurture 
their children until their majority. 
The first conflict discussed in the socio-legal issues 
section dealt with child abuse. From a legal perspective 
relative to the handicapped child abuse may take many 
forms: physical, emotional, medical, etc. The question at 
hand is what is the proper role of society in intervening 
on behalf of children and in opposition to parents when an 
abuse is suspected. An examination of Kant's expressions 
regarding familial affairs would lead one to place primary 
authority in the hands of parents. Nonetheless, Kant points 
out the requirement for parental recognition of children's 
rights to expect parental accountability based upon the 
child's incapacity to take care of himself. This is defined 
as natural law grounded in the personhood of the 
individual. Thus Kant would support legal intervention on 
behalf of the child in recognition of a child's rights as 
an individual. However, grounds for usurping parental 
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authority would have to be based on such a severe 
compromise of the chi Id's rights that the benefit of 
parental authority would be negated. 
The concept of a foster home placement for children 
who are abused would probably not be out of the realm of 
possibilities from a Kantian perspective. Foster parents 
would necessarily bear the same relational responsibility 
toward a child as natural parents would. Again, as in the 
case of biological parents, the child is placed without 
necessarily his own consent into a situation, and therefore 
it becomes the responsibility of the foster parents to 
respect the rights of the child. Kant suggests that parents 
regard their child, not as a "thing of their own making," 
but rather a living human being endowed with freedom. 
With regard to respect for free will and the 
importance, from a Kantian perspective, of the development 
of human will it would seem essential that parents 
facilitate opportunities for their children to negotiate to 
whatever extent possible with the world around them. 
Children, however handicapped, are potential parents. Their 
capacity to make right decisions and set examples for their 
children to make right decisions will depend upon the 
opportunities they have to reason and "think through" the 
dilemmas life presents them. 
2}0 
Placing the primary responsibility for the rearing of 
children upon the shoulders of parents, Kant provides as a 
claim right of children the necessary attentions of their 
parents. This claim right proceeds from the incapacities of 
the child to provide for himself. and the personal freedom 
inherent in the personhood of the child, the child having 
come to earth, according to Kant, without his consent and 
as the result of a choice made by parents which is 
commensurate with the nature of the human species. 
Thus a trust is established wherever parents are held 
accountable and children may grow up in the security of 
expectations that their welfare will be responsibly taken 
care of by their parents. When that trust is broken by 
parental abuses of children, then the violation will bear 
deep psychological consequences. 
A Kantian approach to the issue of parent-child trust 
would require absolute integrity and an honoring of the 
commitment entrusted in the parent. Children would 
anticipate their right to the honest behavior of their 
parents toward them and society would anticipate that 
parents would honor this trust. as children are entrusted 
to them by nature <or by God). 
Children also would be expected, by parents and by 
society, to act honestly towards their parents and towards 
society beyond the realm of the family to the degree that 
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they have attained a level of accountability for their 
actions. 
In the discussion of child abuse cases covered in this 
work the question of judgment and intervention where abuse 
or neglect is suspected by society is brought up. What 
authorities should appropriately be assigned to society and 
what would, from a Kantian viewpoint, be the appropriate 
role of the various social services and judicial 
institutions in cases where abuse or neglect is suspected? 
Kant seems to have held little special regard for the 
"social service'' institutions of his day which were 
represented primarily by churches which worked in 
combination with political authority. Nonetheless, if the 
rights of children which are naturally theirs as human 
beings dependent upon the care of their parents such as 
life, or nourishment, would be violated, a Kantian approach 
would sustain some intervention. However, the latitude of 
parental authority would probably encompass a greater scope 
from a Kantian perspective than it does in modern American 
society. 
A "least inhuman" invocation of the law, adjudication 
and intervention as recommended by Goldstein, et al .. would 
find support in a Kantian attitude toward respect of 
individual freedoms. But these freedoms of parents and of 
children should not be compromised. The pursuit of parental 
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freedoms should not compromise the rights of children. 
Parents do not have a right to be "free" of their duty 
toward their children. Children were viewed by Kant as 
having rights as E..Q.ienil~l free and independent persons. 
Until they reached an age of majority, their freedoms were 
limited by their dependency upon their parents. 
Today, where there is clear evidence of child abuse to 
the degree that the health and welfare of a child are 
compromised, then intervention generally results in some 
form of placement of the child protected from the abusive 
parent. In Kant's time, parentally-abused children were not 
removed from their families, but where families were unable 
to feed or care for a child or when a mother wished to give 
up her child, churches did take responsibility to operate 
orphanages. Because the church and state were not separated 
in Prussia, it would be inappropriate to distinguish 
between the two with reference to orphan care. Then, as 
today, it was clear that such institutions were not 
adequate substitutes for families. 
Here we are concerned with principles, however, and 
not history. Therefore, a Kantian view with regard to 
parental obligations and authority would apply equally to 
biological parents as it would to surrogate parents. 
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The Case of the Vulon Children 
Proceeding from a sense of duty, the personnel of the 
state intervened in the interest of the children. However, 
their ignorance of the actual circumstances of the incident 
led them into a course opposite to the best interests of 
the children. The judge in this case affirmed the free will 
of the parents and hence their liberty to care for their 
children as they felt appropriate. 
The Case of Miss Shay 
Clearly an overzealous social worker was confused, and 
she was supported in her confusion by unclear statutes 
about what appropriate state interests are in the welfare 
of children. The Kantian principle of free agency was 
violated to the detriment of the mother-child relationship. 
The Case of in re Pogue 
Here a court intervened to protect the life of a child 
but preserved the agency of the mother with regard to her 
own welfare. The "maxim" of the mother was that the 
preservation of her 1 ife and of her child was not as 
important as obedience or duty to religious principles 
2}4 
which precluded a blood transfusion. The argument of the 
judge respected the mother's maxim as it pertained to 
herself but not as it affected the child. It was the 
judge's decision that the child's agency would be violated 
if his life were not preserved. 
Kant provides a specific example in his discussion of 
maxims which may be applied to this case. He finds the 
maxim of "I must try to live as long as possible" grounded 
in a good will moral foundation and the maxim of "When my 
1 ife becomes intolerable J will commit suicide" reflecting 
personal inclination but not impositions on others. 
The mother in the above case was not actively 
attempting suicide, but was accepting a suicidal course of 
events as preferable to the violation of what she felt was 
a higher moral imperative and therefore an intolerable 
1 if e. 
Kant, in his example, does not seem to take into 
account that a suicide may indeed impose or inflict damage 
upon others such as children left behind. 
Medical Neglect 
When parents refuse to accept medical treatment for 
their handicapped children, as in the case commented on by 
Duff and Campbell, their actions from a Kantian point of 
view lack good will and cannot be supported by natural 
principles of agency. The motives of the parents may, at 
first glance, seem laudable, wanting to protect the 
children from having imperfect lives, but in the final 
analysis, one generally finds that the parents' motive for 
this action is based upon self-interest. Certainly the 
basic Kantian principle of acting out of duty to right 
principles rather than out of inclination is not fulfilled 
by parents who allow their handicapped children to die. 
There would be greater moral worth in preserving the life 
of the child even though it means hardship for both parents 
and child, and such a course would reflect a true Kantian 
response to a sense of duty. 
In the case of Kevin Sampson a Kantian viewpoint would 
suggest the freedom of the child to express his view and 
the authority of the parent to determine the proper course 
for the welfare of the child should be sustained. However, 
parental authority would not qualify the parent to insist 
upon the fatal neglect of the child, as in the case of 
Iafelice v. Zarofu. 
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"Wrongful Life" 
"Wrongful life" is a concept inconsistent with the 
free-will principles which lie at the foundation of Kantian 
philosophy. The term "wrongful life" implies that a 
judgement is made by others (parents or society> as to the 
value of a ife which, in Kant's view, would have a 
sovereign right to self valuation at least at an age of 
majority. 
A necessary component of Kantian free-will is the 
rational capacity of the individual. Some would argue that 
an individual who, as far as others can determine, never 
attains a state of rationality due to retardation. would 
not qualify for respect as a sovereign individual. But 
neither do infants possess such apparent rationality, and 
we are compelled to respect their rights and understand 
that they have the potential to grow up and become rational 
individuals. In the case of retarded children, we may find 
their limited state in this life lamentable, but this 
should not negate the value of their existence. 
Although Kant addresses rights of individuals from the 
perspective of an earthly existence, the argument that an 
infant has rights in view of the free-will capacity which 
is potentially within him could be applied to the retarded 
child or person who, in spite of an apparent lack of 
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potential for rationality in this life, cannot be denied 
the potentiality for rational existence in his eternal 
existence (if one accepts such a concept). 
In the case of Renee Iafelice (page 85) the decision 
of the court upheld the protection of "life" without 
qualification, quoting, "it is life itself that is 
jealously safeguarded, not life in a perfect state." 
The Ryan Thomas Case 
The case of Ryan Thomas poses a dilemma which may have 
had some parallels in Kant's time. Certainly, infectious 
diseases were a familiar problem and the isolation of 
individuals suspected of carrying infectious diseases was a 
common practice. Whether for leprosy, the plague, or 
tuberculosis, society was familiar with the need to protect 
citizens from the spread of infection. The question in 
Ryan's case is whether his behavior would cause his 
infection to spread. Clearly, community reaction and fears 
of perceived potential threats were factors. A Kantian view 
would preserve the freedom of the child to enjoy the 
benefits of society provided it did not cause undue risk to 
the community. 
Ryan had AIDS and his situation in school created a 
conflict between his parents and his school district 
238 
regarding his isolation which was felt by his parents to be 
unjustified. The court ruled in favor of the parents. 
A Kantian approach to this situation would respect the 
right of the family to pursue obtaining a public education 
in a fair and equitable manner. Naturally, the interests of 
the community are not to be overlooked. But, since there 
was no established risk to the community in spite of 
prejudices regarding the infection in question, the ruling 
could seem consistent with a Kantian approach, based upon 
Kant's upholding of parental rights. 
Johnson v. Sullivan 
The case of Johnson v. Sullivan would clearly have 
found resolution through a Kantian perspective regarding 
the rights of parents to determine the welfare of their 
children. For physicians to play "God" in selecting those 
whom they would treat based upon social criteria would fly 
in the face of true social justice which was so much a part 
of romantic era philosophy. Parents and society, according 
to Kant, cannot regard their children as "things of their 
own making," but rather, "being(s) endowed with Freedom." 
"Nor. consequently, have they a right to destroy it as if 
it were their own property, or even to leave it to chance." 
Thus we see that it behooves both parents and society to do 
what is medically necessary for children according to the 
views expressed by Kant. 
Here we see parents attempting to obtain the best 
possible medical treatment for their handicapped children 
free from arbitrary determinations on the part of the 
medical community as to the quality of the children's lives 
or the socioeconomic capacities of the parents which 
doctors felt compromised the viability of the children. The 
argument for their protection is similar to the one put 
forth in the case of Iafelice in that the quality of life 
should not be the determinant of decisions to treat or not 
to treat. 
Certainly from a Kantian perspective, these children 
have rights, and the parents, who act as advocates in 
behalf of these children <unlike the lafelice case) also 
have the right to expect fair treatment for their children. 
The Beckett Case 
The case of Mary Katherine Beckett represents a 
situation in which society, due to technological advances, 
has the capacity to preserve and sustain life but not 
without prolonged dependency upon machines. Thus the normal 
human relationships between parent and child become 
interrupted and intellectual: emotional and social 
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development may be retarded. A Kantian perspective in the 
Beckett case would support the parental right to manage the 
welfare of their child at home and an obligation of the 
state to be non-discriminatory in its provision for 
financial support whether in the home or in an institution. 
Discriminatory practices, or bureaucratic rulings 
which. although designed to protect the rights of some, may 
result in the detriment of others, are not specifically 
addressed in Kant's works. It is the basic principle of a 
good will which represents the ultimate criteria for 
goodness which would not permit the unfairness of 
discrimination. 
A cognizance on the part of professionals who work in 
perinatal medicine nursing and social work of the potential 
magnitude of human sufferings which can result from the 
stress of dealing with the birth of a handicapped child 
could contribute significantly towards protocols which 
represent a humanistic good will and what Kant refers to as 
"being worthy of happiness." 
Conflicts Perceived by Parents 
In the section on conflicts perceived by parents 
relative to the rearing of their handicapped children, the 
feelings and perceptions of the parents represented 
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manifest the complex variety of emotions parents feel 
towards their handicapped children and toward society. 
The conflicts are between parents and society, between 
parents and children, between parents, and within the 
parents individually. The Kantian concepts of duty and good 
will can provide keys to the resolution of these conflicts. 
Parents who respond in frustration and anger towards 
their children because they are presented with less than 
what they had hoped for in the physical or mental 
capacities of their children would benefit from a grounding 
in Kantian perspectives. To be worthy of happiness by 
virtue of having done one's duty motivated by a sense of 
good will is not an impossible goal. But many of the 
reactions of parents in frustration over their handicapped 
children reflect attitudes deeply ingrained in our society 
which tends to reject those who are ''different". The parent 
is frustrated in several ways. 
l. Selfishly 
a. because the handicapped child is perceived as 
thwarting the parent's chances to obtain the things 
both tangible and intangible that the parent seeks; 
b. because the birth of the handicapped child may be 
perceived as a blight upon the otherwise unblemished 
family image. The parent fears that he or she will be 
242 
perceived by others as defective, having given birth 
to or sired something defective; 
c. because the parent is unable to gain the responsive 
love from the child that the parent wants and expects 
from a child; 
d. because the child will not be able to fulfill the 
dreams of the parents which the parents were unable 
to fulfill themselves, but hoped to vicariously 
experience through the child; 
e. because of self pity of the parent. 
2. In sympathy for the child 
a. because the parent may discover that fair treatment 
for the child is not easily obtainable; 
b. because the parent feels inadequate to meet the 
child's needs; 
c. because the parent has pity for the child. 
}. In relating to society regarding the child 
a. because the parent wants society to understand the 
child; 
b. because parents may want to prevent what has happened 
with their child happening to others; 
c. because parents may wish to become advocates for 
other children in the same category as their child; 
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d. because parents may feel that others who have no 
handicapped child cannot understand what they are 
enduring. 
These frustrations and anxiety-causing circumstances 
can result in experiences of anger and often the thwarting 
of the very goals the parents pursue. Other parents respond 
by uniting to meet an increased challenge. Nonetheless, it 
is difficult for parents to deal with problems that are 
rooted in societal attitudes. Often parental attitudes 
regarding handicaps are formed long before a handicapped 
child is born to a family. 
Parental perceptions are strongly affected by societal 
attitudes and learned mores. Parental perceptions are also 
passed down to children, the parents having received the 
teachings of their own parents by precept and by example. 
Parents who rear handicapped children must deal with 
the prejudices of society and the prejudices within 
themselves. An application of Kantian perspectives places 
accountability for children squarely in the hands of 
parents and does not qualify what the condition of the 
child may be except in terms of the dependence of the child 
upon the parents. A status of dependence may persist with 
handicapped children longer than with others and may even 
persist throughout the individual's life. 
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The role of society from a Kantian perspective would 
necessarily include a consideration for the welfare of 
others which is compassionate at least to that extent that 
people would want others to be compassionate towards them. 
The maxim delineated in the categorical imperative 
which prompts us to choose as personal principles what we 
would want to have enacted as universal laws serves to 
encourage a formula in society of providing for the 
handicapped as we would want to be provided for when we are 
ourselves handicapped (as all who reach old age certainly 
become to some degree). This formula would also prompt us 
to compassionately serve neighbors who have handicapped 
children even as we would want to have our neighbors 
campassionately serve us when we have handicapped children. 
But often the pain of prejudices is promulgated 
through ignorance rather than ill-wi II. and even the best 
intentioned words may fall on apprehensive ears to be 
interpreted as an offense. Here the Kantian categorical 
imperative works in a reverse or receivership mode as well. 
Not only should we be active in maxims which we would want 
to have as universal law, but we must receive, in the 
passive mode, the expressions and actions of others in a 
manner that we would want others to receive our actions 
regardless of how clumsy they may be. 
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This approach would not erase the need to correct the 
ignorance or the ill-will at the root of prejudices, but it 
would serve to dampen the consequences of offense taken 
where none is intended. 
The next problem discussed in the parental 
perspectives section is that of guilt and the accompanying 
self-pity which is so destructive. In this context we have 
a valid application of Kant's argument of duty toward self 
to preserve life and not commit (emotional> suicide. Our 
"maxim has moral worth" according to Kant when we preserve 
our state of wholeness out of a sense of duty, "not from 
inclination or fear, but from duty." 
The duty of the parent to discipline a child in spite 
of his handicap {page 107> will find support in a Kantian 
perspective. Nonetheless, Kant would give the parents 
freedom to spoil their handicapped children also. Kant 
specifies the duty of the parent to respond to the 
"original congenital Right--distinguished from mere 
hereditary Right--to be reared by the care of their Parents 
till they are capable of maintaining themselves." 
On page 128 the issue of parental denial is discussed 
relative to its potential for conflict between family and 
society. Families may suffer under the critical orientation 
of social service professionals who view this denial as 
detrimental and make a concerted effort to "help" families 
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"see reality". The efforts of these professionals are 
laudable. At times they are certainly justified in their 
efforts to prevent any neglect that may ensue from parental 
denial of a child's defects and consequently his medical 
and educational needs. 
On the other hand a certain degree of parental denial 
of a child's defects may be a positive force allowing 
families to move ahead in a positive, albeit sometimes 
unrealistic, approach to their child's life and potential 
for future achievement. 
A Kantian approach would probably favor leaving the 
parents alone. Kant felt that parents were accountable and 
as such should be respected in the discharge of their 
responsibilities. However, Kantian "duty" must also be 
allowed the social service worker who is an agent of 
society responding on behalf of a legitimate authority to 
intervene in the interest of the child. 
Siblings of handicapped children <page 128> offer an 
interesting problematic in the application of Kantian 
principles. Their growth and developmental progress may be 
deeply affected, positively or negatively by the 
introduction of the special needs of their handicapped 
sibling. How parents respond to the emotional needs of the 
sibling will affect, to a great extent, the direction of 
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the normal child's feelings about their handicapped brother 
or sister and handicapped children in general. 
Kant recognizes "happiness" as the one end ''which may 
be assumed to be such to all rational beings." This pursuit 
is the one which, of all the ends which the acquiring of 
skills may direct one to, constitutes a "natural 
necessity." Kant points this out in reference to the skills 
that parents attempt to assist their children in acquiring 
(page 235>. If siblings of handicapped children are to be 
happy, they must have a clear understanding of their 
handicapped sibling's problems and needs so that there is 
no unrealistic threat perceived by the normal child and the 
self-image of the normal sibling is not undermined by his 
perceptions of how the handicapped nature of his brother or 
sister affects him. 
On page 131 we move to the element of fear and the 
role it can play in the conflicts between parents of 
handicapped children and society. The situations and 
related cases deal with perceptions and realities, 
responses grounded in ignorance and fear of the unknown as 
well as fear of what is realistically within individuals 
fearing that they themselves are their worst enemy. Of all 
the fears of parents of handicapped children, the most 
common is the fear which focuses on the handicapping 
condition itself. The defect is the enemy. It has stricken 
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the child and may loom to strike again at children yet 
unborn. 
Fear is not compatible with happiness. According to 
Kant, our goal in life is to be worthy of happiness. The 
primary condition for this worthiness is a good will. If we 
interpret fear to be a form of disdain either for self or 
for others, then the good will may come into question. To 
bring the good will of the parent into question seems 
unfair, however, because it is common to fear the unknown 
possibilities which the parent of a handicapped child with 
a genetic disorder must realistically face. 
Kant offers the comfort of self assurance in good will 
even when "owing to special disfavor of fortune, or the 
niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will 
should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose." The 
value of the good will is intrinsic and cannot be detracted 
from. 
Kant does not address directly the property of trust 
or faith which may well be a more direct process in dealing 
with fear. Generally, fear is overcome through 
understanding and confidence in a provident reality. But 
where fear is in reality an expression of selfish concerns 
for one's own potential losses and not the well-being of 
others. then Kant's admonition to duty motivated by good 
will is appropriate. 
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It is difficult to separate the person of the child 
from the person of the parent when examining the feelings 
of the parent for the child. Often expressions of concern 
for the welfare of the child, such as those on page 1}2 
would appear compassionate. The possibility remains that 
the parent is expressing concern for the welfare of the 
child because the child represents a part of the person of 
the parent. When the parent says "I think I will die from 
hurting to think of his future without us," when 
contemplating institutionalization of a retarded child, we 
have to ask ourselves how much the parent may mean "I think 
I will die from hutting to think of our life without him," 
or "I think I will die from hurting when I think of my life 
(by proxy) in an institution. Only in sincere Kantian good 
will 1s the parent truly justified. 
On page 1}5 we see how the apparently good motives of 
friends and professionals who speak out in ignorance of the 
impact their promptings can have upon a parent, can 
generate fear unnecessarily. This may provide a counter 
argument for Kant's good will approach. It appears in this 
case that the good will of the friend and professional who 
encourages the parent to institutionalize her child by 
painttng a bleak prognosis backfires in the creation of 
resentments, fears, and guilt feelings. Often the well-
meaning friend is totally wrong in the assumptions made 
about the potential of the child. 
According to Kant, even here, the "good will" itself 
remains unblemished. In spite of ignorance, lack of tact, 
and the h u r t the s e be ha v i o rs may ca us e , the "good w i l l " 
itself cannot be diminished in value. This does not, 
however, mean that the hurtful friend or professional would 
not benefit from a more informed application of their good 
w i 11 . 
The example on page 139 of friends who helped a family 
with a sick child but resented it when the family attempted 
to pursue a normal life represents the insincere will which 
Kant cautioned against. It is not what one "performs or 
effects" that counts for Kant, but rather the motive behind 
it. The insincerity of friends who help but do not accept 
the pursuit of joy on the part of those they help reveals 
their true motives and will. Other examples follow on pages 
140-142 demonstrating parental responses to the collective 
provisions of society in the interest of handicapped 
children which have the appearance of an insincere will to 
benefit them. 
Anger is the subject of the next section. Here we must 
deal with parental anger as well as with those who may 
precipitate their anger. Let us deal with the anger first. 
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Kant finds the source of moral law in reason as opposed to 
experience. Much anger could be avoided if reason would 
prevail in those moments when parents are confronted with 
thoughtless but well intended remarks of others. 
On the other hand, anger is offered in some of the 
cases presented as a positive force and a tool for parental 
ventilation of feelings that would be destructive if 
internalized. In the examples given on pages 143-145 
conflicts are dealt with through the expression of anger 
which communicates forcefully the needs of families that 
feel backed into a corner emotionally. 
If feelings of anger are destructive and if their 
expression results in contention and the destruction of 
motivation for good will then anger has no justifiable 
place in rational moral rule after the Kantian fashion. The 
pain which is avoided through angry ventilations is not 
resolved although it may seem temporarily salved. Unless 
the individual can deal directly with the cause of the pain 
and ftnd a rational adjustment that does not hinder a good 
will toward self and others then the pain will eventually 
return and with it the anger which has also remained, 
unresolved with its cumulative effects and destructive 
nature. 
Those whose words and behaviors precipitate the angry 
reactions of parents may benefit from a reevaluation of 
their good will 
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If their will is truly good then an 
adjustment in its expression will follow their recognition 
of the consequences of their behavior and the perceptions 
of the handicapped child's parents. 
Siblings 
Kant expressly defines parental accountability for the 
rearing of children but he does not name siblings 
specifically in his formula. Certainly siblings are under 
the same moral obligations as fellow citizens would be in 
Kant's proposal for the pursuit of happiness. Nonetheless, 
siblings do play a unique role and are affected in a unique 
manner in the family where a handicapped child is present. 
The sibling of the handicapped child must often grow 
up side by side with the handicapped child. He may be a 
little younger or a little older. In either case his vision 
of himself as a person includes his perception of his 
family which represents his generative development. His 
handicapped sibling is a part of him and wi 11 have a 
profound effect upon him throughout life. This may be a 
blessing if it deepens his perspective and appreciation for 
t h e h e a 1 t h y bod y h e ha s . I t may be a h i n d ran c e i f he s e e s 
himself defective by association. The power of an informed 
and rationally developed good will can go a long way 
towards making a difficult circumstance one that builds 
character and leads to a well adjusted and happy existence. 
Kant does not speak directly to human psychology in 
the sense that this field is appreciated today. 
Nonetheless, the behaviors he suggests as rational for 
productive human association based upon his concepts of 
right or true principles could easily be incorporated into 
a prescription for good psychological adjustment in the 
fashion of today's thinking. The idea of promoting a 
positive self-image of the sibling of a handicapped child 
and the understanding approach of parents who are 
considerate of all of their children's emotional needs are 
in harmony with a Kantian approach to human affairs. 
It is also arguable that Kant's offerings to 
principles of human relations are too theoretical and not 
easily formulated into practical applications and specific 
behaviors. Because his principles are so general in nature 
and revolve around basic concepts of living "only on that 
maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law," it is not difficult to 
formulate almost any reasonable approach to human 
relations, family law, or even educational and medical 
ethics in such a way that one could declare them "Kantian." 
It appears that Kant sought to find those universal 
laws which, through rational understanding, guide man to 
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his most fulfilling self, i.e. happiness. To be worthy of 
happiness is Kant's declared goal and he suggests that this 
is what all of us should strive for. But happiness is not 
defined and thus it is left to each individual to exercise 
that agency which Kant declares should be theirs by natural 
right and discover "true" happiness. Jn a pluralistic and 
tolerant society this is acceptable. Each individual is 
free to choose what constitutes for him "happiness." But it 
is likely that Kant had in mind a universally "real" 
happiness which each individual should have the agency to 
discover. The criteria for worthiness for that happiness 
were determined by universal truths and immutable laws for 
Kant. 
Whatever the area of conflict we may examine, the 
resolution of that conflict requires the application of 
certain basic principles which are based upon universal 
truths. To whatever degree these truths are lacking, 
misunderstood or perverted, to that degree the resolution 
is retarded. The sibling, for example, who lacks good will 
toward himself or his handicapped brother cannot obtain 
happiness and freedom from the conflicts within him or 
between him and others in his family. This way of thinking 
is in stark contrast to the psychological approach that 
places the individual outside of the locus of control and, 
at Jeast partially, estranged from the formulation of his 
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will. Environmental influences, the ecology of society, the 
control of the circumstances all "impact upon" the 
individual, and agency is, in a certain sense, compromised. 
in this psychological approach. It is doubtful that Kant 
would have accepted as much compromise of human agency as 
modern psychology allows for. 
Certainly the circumstances described in the cases 
presented in this dissertation present dilemmas far beyond 
what was routine in the community of Kant's Koenigsburg. 
Nonetheless. if the principles he expresses are true, their 
value should be universally beneficial in any community in 
any age. 
Discrimination 
On page 162 attention is turned to conflicts that have 
been addressed in case law between parents of handicapped 
children and society. The cases presented revolve around 
the issue of discrimination when minority handicapped 
children appeared to receive a different level of services 
than other children. 
The root problem here seems to be the consideration of 
people's needs on the basis of their association with some 
identifiable group, i.e. sKin color, language, cultural 
background, socioeconomic status, etc. rather than an 
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approach based upon an assessment of the individual. Even 
when measures were taken specifically to remediate the 
discriminations of the past and provide assurances for fair 
and equal treatment for all through racial quotas for 
entrance into special education, the result was a 
detrimental denying of services where children had real 
needs because children were being evaluated with their 
group affiliation in mind rather than their individual 
needs. 
From a perspective of Kantian justice there seems to 
be no basis for discrimination on any grounds other than 
real and actual ind iv i dua 1 assessment. If the law an 
individual takes to be his own is only that which he would 
want as universal law for his neighbor, then a regulation 
which discriminates unfairly on the basis of perceived 
differences of no consequence relative to the matter being 
regulated would be inconsistent with fair and equitable 
justice. 
On the other hand, if an individual's orientation was 
what is referred to today as "racist" or. in other words, 
protective of that which is racially, ethnically, or 
linguistically perceived as exclusive to his own group, 
then he might remain in harmony with a Kantian perspective 
if the maxims he accepts and would have as universal for 
all mankind discriminate on the basis of group affiliation 
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rather than individual qualitie~. At the same time such an 
individual would have to accept that a universal policy 
protective of the identity of groups rather than 
individuals could run counter ~o his personal interests if 
he found himself suddenly among members of a group other 
than his own. Here is the con~radiction intrinsic within 
such approaches. If a universal law is protective of group 
identities it must of necessity restrict the rights of 
those who find themselves in an alien group and that new 
group <the set of individuals who find themselves outside 
of their own group) is without protection of any law in its 
interest. Therefore, if a law is truly universal. then it 
cannot be protective of one group any more than another 
just as it cannot be more protective of one individual more 
than any other. 
A dilemma may arise when, by virtue of the universal 
nature of the law and the equal application of maxims, the 
individuality of some may be compromised. Special consider-
ation for individuals with universally recognized special 
needs may seem to run counter to universal equality. None-
theless, without such special considerations, children, who 
are a group with a definite identity (younger age) could 
not receive the special protections they need. This is 
unlike special considerations for groups identified on any 
other basis because children are a part of every group. 
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which exists in perpetuity. Without children there would be 
no continuation of any societal group. Women, as exclusive 
child bearers, may also be connected to this special group 
with some rights beyond what would be universally 
anticipated. 
The comments from parents presented in the section on 
parent-school conflicts all have to do with the central 
theme of societal responsibility for the handicapped. 
Although policies at every level of government in the 
United States reflect an increasing acceptance of 
responsibility for civi inequity among the various 
minorities of our society including the handicapped, each 
group continues to struggle for what they feel is a fair 
approach to their particular circumstances. 
The unique element of the situation posed by 
handicapped children is that they permeate every other 
group in society, be it minority or majority. Every group 
that includes members of childbearing age has the potential 
to have a handicapped child. Even senior citizens who are 
beyond childbearing age are potential grandparents, 
caretakers and familially responsible for the welfare of 
handicapped offspring. 
What should be the duty of the community toward 
handicapped? How, in the name of fair and democratic 
government, should resources be divided and made available 
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to provide for handicapped children and thereby alleviate 
the source of conflict between parents and society. 
Kant places primary responsibility for children in the 
hands of parents. He does not mention specifically any 
societal duties toward children beyond what is universal 
for all. Children are, for Kant, the "possessions'' of their 
parents until they obtain their majority. Parents have 
duties toward children and children have duties toward 
parents, but society outside of the family bears no special 
responsibility toward children. Nonetheless, if society 
should act collectively on the basis of Kant's categorical 
imperative laws could be formulated to provide for the 
division of resources so that the special burdens borne by 
parents of the handicapped in terms of medical costs and 
educational needs could be alleviated. Such provisions of 
the law would only be acceptable from a Kantian 
perspective, if they were universal for all who qualify for 
them. that is, truly have need of them. 
Herein lies, however, another source of conflict. 
Judgements would have to be made as to who deserves special 
consideration and who does not. Society would have to 
define qualifications for being handicapped. Clearly the 
resources of any society are not unlimited and some 
decisions would have to be made as to which children 
qualify for what services. A society that truly did not 
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have the resources to fairly meet the needs of its 
handicapped children would not be found in error, from a 
Kantian view, if the decision was made not to provide any 
special services to handicapped children. In that case, 
parents would be totally responsible to provide whatever a 
child needed beyond what was generally provided by society 
for all children. 
Attitudes of Professional Educators 
On pages 109 through 137 conflicts are discussed which 
arise because of the lack of regard some professionals 
express toward the parents of handicapped children. These 
problems can be generalized as stemming from a lack of 
fairness without prejudice toward others. Educators. like 
many professional, can be protective of their profession 
and the institutions they work in. The are concerned about 
the level of control they have in their work environment 
and often have difficulty managing any exception to what 
they are accustomed to. A child who demands more attention 
because of his slowness to learn or a chi Id who is 
disruptive and threatens the order of the class can usually 
be dealt with by an experienced teacher as long as the 
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chi Id can be viewed in the context of "normal" child. If, 
however, the teacher is offered an alternative diagnosis, 
even if that diagnosis is irrelevant to the educational 
concerns the teacher has for the child (as in the case of a 
physically handicapped child> then an effectual door is 
opened for the teacher to deal with the chi Id as a 
"special" student. The regard for the parent which should 
be equal to the regard the teacher expects to receive from 
the parent is couched in the perspective of the parent as 
also "special" and perhaps not as capable as otherwise 
might be expected of providing "education" for the child. 
There is also the element of the education professional 's 
rescue fantasy which may not only be manifest toward the 
child, but also toward the parent. The educator may want to 
rescue the parent from the burden of concern for the 
child's education. The parent may be viewed as frustrated, 
over anxious, and too much involved in the child's 
education. Many educators do not appreciate parental 
interference in their pupil's education. 
Following the guidance of the categorical imperative 
teachers should ask themselves what they would do if they 
were the parent and the parent were the teacher. 
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Euthanasia and the Handicapped Newborn 
This section addresses issues of society's concern for 
its own identity as more or less tainted by the presence of 
undesirable elements. With medical technology offering 
convenient methods of eliminating unwanted pregnancies and 
unwanted infants because of the defects they present 
possibilities for the pursuit of eugenics are made more 
convenient than ever before. Infanticide through 
deliberate neglect and the abortion of "defective" fetuses 
represent measures that professionals and parents pursue in 
order to avoid the burdens of caring for children who are 
less perfect in appearance or capabilities that what is 
commonly found in society. 
This situation is further aggravated by the inability 
of infants and fetuses to advocate in their own behalf. 
Their citizenship is more easily compromised because they 
have not formed the societal bonds which insure the 
commitment of society for their welfare. If they would be 
perceived by society as citizens with equal rights under 
the law, then they could expect fair and just treatment and 
the protection of the courts. The hope that a government 
ruled on the basis of the categorical imperative and 
offering infants and the unborn the same universal 
privileges as any other individual might enjoy m~st be 
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couched in the recognition that human nature tends to 
prompt the shunning of what 1s unlike perceived norms. To 
kill infants would be understood as murder and mothers like 
Carrie Buck, who was sterilized in order to avoid the 
suspected pollution of the genetic integrity of society, 
would not be subjected to such erroneous prejudices if true 
compassion for the welfare of all on a fair and equal basis 
were the norm in society. 
Suicide 
The final review in this work discusses the area of 
childhood suicide and the rights under the law of children 
who attempt to commit suicide. Because children are, upon 
such action, considered to be emotionally disturbed they 
are necessarily included among those handicapped and 
qualifying for special educational services. The issue 
appears to be one of society's interest in the preservation 
of life versus the rights of individuals to privacy and 
self-determination. An intervening element in this debate 
is the specificity of laws to certain age groups based upon 
the relative ability of members of an age group to look 
after their own welfare. Certain laws are considered 
acceptable in application to one age group and not another. 
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Kant is quite specific in his declaration of the 
parental right to govern the child. However, no parent can 
completely shield a child from knowledge of societal 
promptings. As pointed out in the review on childhood 
suicide, the power of an open debate regarding the 
possibility of a right to self-termination could have a 
devastating impact upon some less stable youth. Parents 
may best apply their energies to the development of 
understanding and communicative bonds with their children 
if they are concerned about their child's vulnerability to 
the influence of debates in society. 
Kant's expressed concept of parental responsibility 
would accept standards in society which are particular to 
age and the level of responsibility manifest by that age. 
Children are, for Kant, parental possessions and, as such, 
also a parental responsibility. 
CHAPTER 8 
EPILOGUE 
This dissertation has reviewed literature relative to 
the conflicts between families and society regarding 
children who require special educational services. Specific 
cases and areas of special concern were then presented. 
These cases offered details of the dilemmas that parents, 
schools, government agencies. courts and other bodies 
representing society's interests face. A philosophical 
perspective based upon some of the writings of Immanuel 
Kant was then provided. With this basic framework for the 
formulation of possible working principles to guide the 
successful working out of the conflicts which arise between 
families and society the situations and concerns presented 
previously were examined with an eye to amelioration 
through a Kantian approach. This is not to suggest that 
Kant had something to offer that would be applicable in 
every case, rather that the fundamental principles Kant 
espoused, if absorbed in the thinking of both parties to 
the conflicts discussed, could offer a vehicle for the 
successful resolution of the conflicts. 
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Problematic to these situations is the reality of 
human judgement and prejudice which is formed very early in 
1 i f e. Beacuse the conflicts discussed are intrinsically 
grounded in emotions, compassion and attitudes, offering 
fundamental philosophical principles as a means of 
relieving conflicts is difficult at best. One cannot 
simply declare that if both sides would have as guiding 
principles of their lives Kant's categorical imperative all 
would be well. Not only will each individual interpret the 
application of that principle in his own way and place 
emphasis on the importance of different values, but such 
principles, to have significant effect upon judgements and 
attitudes, must be a part of the upbringing of individuals 
from their earliest years. Indeed, it is unreasonable to 
expect that such deeply rooted attitudes as the personal 
prejudices and unconscious feelings toward the handicapped 
would be easily affected by the introduction of a 
philosophical perspective such as Kant's. 
Individuals cannot easily assess what their true 
response to certain situations would be without being 
placed in those situations. No matter how benevolent, or 
patient, or fair people may view themselves to be, when the 
moment of truth arrives, when the handicapped newborn comes 
forth in the delivery room, or when a child suffers 
irreversible central nervous system damage, just how a 
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parent will react, no one can predict. Similarly, the roots 
of a professionat•s attitude and expectations run far 
deeper than post secondary learning. A case in point: In 
1978 a nurse who had an exceptional record of service to 
handicapped children gave birth to a child with spina 
bifida. She insisted that the child not be treated, but 
allowed to die by withholding any lifesaving medical 
intervention. In an interview it was discovered that her 
brother had died of complications secondary to spina bifida 
at the age of 20. Caring for him during his life had been a 
draining experience for their mother and there were many 
unresolved feelings about the attentions this sibling had 
received, the effect of his handicap, the odor resulting 
from his incontinence and the nurse's perception of an 
impaired adolescent social life because of the presence of 
the handicapped brother. 
Attitudes about the handicapped, parenting, 
appropriate professional roles, the duties of government 
and educational systems, all reflect societal norms as well 
as individual feelings. These norms and feelings reflect 
the inseparable history of families and of society in 
general. The evolution of American perspectives on 
education, family, and government has not been without 
significant influence from eighteenth century philosophy. 
The writings of Locke, Hobbs, Rousseau, Montesquieu and 
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Kant reflect perspectives that are the product of late 
eighteenth century Romanticism and have left an indelible 
mark on modern society. Integrating of Kantian values into 
American thought could renew the strength of a rational 
sense of fairness. This interaction might provide approach 
to the conflicts that arise between families and the 
agencies of society, based on fundamental principles akin 
to those upon which American government was founded. 
Such principles as may follow from the categorical 
imperative can hardly become a significant part of a 
family's approach to conflicts without the general 
understanding of this approach to human relations among the 
institutions of society. A family with a clear model of 
the parental and societal roles in the education and 
rearing of their children as elucidated by Kant cannot 
truly expect to avoid conflict. Conflicts are inevitable. 
However, with an instrument for thinking through and 
rationally approaching conflicts. solutions can be brought 
about. Such a vehicle is Kant's approach to human 
relations as described in the Fundamental Metaphysics of 
Morals. Not a tool to be taken from the shelf and applied 
to the "fixing" of conflicts, but rather a way of thinking 
which. when part of the warp and woof of individual, 
fami 1 ial, and societal philosophy can offer an 
understanding that transcends the misjudgment that leads to 
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conflict between fami 1 ies and society and through which, 
when the unavoidable conflicts do arise, rational solutions 
can be found which are available to all rational parties. 
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